FKIE_CVE-2023-53823

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-12-09 16:17 - Updated: 2025-12-09 18:37
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: block/rq_qos: protect rq_qos apis with a new lock commit 50e34d78815e ("block: disable the elevator int del_gendisk") move rq_qos_exit() from disk_release() to del_gendisk(), this will introduce some problems: 1) If rq_qos_add() is triggered by enabling iocost/iolatency through cgroupfs, then it can concurrent with del_gendisk(), it's not safe to write 'q->rq_qos' concurrently. 2) Activate cgroup policy that is relied on rq_qos will call rq_qos_add() and blkcg_activate_policy(), and if rq_qos_exit() is called in the middle, null-ptr-dereference will be triggered in blkcg_activate_policy(). 3) blkg_conf_open_bdev() can call blkdev_get_no_open() first to find the disk, then if rq_qos_exit() from del_gendisk() is done before rq_qos_add(), then memory will be leaked. This patch add a new disk level mutex 'rq_qos_mutex': 1) The lock will protect rq_qos_exit() directly. 2) For wbt that doesn't relied on blk-cgroup, rq_qos_add() can only be called from disk initialization for now because wbt can't be destructed until rq_qos_exit(), so it's safe not to protect wbt for now. Hoever, in case that rq_qos dynamically destruction is supported in the furture, this patch also protect rq_qos_add() from wbt_init() directly, this is enough because blk-sysfs already synchronize writers with disk removal. 3) For iocost and iolatency, in order to synchronize disk removal and cgroup configuration, the lock is held after blkdev_get_no_open() from blkg_conf_open_bdev(), and is released in blkg_conf_exit(). In order to fix the above memory leak, disk_live() is checked after holding the new lock.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/16398b4638b5cd8c1dc95fc940a1591a801d53ce
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a13bd91be22318768d55470cbc0b0f4488ef9edf
Impacted products
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{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nblock/rq_qos: protect rq_qos apis with a new lock\n\ncommit 50e34d78815e (\"block: disable the elevator int del_gendisk\")\nmove rq_qos_exit() from disk_release() to del_gendisk(), this will\nintroduce some problems:\n\n1) If rq_qos_add() is triggered by enabling iocost/iolatency through\n   cgroupfs, then it can concurrent with del_gendisk(), it\u0027s not safe to\n   write \u0027q-\u003erq_qos\u0027 concurrently.\n\n2) Activate cgroup policy that is relied on rq_qos will call\n   rq_qos_add() and blkcg_activate_policy(), and if rq_qos_exit() is\n   called in the middle, null-ptr-dereference will be triggered in\n   blkcg_activate_policy().\n\n3) blkg_conf_open_bdev() can call blkdev_get_no_open() first to find the\n   disk, then if rq_qos_exit() from del_gendisk() is done before\n   rq_qos_add(), then memory will be leaked.\n\nThis patch add a new disk level mutex \u0027rq_qos_mutex\u0027:\n\n1) The lock will protect rq_qos_exit() directly.\n\n2) For wbt that doesn\u0027t relied on blk-cgroup, rq_qos_add() can only be\n   called from disk initialization for now because wbt can\u0027t be\n   destructed until rq_qos_exit(), so it\u0027s safe not to protect wbt for\n   now. Hoever, in case that rq_qos dynamically destruction is supported\n   in the furture, this patch also protect rq_qos_add() from wbt_init()\n   directly, this is enough because blk-sysfs already synchronize\n   writers with disk removal.\n\n3) For iocost and iolatency, in order to synchronize disk removal and\n   cgroup configuration, the lock is held after blkdev_get_no_open()\n   from blkg_conf_open_bdev(), and is released in blkg_conf_exit().\n   In order to fix the above memory leak, disk_live() is checked after\n   holding the new lock."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2023-53823",
  "lastModified": "2025-12-09T18:37:13.640",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2025-12-09T16:17:21.107",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/16398b4638b5cd8c1dc95fc940a1591a801d53ce"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a13bd91be22318768d55470cbc0b0f4488ef9edf"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}


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