FKIE_CVE-2025-51726
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-08-04 21:15 - Updated: 2025-08-05 14:34
Severity ?
Summary
CyberGhostVPNSetup.exe (Windows installer) is signed using the weak cryptographic hash algorithm SHA-1, which is vulnerable to collision attacks. This allows a malicious actor to craft a fake installer with a forged SHA-1 certificate that may still be accepted by Windows signature verification mechanisms, particularly on systems without strict SmartScreen or trust policy enforcement. Additionally, the installer lacks High Entropy Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), as confirmed by BinSkim (BA2015 rule) and repeated WinDbg analysis. The binary consistently loads into predictable memory ranges, increasing the success rate of memory corruption exploits. These two misconfigurations, when combined, significantly lower the bar for successful supply-chain style attacks or privilege escalation through fake installers.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CyberGhostVPNSetup.exe (Windows installer) is signed using the weak cryptographic hash algorithm SHA-1, which is vulnerable to collision attacks. This allows a malicious actor to craft a fake installer with a forged SHA-1 certificate that may still be accepted by Windows signature verification mechanisms, particularly on systems without strict SmartScreen or trust policy enforcement. Additionally, the installer lacks High Entropy Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), as confirmed by BinSkim (BA2015 rule) and repeated WinDbg analysis. The binary consistently loads into predictable memory ranges, increasing the success rate of memory corruption exploits. These two misconfigurations, when combined, significantly lower the bar for successful supply-chain style attacks or privilege escalation through fake installers."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "CyberGhostVPNSetup.exe (instalador de Windows) est\u00e1 firmado con el d\u00e9bil algoritmo hash criptogr\u00e1fico SHA-1, vulnerable a ataques de colisi\u00f3n. Esto permite a un atacante manipular un instalador falso con un certificado SHA-1 falsificado que a\u00fan podr\u00eda ser aceptado por los mecanismos de verificaci\u00f3n de firmas de Windows, especialmente en sistemas sin una aplicaci\u00f3n estricta de SmartScreen o pol\u00edticas de confianza. Adem\u00e1s, el instalador carece de Aleatorizaci\u00f3n de Dise\u00f1o de Espacio de Direcciones de Alta Entrop\u00eda (ASLR), como lo confirman BinSkim (regla BA2015) y repetidos an\u00e1lisis de WinDbg. El archivo binario se carga constantemente en rangos de memoria predecibles, lo que aumenta la tasa de \u00e9xito de los exploits de corrupci\u00f3n de memoria. Estas dos configuraciones err\u00f3neas, al combinarse, reducen significativamente el \u00e9xito de los ataques de cadena de suministro o la escalada de privilegios mediante instaladores falsos."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-51726",
"lastModified": "2025-08-05T14:34:17.327",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.4,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.5,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2025-08-04T21:15:30.653",
"references": [
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"url": "https://github.com/meisterlos/CVE"
},
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"url": "https://github.com/meisterlos/CVE-2025-51726"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "cve@mitre.org",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-327"
}
],
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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