FKIE_CVE-2022-50731

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-12-24 13:15 - Updated: 2025-12-24 13:15
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: akcipher - default implementation for setting a private key Changes from v1: * removed the default implementation from set_pub_key: it is assumed that an implementation must always have this callback defined as there are no use case for an algorithm, which doesn't need a public key Many akcipher implementations (like ECDSA) support only signature verifications, so they don't have all callbacks defined. Commit 78a0324f4a53 ("crypto: akcipher - default implementations for request callbacks") introduced default callbacks for sign/verify operations, which just return an error code. However, these are not enough, because before calling sign the caller would likely call set_priv_key first on the instantiated transform (as the in-kernel testmgr does). This function does not have a default stub, so the kernel crashes, when trying to set a private key on an akcipher, which doesn't support signature generation. I've noticed this, when trying to add a KAT vector for ECDSA signature to the testmgr. With this patch the testmgr returns an error in dmesg (as it should) instead of crashing the kernel NULL ptr dereference.
Impacted products
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{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncrypto: akcipher - default implementation for setting a private key\n\nChanges from v1:\n  * removed the default implementation from set_pub_key: it is assumed that\n    an implementation must always have this callback defined as there are\n    no use case for an algorithm, which doesn\u0027t need a public key\n\nMany akcipher implementations (like ECDSA) support only signature\nverifications, so they don\u0027t have all callbacks defined.\n\nCommit 78a0324f4a53 (\"crypto: akcipher - default implementations for\nrequest callbacks\") introduced default callbacks for sign/verify\noperations, which just return an error code.\n\nHowever, these are not enough, because before calling sign the caller would\nlikely call set_priv_key first on the instantiated transform (as the\nin-kernel testmgr does). This function does not have a default stub, so the\nkernel crashes, when trying to set a private key on an akcipher, which\ndoesn\u0027t support signature generation.\n\nI\u0027ve noticed this, when trying to add a KAT vector for ECDSA signature to\nthe testmgr.\n\nWith this patch the testmgr returns an error in dmesg (as it should)\ninstead of crashing the kernel NULL ptr dereference."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2022-50731",
  "lastModified": "2025-12-24T13:15:59.770",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2025-12-24T13:15:59.770",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/779a9930f3e152c82699feb389a0e6d6644e747e"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/85bc736a18b872f54912e8bb70682d11770aece0"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/95c4e20adc3ea00d1594a2a05d9b187ed12ffa8e"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a1354bdd191d533211b7cb723aa76a66f516f197"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bc155c6c188c2f0c5749993b1405673d25a80389"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f9058178597059d6307efe96a7916600f8ede08c"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}


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