FKIE_CVE-2026-49943

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-06-02 17:16 - Updated: 2026-07-22 19:10
Summary
CZ.NIC BIRD Internet Routing Daemon through 2.19.0 contains a stack-based buffer overflow in the BGP AS_PATH mask matching implementation in nest/a-path.c. The as_path_match() function uses a fixed-size stack array of 2048 + 1 pm_pos entries, while parse_path() expands AS_PATH segments from a received BGP UPDATE without enforcing a corresponding capacity limit. When RFC 8654 BGP Extended Messages are enabled and a BIRD filter evaluates an AS path mask expression such as "bgp_path ~ [= ... =]", an established BGP peer can send a long AS_PATH containing more than 2048 expanded ASNs. This causes parse_path()/as_path_match() to write beyond the fixed stack buffer, resulting in a crash of the daemon. NOTE: reportedly, the Supplier's position is that a fix is not being prioritized because all network operators should already be rejecting routes with unusually long attributes.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unknown",
          "product": "BIRD",
          "vendor": "NIC",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "2.19.0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "cve@mitre.org"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "CZ.NIC BIRD Internet Routing Daemon through 2.19.0 contains a stack-based buffer overflow in the BGP AS_PATH mask matching implementation in nest/a-path.c. The as_path_match() function uses a fixed-size stack array of 2048 + 1 pm_pos entries, while parse_path() expands AS_PATH segments from a received BGP UPDATE without enforcing a corresponding capacity limit. When RFC 8654 BGP Extended Messages are enabled and a BIRD filter evaluates an AS path mask expression such as \"bgp_path ~ [= ... =]\", an established BGP peer can send a long AS_PATH containing more than 2048 expanded ASNs. This causes parse_path()/as_path_match() to write beyond the fixed stack buffer, resulting in a crash of the daemon. NOTE: reportedly, the Supplier\u0027s position is that a fix is not being prioritized because all network operators should already be rejecting routes with unusually long attributes."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "CZ.NIC BIRD Internet Routing Daemon hasta la versi\u00f3n 2.19.0 contiene un desbordamiento de b\u00fafer basado en pila en la implementaci\u00f3n de coincidencia de m\u00e1scara BGP AS_PATH en nest/a-path.c. La funci\u00f3n as_path_match() utiliza un array de pila de tama\u00f1o fijo de 2048 + 1 entradas pm_pos, mientras que parse_path() expande segmentos AS_PATH de una ACTUALIZACI\u00d3N BGP recibida sin aplicar un l\u00edmite de capacidad correspondiente. Cuando los Mensajes Extendidos BGP RFC 8654 est\u00e1n habilitados y un filtro BIRD eval\u00faa una expresi\u00f3n de m\u00e1scara de ruta AS como \u0027bgp_path ~ [= ... =]\u0027, un par BGP establecido puede enviar una AS_PATH larga que contenga m\u00e1s de 2048 ASNs expandidos. Esto provoca que parse_path()/as_path_match() escriba m\u00e1s all\u00e1 del b\u00fafer de pila fijo, lo que resulta en un fallo del demonio. NOTA: seg\u00fan se informa, la posici\u00f3n del Proveedor es que una soluci\u00f3n no est\u00e1 siendo priorizada porque todos los operadores de red ya deber\u00edan estar rechazando rutas con atributos inusualmente largos."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-49943",
  "lastModified": "2026-07-22T19:10:00.120",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 6.3,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "CHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
        "impactScore": 4.0,
        "source": "cve@mitre.org",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-49943",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-06-02T18:20:11.710969Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-06-02T17:16:37.657",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "cve@mitre.org",
      "url": "https://bird.nic.cz"
    },
    {
      "source": "cve@mitre.org",
      "url": "https://gitlab.nic.cz/labs/bird/-/blob/master/NEWS"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "cve@mitre.org",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-121"
        }
      ],
      "source": "cve@mitre.org",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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