FKIE_CVE-2025-53104

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-07-01 19:15 - Updated: 2025-07-03 15:14
Severity ?
9.1 (Critical) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Summary
gluestack-ui is a library of copy-pasteable components & patterns crafted with Tailwind CSS (NativeWind). Prior to commit e6b4271, a command injection vulnerability was discovered in the discussion-to-slack.yml GitHub Actions workflow. Untrusted discussion fields (title, body, etc.) were directly interpolated into shell commands in a run: block. An attacker could craft a malicious GitHub Discussion title or body (e.g., $(curl ...)) to execute arbitrary shell commands on the Actions runner. This issue has been fixed in commit e6b4271 where the discussion-to-slack.yml workflow was removed. Users should remove the discussion-to-slack.yml workflow if using a fork or derivative of this repository.
References
security-advisories@github.comhttps://github.com/gluestack/gluestack-ui/commit/e6b427150b35e97a089ea10409de8c5c52f8a7b9
security-advisories@github.comhttps://github.com/gluestack/gluestack-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-432r-9455-7f9x
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "gluestack-ui is a library of copy-pasteable components \u0026 patterns crafted with Tailwind CSS (NativeWind). Prior to commit e6b4271, a command injection vulnerability was discovered in the discussion-to-slack.yml GitHub Actions workflow. Untrusted discussion fields (title, body, etc.) were directly interpolated into shell commands in a run: block. An attacker could craft a malicious GitHub Discussion title or body (e.g., $(curl ...)) to execute arbitrary shell commands on the Actions runner. This issue has been fixed in commit e6b4271 where the discussion-to-slack.yml workflow was removed. Users should remove the discussion-to-slack.yml workflow if using a fork or derivative of this repository."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "Gluestack-ui es una librer\u00eda de componentes y patrones copiables y pegables, manipulada con Tailwind CSS (NativeWind). Antes del commit e6b4271, se descubri\u00f3 una vulnerabilidad de inyecci\u00f3n de comandos en el flujo de trabajo de GitHub Actions, que convierte la discusi\u00f3n en slack.yml. Campos de discusi\u00f3n no confiables (t\u00edtulo, cuerpo, etc.) se interpolaban directamente en comandos de shell en un bloque `run:`. Un atacante podr\u00eda crear un t\u00edtulo o cuerpo malicioso de discusi\u00f3n de GitHub (p. ej., $(curl ...)) para ejecutar comandos de shell arbitrarios en el ejecutor de acciones. Este problema se solucion\u00f3 en el commit e6b4271, donde se elimin\u00f3 el flujo de trabajo `discussion-to-slack.yml`. Los usuarios deben eliminar el flujo de trabajo `discussion-to-slack.yml` si utilizan una bifurcaci\u00f3n o un derivado de este repositorio."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2025-53104",
  "lastModified": "2025-07-03T15:14:12.767",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 9.1,
          "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 5.2,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2025-07-01T19:15:27.800",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/gluestack/gluestack-ui/commit/e6b427150b35e97a089ea10409de8c5c52f8a7b9"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/gluestack/gluestack-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-432r-9455-7f9x"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-77"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}


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  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.



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