FKIE_CVE-2026-22977

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-01-21 14:16 - Updated: 2026-01-21 14:16
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: sock: fix hardened usercopy panic in sock_recv_errqueue skbuff_fclone_cache was created without defining a usercopy region, [1] unlike skbuff_head_cache which properly whitelists the cb[] field. [2] This causes a usercopy BUG() when CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled and the kernel attempts to copy sk_buff.cb data to userspace via sock_recv_errqueue() -> put_cmsg(). The crash occurs when: 1. TCP allocates an skb using alloc_skb_fclone() (from skbuff_fclone_cache) [1] 2. The skb is cloned via skb_clone() using the pre-allocated fclone [3] 3. The cloned skb is queued to sk_error_queue for timestamp reporting 4. Userspace reads the error queue via recvmsg(MSG_ERRQUEUE) 5. sock_recv_errqueue() calls put_cmsg() to copy serr->ee from skb->cb [4] 6. __check_heap_object() fails because skbuff_fclone_cache has no usercopy whitelist [5] When cloned skbs allocated from skbuff_fclone_cache are used in the socket error queue, accessing the sock_exterr_skb structure in skb->cb via put_cmsg() triggers a usercopy hardening violation: [ 5.379589] usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLUB object 'skbuff_fclone_cache' (offset 296, size 16)! [ 5.382796] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102! [ 5.383923] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 5.384903] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 138 Comm: poc_put_cmsg Not tainted 6.12.57 #7 [ 5.384903] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 5.384903] RIP: 0010:usercopy_abort+0x6c/0x80 [ 5.384903] Code: 1a 86 51 48 c7 c2 40 15 1a 86 41 52 48 c7 c7 c0 15 1a 86 48 0f 45 d6 48 c7 c6 80 15 1a 86 48 89 c1 49 0f 45 f3 e8 84 27 88 ff <0f> 0b 490 [ 5.384903] RSP: 0018:ffffc900006f77a8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 5.384903] RAX: 000000000000006f RBX: ffff88800f0ad2a8 RCX: 1ffffffff0f72e74 [ 5.384903] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff87b973a0 [ 5.384903] RBP: 0000000000000010 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff0f72e74 [ 5.384903] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 79706f6372657375 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 5.384903] R13: ffff88800f0ad2b8 R14: ffffea00003c2b40 R15: ffffea00003c2b00 [ 5.384903] FS: 0000000011bc4380(0000) GS:ffff8880bf100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 5.384903] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 5.384903] CR2: 000056aa3b8e5fe4 CR3: 000000000ea26004 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 [ 5.384903] PKRU: 55555554 [ 5.384903] Call Trace: [ 5.384903] <TASK> [ 5.384903] __check_heap_object+0x9a/0xd0 [ 5.384903] __check_object_size+0x46c/0x690 [ 5.384903] put_cmsg+0x129/0x5e0 [ 5.384903] sock_recv_errqueue+0x22f/0x380 [ 5.384903] tls_sw_recvmsg+0x7ed/0x1960 [ 5.384903] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 5.384903] ? schedule+0x6d/0x270 [ 5.384903] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 5.384903] ? mutex_unlock+0x81/0xd0 [ 5.384903] ? __pfx_mutex_unlock+0x10/0x10 [ 5.384903] ? __pfx_tls_sw_recvmsg+0x10/0x10 [ 5.384903] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x8f/0xf0 [ 5.384903] ? _raw_read_unlock_irqrestore+0x20/0x40 [ 5.384903] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 The crash offset 296 corresponds to skb2->cb within skbuff_fclones: - sizeof(struct sk_buff) = 232 - offsetof(struct sk_buff, cb) = 40 - offset of skb2.cb in fclones = 232 + 40 = 272 - crash offset 296 = 272 + 24 (inside sock_exterr_skb.ee) This patch uses a local stack variable as a bounce buffer to avoid the hardened usercopy check failure. [1] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/net/ipv4/tcp.c#L885 [2] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/net/core/skbuff.c#L5104 [3] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/net/core/skbuff.c#L5566 [4] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/net/core/skbuff.c#L5491 [5] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/mm/slub.c#L5719
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/005671c60fcf1dbdb8bddf12a62568fd5e4ec391
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2a71a1a8d0ed718b1c7a9ac61f07e5755c47ae20
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/582a5e922a9652fcbb7d0165c95d5b20aa37575d
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/88dd6be7ebb3153b662c2cebcb06e032a92857f5
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8c6901aa29626e35045130bac09b75f791acca85
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c655d2167bf014d4c61b4faeca59b60ff9b9f6b1
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e00b169eaac5f7cdbf710c354c8fa76d02009115
