FKIE_CVE-2026-46275
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-06-08 16:16 - Updated: 2026-06-17 10:53
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_uart: fix UAFs and race conditions in close and init paths
Vulnerabilities leading to Use-After-Free (UAF) and Null Pointer
Dereference (NPD) conditions were observed in the lifecycle management
of hci_uart.
The primary issue arises because the workqueues (init_ready and
write_work) are only flushed/cancelled if the HCI_UART_PROTO_READY
flag is set during TTY close. If a hangup occurs before setup completes,
hci_uart_tty_close() skips the teardown of these workqueues and
proceeds to free the `hu` struct. When the scheduled work executes
later, it blindly dereferences the freed `hu` struct.
Furthermore, several data races and UAFs were identified in the teardown
sequence:
1. Calling hci_uart_flush() from hci_uart_close() without effectively
disabling write_work causes a race condition where both can concurrently
double-free hu->tx_skb. This happens because protocol timers can
concurrently invoke hci_uart_tx_wakeup() and requeue write_work.
2. Calling hci_free_dev(hdev) before hu->proto->close(hu) causes a UAF
when vendor specific protocol close callbacks dereference hu->hdev.
3. In the initialization error paths, failing to take the proto_lock
write lock before clearing PROTO_READY leads to races with active
readers. Additionally, hci_uart_tty_receive() accesses hu->hdev
outside the read lock, leading to UAFs if the initialization error
path frees hdev concurrently.
Fix these synchronization and lifecycle issues by:
1. Re-ordering hci_uart_tty_close() to clear HCI_UART_PROTO_READY first,
followed immediately by a cancel_work_sync(&hu->write_work). Clearing
the flag locks out concurrent protocol timers from successfully invoking
hci_uart_tx_wakeup(), effectively rendering the cancellation permanent
and preventing the tx_skb double-free.
2. Note: Clearing PROTO_READY early causes hci_uart_close() to skip
hu->proto->flush(). This is perfectly safe in the tty_close path
because hu->proto->close() executes shortly after, which intrinsically
purges all protocol SKB queues and tears down the state.
3. Relocating hu->proto->close(hu) strictly prior to hci_free_dev(hdev)
across all close and error paths to prevent vendor-level UAFs.
4. Moving the hdev->stat.byte_rx increment in hci_uart_tty_receive()
inside the proto_lock read-side critical section to safely synchronize
with device unregistration.
5. Adding cancel_work_sync(&hu->write_work) to hci_uart_close() to safely
flush the workqueue before hci_uart_flush() is invoked via the HCI core.
6. Utilizing cancel_work_sync() instead of disable_work_sync() across
all paths to prevent permanently breaking user-space retry capabilities.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "78aad93e938f013d9272fe0ee168f27883afa95c",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3b799254cf6f481460719023d7a18f46651e5e7f",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "e2d19969c8d9198ecc3090bcd5312ecd503a3339",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3b799254cf6f481460719023d7a18f46651e5e7f",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "c85cff648a2bc92322912db5f1727ad05afae7b6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3b799254cf6f481460719023d7a18f46651e5e7f",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "9d20d48be2c4a071fb015eb09bda2cecd25daf34",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3b799254cf6f481460719023d7a18f46651e5e7f",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "81c7a3c22a0f2808cf4ae0b4908f59763b23606d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3b799254cf6f481460719023d7a18f46651e5e7f",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "192cb0f1ca706d9a1bc36ae0ad5f666d1e4fd894",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3b799254cf6f481460719023d7a18f46651e5e7f",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "7338031946bd06f6dff149e67b60c4cd083bfea8",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3b799254cf6f481460719023d7a18f46651e5e7f",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "c1bb9336ae6b54a5f6a353c4bd4ed9a4307e429b",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3b799254cf6f481460719023d7a18f46651e5e7f",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "cd27019bc149f20f12ebec943c2b4c775745a5a0",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "aea63181b6fcb6b9ccde1ada9ea51be19c4015af",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "0d234d1135dcd8876de0576dac68efd0a87eef87",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "3fe978892ab46efc2f3830d9abc015eff72caaf9",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "0d987e14bebaf0f67ee7dbefaf6165c62cd1d27f",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "4.15",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.14.203",