FKIE_CVE-2026-23114

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-02-14 15:16 - Updated: 2026-02-18 17:52
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64/fpsimd: ptrace: Fix SVE writes on !SME systems When SVE is supported but SME is not supported, a ptrace write to the NT_ARM_SVE regset can place the tracee into an invalid state where (non-streaming) SVE register data is stored in FP_STATE_SVE format but TIF_SVE is clear. This can result in a later warning from fpsimd_restore_current_state(), e.g. WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 7214 at arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c:383 fpsimd_restore_current_state+0x50c/0x748 When this happens, fpsimd_restore_current_state() will set TIF_SVE, placing the task into the correct state. This occurs before any other check of TIF_SVE can possibly occur, as other checks of TIF_SVE only happen while the FPSIMD/SVE/SME state is live. Thus, aside from the warning, there is no functional issue. This bug was introduced during rework to error handling in commit: 9f8bf718f2923 ("arm64/fpsimd: ptrace: Gracefully handle errors") ... where the setting of TIF_SVE was moved into a block which is only executed when system_supports_sme() is true. Fix this by removing the system_supports_sme() check. This ensures that TIF_SVE is set for (SVE-formatted) writes to NT_ARM_SVE, at the cost of unconditionally manipulating the tracee's saved svcr value. The manipulation of svcr is benign and inexpensive, and we already do similar elsewhere (e.g. during signal handling), so I don't think it's worth guarding this with system_supports_sme() checks. Aside from the above, there is no functional change. The 'type' argument to sve_set_common() is only set to ARM64_VEC_SME (in ssve_set())) when system_supports_sme(), so the ARM64_VEC_SME case in the switch statement is still unreachable when !system_supports_sme(). When CONFIG_ARM64_SME=n, the only caller of sve_set_common() is sve_set(), and the compiler can constant-fold for the case where type is ARM64_VEC_SVE, removing the logic for other cases.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\narm64/fpsimd: ptrace: Fix SVE writes on !SME systems\n\nWhen SVE is supported but SME is not supported, a ptrace write to the\nNT_ARM_SVE regset can place the tracee into an invalid state where\n(non-streaming) SVE register data is stored in FP_STATE_SVE format but\nTIF_SVE is clear. This can result in a later warning from\nfpsimd_restore_current_state(), e.g.\n\n  WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 7214 at arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c:383 fpsimd_restore_current_state+0x50c/0x748\n\nWhen this happens, fpsimd_restore_current_state() will set TIF_SVE,\nplacing the task into the correct state. This occurs before any other\ncheck of TIF_SVE can possibly occur, as other checks of TIF_SVE only\nhappen while the FPSIMD/SVE/SME state is live. Thus, aside from the\nwarning, there is no functional issue.\n\nThis bug was introduced during rework to error handling in commit:\n\n  9f8bf718f2923 (\"arm64/fpsimd: ptrace: Gracefully handle errors\")\n\n... where the setting of TIF_SVE was moved into a block which is only\nexecuted when system_supports_sme() is true.\n\nFix this by removing the system_supports_sme() check. This ensures that\nTIF_SVE is set for (SVE-formatted) writes to NT_ARM_SVE, at the cost of\nunconditionally manipulating the tracee\u0027s saved svcr value. The\nmanipulation of svcr is benign and inexpensive, and we already do\nsimilar elsewhere (e.g. during signal handling), so I don\u0027t think it\u0027s\nworth guarding this with system_supports_sme() checks.\n\nAside from the above, there is no functional change. The \u0027type\u0027 argument\nto sve_set_common() is only set to ARM64_VEC_SME (in ssve_set())) when\nsystem_supports_sme(), so the ARM64_VEC_SME case in the switch statement\nis still unreachable when !system_supports_sme(). When\nCONFIG_ARM64_SME=n, the only caller of sve_set_common() is sve_set(),\nand the compiler can constant-fold for the case where type is\nARM64_VEC_SVE, removing the logic for other cases."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad:\n\narm64/fpsimd: ptrace: Corrige escrituras SVE en sistemas sin SME\n\nCuando SVE es compatible pero SME no lo es, una escritura de ptrace al regset NT_ARM_SVE puede colocar al tracee en un estado inv\u00e1lido donde los datos del registro SVE (no streaming) se almacenan en formato FP_STATE_SVE pero TIF_SVE est\u00e1 en cero. Esto puede resultar en una advertencia posterior de fpsimd_restore_current_state(), por ejemplo:\n\n  WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 7214 at arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c:383 fpsimd_restore_current_state+0x50c/0x748\n\nCuando esto sucede, fpsimd_restore_current_state() establecer\u00e1 TIF_SVE, colocando la tarea en el estado correcto. Esto ocurre antes de que cualquier otra verificaci\u00f3n de TIF_SVE pueda ocurrir, ya que otras verificaciones de TIF_SVE solo suceden mientras el estado FPSIMD/SVE/SME est\u00e1 activo. Por lo tanto, aparte de la advertencia, no hay ning\u00fan problema funcional.\n\nEste error fue introducido durante una revisi\u00f3n del manejo de errores en el commit:\n\n  9f8bf718f2923 (\u0027arm64/fpsimd: ptrace: Manejar errores con gracia\u0027)\n\n... donde la configuraci\u00f3n de TIF_SVE se movi\u00f3 a un bloque que solo se ejecuta cuando system_supports_sme() es verdadero.\n\nEsto se soluciona eliminando la verificaci\u00f3n de system_supports_sme(). Esto asegura que TIF_SVE se establezca para escrituras (con formato SVE) a NT_ARM_SVE, a costa de manipular incondicionalmente el valor svcr guardado del tracee. La manipulaci\u00f3n de svcr es inofensiva y de bajo costo, y ya hacemos algo similar en otros lugares (por ejemplo, durante el manejo de se\u00f1ales), por lo que no creo que valga la pena condicionar esto a verificaciones de system_supports_sme().\n\nAparte de lo anterior, no hay ning\u00fan cambio funcional. El argumento \u0027type\u0027 de sve_set_common() solo se establece en ARM64_VEC_SME (en ssve_set()) cuando system_supports_sme(), por lo que el caso ARM64_VEC_SME en la declaraci\u00f3n switch sigue siendo inalcanzable cuando system_supports_sme() es falso. Cuando CONFIG_ARM64_SME=n, el \u00fanico llamador de sve_set_common() es sve_set(), y el compilador puede realizar plegado de constantes para el caso en que \u0027type\u0027 es ARM64_VEC_SVE, eliminando la l\u00f3gica para otros casos."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-23114",
  "lastModified": "2026-02-18T17:52:44.520",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-02-14T15:16:06.500",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/128a7494a9f15aad60cc6b7e3546bf481ac54a13"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4f39984176e7edcaba3432b6c649c6fe93bf2f80"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}


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