FKIE_CVE-2025-46720
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-05-05 19:15 - Updated: 2025-09-19 19:53
Severity ?
3.1 (Low) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
4.3 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
4.3 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Summary
Keystone is a content management system for Node.js. Prior to version 6.5.0, `{field}.isFilterable` access control can be bypassed in `update` and `delete` mutations by adding additional unique filters. These filters can be used as an oracle to probe the existence or value of otherwise unreadable fields. Specifically, when a mutation includes a `where` clause with multiple unique filters (e.g. `id` and `email`), Keystone will attempt to match records even if filtering by the latter fields would normally be rejected by `field.isFilterable` or `list.defaultIsFilterable`. This can allow malicious actors to infer the presence of a particular field value when a filter is successful in returning a result. This affects any project relying on the default or dynamic `isFilterable` behavior (at the list or field level) to prevent external users from using the filtering of fields as a discovery mechanism. While this access control is respected during `findMany` operations, it was not completely enforced during `update` and `delete` mutations when accepting more than one unique `where` values in filters. This has no impact on projects using `isFilterable: false` or `defaultIsFilterable: false` for sensitive fields, or for those who have otherwise omitted filtering by these fields from their GraphQL schema. This issue has been patched in `@keystone-6/core` version 6.5.0. To mitigate this issue in older versions where patching is not a viable pathway, set `isFilterable: false` statically for relevant fields to prevent filtering by them earlier in the access control pipeline (that is, don't use functions); set `{field}.graphql.omit.read: true` for relevant fields, which implicitly removes filtering by these fields from the GraphQL schema; and/or deny `update` and `delete` operations for the relevant lists completely.
References
| URL | Tags | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| security-advisories@github.com | https://github.com/keystonejs/keystone/security/advisories/GHSA-hg9m-67mm-7pg3 | Mitigation, Vendor Advisory |
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| keystonejs | keystone | * |
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"configurations": [
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"nodes": [
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"descriptions": [
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"lang": "en",
"value": "Keystone is a content management system for Node.js. Prior to version 6.5.0, `{field}.isFilterable` access control can be bypassed in `update` and `delete` mutations by adding additional unique filters. These filters can be used as an oracle to probe the existence or value of otherwise unreadable fields. Specifically, when a mutation includes a `where` clause with multiple unique filters (e.g. `id` and `email`), Keystone will attempt to match records even if filtering by the latter fields would normally be rejected by `field.isFilterable` or `list.defaultIsFilterable`. This can allow malicious actors to infer the presence of a particular field value when a filter is successful in returning a result. This affects any project relying on the default or dynamic `isFilterable` behavior (at the list or field level) to prevent external users from using the filtering of fields as a discovery mechanism. While this access control is respected during `findMany` operations, it was not completely enforced during `update` and `delete` mutations when accepting more than one unique `where` values in filters. This has no impact on projects using `isFilterable: false` or `defaultIsFilterable: false` for sensitive fields, or for those who have otherwise omitted filtering by these fields from their GraphQL schema. This issue has been patched in `@keystone-6/core` version 6.5.0. To mitigate this issue in older versions where patching is not a viable pathway, set `isFilterable: false` statically for relevant fields to prevent filtering by them earlier in the access control pipeline (that is, don\u0027t use functions); set `{field}.graphql.omit.read: true` for relevant fields, which implicitly removes filtering by these fields from the GraphQL schema; and/or deny `update` and `delete` operations for the relevant lists completely."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Keystone es un sistema de gesti\u00f3n de contenido para Node.js. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 6.5.0, el control de acceso `{field}.isFilterable` se pod\u00eda omitir en las mutaciones `update` y `delete` a\u00f1adiendo filtros \u00fanicos adicionales. Estos filtros se pueden usar como un or\u00e1culo para sondear la existencia o el valor de campos que de otro modo ser\u00edan ilegibles. Espec\u00edficamente, cuando una mutaci\u00f3n incluye una cl\u00e1usula `where` con m\u00faltiples filtros \u00fanicos (p. ej., `id` y `email`), Keystone intentar\u00e1 encontrar coincidencias en los registros incluso si el filtrado por estos \u00faltimos campos normalmente ser\u00eda rechazado por `field.isFilterable` o `list.defaultIsFilterable`. Esto puede permitir que actores maliciosos infieran la presencia de un valor de campo espec\u00edfico cuando un filtro devuelve un resultado correctamente. Esto afecta a cualquier proyecto que dependa del comportamiento predeterminado o din\u00e1mico de `isFilterable` (a nivel de lista o campo) para evitar que usuarios externos utilicen el filtrado de campos como mecanismo de descubrimiento. Aunque este control de acceso se respeta durante las operaciones `findMany`, no se aplic\u00f3 completamente durante las mutaciones `update` y `delete` al aceptar m\u00e1s de un valor `where` \u00fanico en los filtros. Esto no tiene impacto en los proyectos que usan `isFilterable: false` o `defaultIsFilterable: false` para campos sensibles, o para aquellos que de otra manera han omitido el filtrado por estos campos de su esquema GraphQL. Este problema se ha corregido en `@keystone-6/core` versi\u00f3n 6.5.0. Para mitigar este problema en versiones anteriores donde la aplicaci\u00f3n de parches no es una ruta viable, configure `isFilterable: false` est\u00e1ticamente para los campos relevantes para evitar el filtrado por ellos anteriormente en el flujo de trabajo de control de acceso (es decir, no use funciones); configure `{field}.graphql.omit.read: true` para los campos relevantes, lo que impl\u00edcitamente elimina el filtrado por estos campos del esquema GraphQL; y/o deniegue las operaciones `update` y `delete` para las listas relevantes por completo."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-46720",
"lastModified": "2025-09-19T19:53:56.810",
"metrics": {
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"cvssData": {
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"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 3.1,
"baseSeverity": "LOW",
"confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
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"impactScore": 1.4,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
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"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
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"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
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"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 1.4,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
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"published": "2025-05-05T19:15:57.330",
"references": [
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"tags": [
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"url": "https://github.com/keystonejs/keystone/security/advisories/GHSA-hg9m-67mm-7pg3"
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"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
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"value": "CWE-200"
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"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
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"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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