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "4.20",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.19.153",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.5",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.4.73",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.9",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.8.17",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.10",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.9.2",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.10"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.10",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.10.258",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.209",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.175",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.142",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.92",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.34",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.0.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.0.11",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: hci_uart: fix UAFs and race conditions in close and init paths\n\nVulnerabilities leading to Use-After-Free (UAF) and Null Pointer\nDereference (NPD) conditions were observed in the lifecycle management\nof hci_uart.\n\nThe primary issue arises because the workqueues (init_ready and\nwrite_work) are only flushed/cancelled if the HCI_UART_PROTO_READY\nflag is set during TTY close. If a hangup occurs before setup completes,\nhci_uart_tty_close() skips the teardown of these workqueues and\nproceeds to free the `hu` struct. When the scheduled work executes\nlater, it blindly dereferences the freed `hu` struct.\n\nFurthermore, several data races and UAFs were identified in the teardown\nsequence:\n1. Calling hci_uart_flush() from hci_uart_close() without effectively\n disabling write_work causes a race condition where both can concurrently\n double-free hu-\u003etx_skb. This happens because protocol timers can\n concurrently invoke hci_uart_tx_wakeup() and requeue write_work.\n2. Calling hci_free_dev(hdev) before hu-\u003eproto-\u003eclose(hu) causes a UAF\n when vendor specific protocol close callbacks dereference hu-\u003ehdev.\n3. In the initialization error paths, failing to take the proto_lock\n write lock before clearing PROTO_READY leads to races with active\n readers. Additionally, hci_uart_tty_receive() accesses hu-\u003ehdev\n outside the read lock, leading to UAFs if the initialization error\n path frees hdev concurrently.\n\nFix these synchronization and lifecycle issues by:\n1. Re-ordering hci_uart_tty_close() to clear HCI_UART_PROTO_READY first,\n followed immediately by a cancel_work_sync(\u0026hu-\u003ewrite_work). Clearing\n the flag locks out concurrent protocol timers from successfully invoking\n hci_uart_tx_wakeup(), effectively rendering the cancellation permanent\n and preventing the tx_skb double-free.\n2. Note: Clearing PROTO_READY early causes hci_uart_close() to skip\n hu-\u003eproto-\u003eflush(). This is perfectly safe in the tty_close path\n because hu-\u003eproto-\u003eclose() executes shortly after, which intrinsically\n purges all protocol SKB queues and tears down the state.\n3. Relocating hu-\u003eproto-\u003eclose(hu) strictly prior to hci_free_dev(hdev)\n across all close and error paths to prevent vendor-level UAFs.\n4. Moving the hdev-\u003estat.byte_rx increment in hci_uart_tty_receive()\n inside the proto_lock read-side critical section to safely synchronize\n with device unregistration.\n5. Adding cancel_work_sync(\u0026hu-\u003ewrite_work) to hci_uart_close() to safely\n flush the workqueue before hci_uart_flush() is invoked via the HCI core.\n6. Utilizing cancel_work_sync() instead of disable_work_sync() across\n all paths to prevent permanently breaking user-space retry capabilities."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-46275",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T10:53:27.697",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-06-08T16:16:40.863",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/192cb0f1ca706d9a1bc36ae0ad5f666d1e4fd894"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7338031946bd06f6dff149e67b60c4cd083bfea8"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/78aad93e938f013d9272fe0ee168f27883afa95c"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/81c7a3c22a0f2808cf4ae0b4908f59763b23606d"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9d20d48be2c4a071fb015eb09bda2cecd25daf34"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c1bb9336ae6b54a5f6a353c4bd4ed9a4307e429b"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c85cff648a2bc92322912db5f1727ad05afae7b6"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e2d19969c8d9198ecc3090bcd5312ecd503a3339"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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