FKIE_CVE-2019-20461

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2024-11-07 21:15 - Updated: 2025-11-04 18:15
Severity ?
9.8 (Critical) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
An issue was discovered on Alecto IVM-100 2019-11-12 devices. The device uses a custom UDP protocol to start and control video and audio services. The protocol has been partially reverse engineered. Based upon the reverse engineering, no password or username is ever transferred over this protocol. Thus, one can set up the camera connection feed with only the encoded UID. It is possible to set up sessions with the camera over the Internet by using the encoded UID and the custom UDP protocol, because authentication happens at the client side.
References
cve@mitre.orghttps://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2024/Jul/14
cve@mitre.orghttps://www.alecto.nl
af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2024/Jul/14
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "An issue was discovered on Alecto IVM-100 2019-11-12 devices. The device uses a custom UDP protocol to start and control video and audio services. The protocol has been partially reverse engineered. Based upon the reverse engineering, no password or username is ever transferred over this protocol. Thus, one can set up the camera connection feed with only the encoded UID. It is possible to set up sessions with the camera over the Internet by using the encoded UID and the custom UDP protocol, because authentication happens at the client side."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "Se descubri\u00f3 un problema en los dispositivos Alecto IVM-100 2019-11-12. El dispositivo utiliza un protocolo UDP personalizado para iniciar y controlar los servicios de video y audio. El protocolo ha sido parcialmente dise\u00f1ado a la inversa. En base a la ingenier\u00eda inversa, nunca se transfiere ninguna contrase\u00f1a o nombre de usuario a trav\u00e9s de este protocolo. Por lo tanto, se puede configurar la transmisi\u00f3n de conexi\u00f3n de la c\u00e1mara solo con el UID codificado. Es posible configurar sesiones con la c\u00e1mara a trav\u00e9s de Internet utilizando el UID codificado y el protocolo UDP personalizado, porque la autenticaci\u00f3n se realiza en el lado del cliente."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2019-20461",
  "lastModified": "2025-11-04T18:15:37.663",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 9.8,
          "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2024-11-07T21:15:05.400",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "cve@mitre.org",
      "url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2024/Jul/14"
    },
    {
      "source": "cve@mitre.org",
      "url": "https://www.alecto.nl"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2024/Jul/14"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "cve@mitre.org",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-295"
        }
      ],
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}


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