FKIE_CVE-2023-53778

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-12-09 01:16 - Updated: 2025-12-09 18:37
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/qaic: Clean up integer overflow checking in map_user_pages() The encode_dma() function has some validation on in_trans->size but it would be more clear to move those checks to find_and_map_user_pages(). The encode_dma() had two checks: if (in_trans->addr + in_trans->size < in_trans->addr || !in_trans->size) return -EINVAL; The in_trans->addr variable is the starting address. The in_trans->size variable is the total size of the transfer. The transfer can occur in parts and the resources->xferred_dma_size tracks how many bytes we have already transferred. This patch introduces a new variable "remaining" which represents the amount we want to transfer (in_trans->size) minus the amount we have already transferred (resources->xferred_dma_size). I have modified the check for if in_trans->size is zero to instead check if in_trans->size is less than resources->xferred_dma_size. If we have already transferred more bytes than in_trans->size then there are negative bytes remaining which doesn't make sense. If there are zero bytes remaining to be copied, just return success. The check in encode_dma() checked that "addr + size" could not overflow and barring a driver bug that should work, but it's easier to check if we do this in parts. First check that "in_trans->addr + resources->xferred_dma_size" is safe. Then check that "xfer_start_addr + remaining" is safe. My final concern was that we are dealing with u64 values but on 32bit systems the kmalloc() function will truncate the sizes to 32 bits. So I calculated "total = in_trans->size + offset_in_page(xfer_start_addr);" and returned -EINVAL if it were >= SIZE_MAX. This will not affect 64bit systems.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/96d3c1cadedb6ae2e8965e19cd12caa244afbd9c
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d410a96e5cb8c1ec7049c83f2edcd8bbfaf5d9b3
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
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{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\naccel/qaic: Clean up integer overflow checking in map_user_pages()\n\nThe encode_dma() function has some validation on in_trans-\u003esize but it\nwould be more clear to move those checks to find_and_map_user_pages().\n\nThe encode_dma() had two checks:\n\n\tif (in_trans-\u003eaddr + in_trans-\u003esize \u003c in_trans-\u003eaddr || !in_trans-\u003esize)\n\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n\nThe in_trans-\u003eaddr variable is the starting address.  The in_trans-\u003esize\nvariable is the total size of the transfer.  The transfer can occur in\nparts and the resources-\u003exferred_dma_size tracks how many bytes we have\nalready transferred.\n\nThis patch introduces a new variable \"remaining\" which represents the\namount we want to transfer (in_trans-\u003esize) minus the amount we have\nalready transferred (resources-\u003exferred_dma_size).\n\nI have modified the check for if in_trans-\u003esize is zero to instead check\nif in_trans-\u003esize is less than resources-\u003exferred_dma_size.  If we have\nalready transferred more bytes than in_trans-\u003esize then there are negative\nbytes remaining which doesn\u0027t make sense.  If there are zero bytes\nremaining to be copied, just return success.\n\nThe check in encode_dma() checked that \"addr + size\" could not overflow\nand barring a driver bug that should work, but it\u0027s easier to check if\nwe do this in parts.  First check that \"in_trans-\u003eaddr +\nresources-\u003exferred_dma_size\" is safe.  Then check that \"xfer_start_addr +\nremaining\" is safe.\n\nMy final concern was that we are dealing with u64 values but on 32bit\nsystems the kmalloc() function will truncate the sizes to 32 bits.  So\nI calculated \"total = in_trans-\u003esize + offset_in_page(xfer_start_addr);\"\nand returned -EINVAL if it were \u003e= SIZE_MAX.  This will not affect 64bit\nsystems."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2023-53778",
  "lastModified": "2025-12-09T18:37:13.640",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2025-12-09T01:16:48.887",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/96d3c1cadedb6ae2e8965e19cd12caa244afbd9c"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d410a96e5cb8c1ec7049c83f2edcd8bbfaf5d9b3"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}


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