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: sock: fix hardened usercopy panic in sock_recv_errqueue\n\nskbuff_fclone_cache was created without defining a usercopy region,\n[1] unlike skbuff_head_cache which properly whitelists the cb[] field.\n[2] This causes a usercopy BUG() when CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is\nenabled and the kernel attempts to copy sk_buff.cb data to userspace\nvia sock_recv_errqueue() -\u003e put_cmsg().\n\nThe crash occurs when: 1. TCP allocates an skb using alloc_skb_fclone()\n   (from skbuff_fclone_cache) [1]\n2. The skb is cloned via skb_clone() using the pre-allocated fclone\n[3] 3. The cloned skb is queued to sk_error_queue for timestamp\nreporting 4. Userspace reads the error queue via recvmsg(MSG_ERRQUEUE)\n5. sock_recv_errqueue() calls put_cmsg() to copy serr-\u003eee from skb-\u003ecb\n[4] 6. __check_heap_object() fails because skbuff_fclone_cache has no\n   usercopy whitelist [5]\n\nWhen cloned skbs allocated from skbuff_fclone_cache are used in the\nsocket error queue, accessing the sock_exterr_skb structure in skb-\u003ecb\nvia put_cmsg() triggers a usercopy hardening violation:\n\n[    5.379589] usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLUB object \u0027skbuff_fclone_cache\u0027 (offset 296, size 16)!\n[    5.382796] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!\n[    5.383923] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI\n[    5.384903] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 138 Comm: poc_put_cmsg Not tainted 6.12.57 #7\n[    5.384903] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014\n[    5.384903] RIP: 0010:usercopy_abort+0x6c/0x80\n[    5.384903] Code: 1a 86 51 48 c7 c2 40 15 1a 86 41 52 48 c7 c7 c0 15 1a 86 48 0f 45 d6 48 c7 c6 80 15 1a 86 48 89 c1 49 0f 45 f3 e8 84 27 88 ff \u003c0f\u003e 0b 490\n[    5.384903] RSP: 0018:ffffc900006f77a8 EFLAGS: 00010246\n[    5.384903] RAX: 000000000000006f RBX: ffff88800f0ad2a8 RCX: 1ffffffff0f72e74\n[    5.384903] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff87b973a0\n[    5.384903] RBP: 0000000000000010 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff0f72e74\n[    5.384903] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 79706f6372657375 R12: 0000000000000001\n[    5.384903] R13: ffff88800f0ad2b8 R14: ffffea00003c2b40 R15: ffffea00003c2b00\n[    5.384903] FS:  0000000011bc4380(0000) GS:ffff8880bf100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n[    5.384903] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n[    5.384903] CR2: 000056aa3b8e5fe4 CR3: 000000000ea26004 CR4: 0000000000770ef0\n[    5.384903] PKRU: 55555554\n[    5.384903] Call Trace:\n[    5.384903]  \u003cTASK\u003e\n[    5.384903]  __check_heap_object+0x9a/0xd0\n[    5.384903]  __check_object_size+0x46c/0x690\n[    5.384903]  put_cmsg+0x129/0x5e0\n[    5.384903]  sock_recv_errqueue+0x22f/0x380\n[    5.384903]  tls_sw_recvmsg+0x7ed/0x1960\n[    5.384903]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n[    5.384903]  ? schedule+0x6d/0x270\n[    5.384903]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n[    5.384903]  ? mutex_unlock+0x81/0xd0\n[    5.384903]  ? __pfx_mutex_unlock+0x10/0x10\n[    5.384903]  ? __pfx_tls_sw_recvmsg+0x10/0x10\n[    5.384903]  ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x8f/0xf0\n[    5.384903]  ? _raw_read_unlock_irqrestore+0x20/0x40\n[    5.384903]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n\nThe crash offset 296 corresponds to skb2-\u003ecb within skbuff_fclones:\n  - sizeof(struct sk_buff) = 232 - offsetof(struct sk_buff, cb) = 40 -\n  offset of skb2.cb in fclones = 232 + 40 = 272 - crash offset 296 =\n  272 + 24 (inside sock_exterr_skb.ee)\n\nThis patch uses a local stack variable as a bounce buffer to avoid the hardened usercopy check failure.\n\n[1] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/net/ipv4/tcp.c#L885\n[2] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/net/core/skbuff.c#L5104\n[3] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/net/core/skbuff.c#L5566\n[4] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/net/core/skbuff.c#L5491\n[5] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/mm/slub.c#L5719"
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-22977",
  "lastModified": "2026-01-21T14:16:06.853",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-01-21T14:16:06.853",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/005671c60fcf1dbdb8bddf12a62568fd5e4ec391"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2a71a1a8d0ed718b1c7a9ac61f07e5755c47ae20"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/582a5e922a9652fcbb7d0165c95d5b20aa37575d"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/88dd6be7ebb3153b662c2cebcb06e032a92857f5"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8c6901aa29626e35045130bac09b75f791acca85"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c655d2167bf014d4c61b4faeca59b60ff9b9f6b1"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e00b169eaac5f7cdbf710c354c8fa76d02009115"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}


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