FKIE_CVE-2026-46290
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-06-08 17:16 - Updated: 2026-06-17 10:53
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/efi: Fix graceful fault handling after FPU softirq changes
Since commit d02198550423 ("x86/fpu: Improve crypto performance by
making kernel-mode FPU reliably usable in softirqs"), kernel_fpu_begin()
calls fpregs_lock() which uses local_bh_disable() instead of the
previous preempt_disable(). This sets SOFTIRQ_OFFSET in preempt_count
during the entire EFI runtime service call, causing in_interrupt() to
return true in normal task context.
The graceful page fault handler efi_crash_gracefully_on_page_fault()
uses in_interrupt() to bail out for faults in real interrupt context.
With SOFTIRQ_OFFSET now set, the handler always bails out, leaving EFI
firmware page faults unhandled. This escalates to die() which also sees
in_interrupt() as true and calls panic("Fatal exception in interrupt"),
resulting in a hard system freeze. On systems with buggy firmware that
triggers page faults during EFI runtime calls (e.g., accessing unmapped
memory in GetTime()), this causes an unrecoverable hang instead of the
expected graceful EFI_ABORTED recovery.
Fix by replacing in_interrupt() with !in_task(). This preserves the
original intent of bailing for interrupts or NMI faults, while no longer
falsely triggering from the FPU code path's local_bh_disable().
[ardb: Sashiko spotted that using 'in_hardirq() || in_nmi()' leaves a
window where a softirq may be taken before fpregs_lock() is
called, but after efi_rts_work.efi_rts_id has been assigned,
and any page faults occurring in that window will then be
misidentified as having been caused by the firmware. Instead,
use !in_task(), which incorporates in_serving_softirq(). ]
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "22b365ba1af3d8c6036b8e5112fffe80998b85a0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "d02198550423a0b695e7a24ec77153209ad45b09",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "db155b86d1523e85941f61efd7d7ffb594cc9a29",
"status": "affected",
"version": "d02198550423a0b695e7a24ec77153209ad45b09",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "088f65e206087bf903743bd18417261d7a4c9644",
"status": "affected",
"version": "d02198550423a0b695e7a24ec77153209ad45b09",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.15"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.15",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.30",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.0.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.0.7",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nx86/efi: Fix graceful fault handling after FPU softirq changes\n\nSince commit d02198550423 (\"x86/fpu: Improve crypto performance by\nmaking kernel-mode FPU reliably usable in softirqs\"), kernel_fpu_begin()\ncalls fpregs_lock() which uses local_bh_disable() instead of the\nprevious preempt_disable(). This sets SOFTIRQ_OFFSET in preempt_count\nduring the entire EFI runtime service call, causing in_interrupt() to\nreturn true in normal task context.\n\nThe graceful page fault handler efi_crash_gracefully_on_page_fault()\nuses in_interrupt() to bail out for faults in real interrupt context.\nWith SOFTIRQ_OFFSET now set, the handler always bails out, leaving EFI\nfirmware page faults unhandled. This escalates to die() which also sees\nin_interrupt() as true and calls panic(\"Fatal exception in interrupt\"),\nresulting in a hard system freeze. On systems with buggy firmware that\ntriggers page faults during EFI runtime calls (e.g., accessing unmapped\nmemory in GetTime()), this causes an unrecoverable hang instead of the\nexpected graceful EFI_ABORTED recovery.\n\nFix by replacing in_interrupt() with !in_task(). This preserves the\noriginal intent of bailing for interrupts or NMI faults, while no longer\nfalsely triggering from the FPU code path\u0027s local_bh_disable().\n\n[ardb: Sashiko spotted that using \u0027in_hardirq() || in_nmi()\u0027 leaves a\n window where a softirq may be taken before fpregs_lock() is\n called, but after efi_rts_work.efi_rts_id has been assigned,\n and any page faults occurring in that window will then be\n misidentified as having been caused by the firmware. Instead,\n use !in_task(), which incorporates in_serving_softirq(). ]"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-46290",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T10:53:29.300",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-06-08T17:16:47.230",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/088f65e206087bf903743bd18417261d7a4c9644"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/22b365ba1af3d8c6036b8e5112fffe80998b85a0"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/db155b86d1523e85941f61efd7d7ffb594cc9a29"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
Loading…
Loading…
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Loading…
Loading…