FKIE_CVE-2026-23111
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-02-13 14:16 - Updated: 2026-02-13 14:23
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: fix inverted genmask check in nft_map_catchall_activate()
nft_map_catchall_activate() has an inverted element activity check
compared to its non-catchall counterpart nft_mapelem_activate() and
compared to what is logically required.
nft_map_catchall_activate() is called from the abort path to re-activate
catchall map elements that were deactivated during a failed transaction.
It should skip elements that are already active (they don't need
re-activation) and process elements that are inactive (they need to be
restored). Instead, the current code does the opposite: it skips inactive
elements and processes active ones.
Compare the non-catchall activate callback, which is correct:
nft_mapelem_activate():
if (nft_set_elem_active(ext, iter->genmask))
return 0; /* skip active, process inactive */
With the buggy catchall version:
nft_map_catchall_activate():
if (!nft_set_elem_active(ext, genmask))
continue; /* skip inactive, process active */
The consequence is that when a DELSET operation is aborted,
nft_setelem_data_activate() is never called for the catchall element.
For NFT_GOTO verdict elements, this means nft_data_hold() is never
called to restore the chain->use reference count. Each abort cycle
permanently decrements chain->use. Once chain->use reaches zero,
DELCHAIN succeeds and frees the chain while catchall verdict elements
still reference it, resulting in a use-after-free.
This is exploitable for local privilege escalation from an unprivileged
user via user namespaces + nftables on distributions that enable
CONFIG_USER_NS and CONFIG_NF_TABLES.
Fix by removing the negation so the check matches nft_mapelem_activate():
skip active elements, process inactive ones.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetfilter: nf_tables: fix inverted genmask check in nft_map_catchall_activate()\n\nnft_map_catchall_activate() has an inverted element activity check\ncompared to its non-catchall counterpart nft_mapelem_activate() and\ncompared to what is logically required.\n\nnft_map_catchall_activate() is called from the abort path to re-activate\ncatchall map elements that were deactivated during a failed transaction.\nIt should skip elements that are already active (they don\u0027t need\nre-activation) and process elements that are inactive (they need to be\nrestored). Instead, the current code does the opposite: it skips inactive\nelements and processes active ones.\n\nCompare the non-catchall activate callback, which is correct:\n\n nft_mapelem_activate():\n if (nft_set_elem_active(ext, iter-\u003egenmask))\n return 0; /* skip active, process inactive */\n\nWith the buggy catchall version:\n\n nft_map_catchall_activate():\n if (!nft_set_elem_active(ext, genmask))\n continue; /* skip inactive, process active */\n\nThe consequence is that when a DELSET operation is aborted,\nnft_setelem_data_activate() is never called for the catchall element.\nFor NFT_GOTO verdict elements, this means nft_data_hold() is never\ncalled to restore the chain-\u003euse reference count. Each abort cycle\npermanently decrements chain-\u003euse. Once chain-\u003euse reaches zero,\nDELCHAIN succeeds and frees the chain while catchall verdict elements\nstill reference it, resulting in a use-after-free.\n\nThis is exploitable for local privilege escalation from an unprivileged\nuser via user namespaces + nftables on distributions that enable\nCONFIG_USER_NS and CONFIG_NF_TABLES.\n\nFix by removing the negation so the check matches nft_mapelem_activate():\nskip active elements, process inactive ones."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-23111",
"lastModified": "2026-02-13T14:23:48.007",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-02-13T14:16:10.283",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1444ff890b4653add12f734ffeffc173d42862dd"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/42c574c1504aa089a0a142e4c13859327570473d"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8b68a45f9722f2babe9e7bad00aa74638addf081"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8c760ba4e36c750379d13569f23f5a6e185333f5"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b9b6573421de51829f7ec1cce76d85f5f6fbbd7f"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f41c5d151078c5348271ffaf8e7410d96f2d82f8"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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