FKIE_CVE-2024-7346

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2024-09-03 15:15 - Updated: 2024-09-05 14:03
Severity ?
7.2 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
4.8 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Summary
Host name validation for TLS certificates is bypassed when the installed OpenEdge default certificates are used to perform the TLS handshake for a networked connection.  This has been corrected so that default certificates are no longer capable of overriding host name validation and will need to be replaced where full TLS certificate validation is needed for network security.  The existing certificates should be replaced with CA-signed certificates from a recognized certificate authority that contain the necessary information to support host name validation.
References
security@progress.comhttps://community.progress.com/s/article/Client-connections-using-default-TLS-certificates-from-OpenEdge-may-bypass-TLS-host-name-validationMitigation, Vendor Advisory
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
progress openedge *
progress openedge *
To clipboard 

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              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:progress:openedge:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "148C3BEA-FD57-492F-9214-38FF9C128B67",
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      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Host name validation for TLS certificates is bypassed when the installed OpenEdge default certificates are used to perform the TLS handshake for a networked connection.\u00a0 This has been corrected so that default certificates are no longer capable of overriding host name validation and will need to be replaced where full TLS certificate validation is needed for network security.\u00a0 The existing certificates should be replaced with CA-signed certificates from a recognized certificate authority that contain the necessary information to support host name validation."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "La validaci\u00f3n del nombre de host para los certificados TLS se omite cuando se utilizan los certificados predeterminados de OpenEdge instalados para realizar el protocolo de enlace TLS para una conexi\u00f3n en red. Esto se ha corregido para que los certificados predeterminados ya no puedan anular la validaci\u00f3n del nombre de host y deban reemplazarse cuando se necesite una validaci\u00f3n completa del certificado TLS para la seguridad de la red. Los certificados existentes deben reemplazarse con certificados firmados por una autoridad de certificaci\u00f3n reconocida que contengan la informaci\u00f3n necesaria para admitir la validaci\u00f3n del nombre de host."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2024-7346",
  "lastModified": "2024-09-05T14:03:24.040",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
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        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
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          "baseScore": 7.2,
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  "published": "2024-09-03T15:15:16.913",
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