FKIE_CVE-2018-12702

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2018-06-25 10:29 - Updated: 2026-06-17 01:38
Severity
7.5 (High) - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Summary
The approveAndCallcode function of a smart contract implementation for Globalvillage ecosystem (GVE), an Ethereum ERC20 token, allows attackers to steal assets (e.g., transfer the contract's balances into their account) because the callcode (i.e., _spender.call(_extraData)) is not verified, aka the "evilReflex" issue. NOTE: a PeckShield disclosure states "some researchers have independently discussed the mechanism of such vulnerability."
References
cve@mitre.orghttps://huobiglobal.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/360000110521-HADAX-Suspends-18T-and-GVE-Deposits-and-WithdrawalsThird Party Advisory
cve@mitre.orghttps://peckshield.com/2018/06/23/evilReflex/Exploit, Third Party Advisory
af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108https://huobiglobal.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/360000110521-HADAX-Suspends-18T-and-GVE-Deposits-and-WithdrawalsThird Party Advisory
af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108https://peckshield.com/2018/06/23/evilReflex/Exploit, Third Party Advisory
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
gve globalvillage_ecosystem *
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "n/a",
          "vendor": "n/a",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "n/a"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "cve@mitre.org"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:gve:globalvillage_ecosystem:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "7F095673-3763-463F-A1E8-188518291DAD",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "The approveAndCallcode function of a smart contract implementation for Globalvillage ecosystem (GVE), an Ethereum ERC20 token, allows attackers to steal assets (e.g., transfer the contract\u0027s balances into their account) because the callcode (i.e., _spender.call(_extraData)) is not verified, aka the \"evilReflex\" issue. NOTE: a PeckShield disclosure states \"some researchers have independently discussed the mechanism of such vulnerability.\""
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "La funci\u00f3n approveAndCallcode de una implementaci\u00f3n de contrato inteligente para Globalvillage ecosystem (GVE), un token de Ethereum ERC20, permite que los atacantes roben activos (por ejemplo, transfiriendo el saldo del contrato en su cuenta) debido a que el c\u00f3digo de llamada, como _spender.call(_extraData), no est\u00e1 verificado. Esto tambi\u00e9n se conoce como problema \"evilReflex\". NOTA: un comunicado de PeckShield indica que \"algunos investigadores han discutido de forma independiente el mecanismo de esta vulnerabilidad\"."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2018-12702",
  "lastModified": "2026-06-17T01:38:12.033",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV2": [
      {
        "acInsufInfo": false,
        "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
        "cvssData": {
          "accessComplexity": "LOW",
          "accessVector": "NETWORK",
          "authentication": "NONE",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 5.0,
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL",
          "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N",
          "version": "2.0"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 10.0,
        "impactScore": 2.9,
        "obtainAllPrivilege": false,
        "obtainOtherPrivilege": false,
        "obtainUserPrivilege": false,
        "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
        "type": "Primary",
        "userInteractionRequired": false
      }
    ],
    "cvssMetricV30": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 7.5,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
          "version": "3.0"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
        "type": "Primary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2018-06-25T10:29:00.220",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "cve@mitre.org",
      "tags": [
        "Third Party Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://huobiglobal.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/360000110521-HADAX-Suspends-18T-and-GVE-Deposits-and-Withdrawals"
    },
    {
      "source": "cve@mitre.org",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Third Party Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://peckshield.com/2018/06/23/evilReflex/"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "tags": [
        "Third Party Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://huobiglobal.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/360000110521-HADAX-Suspends-18T-and-GVE-Deposits-and-Withdrawals"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Third Party Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://peckshield.com/2018/06/23/evilReflex/"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "cve@mitre.org",
  "vulnStatus": "Modified",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-20"
        }
      ],
      "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.





Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.