FKIE_CVE-2026-63073
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-25 13:19 - Updated: 2026-08-25 13:19
Severity
Summary
Issue summary: OpenSSL CMP response validation passed an unexpected response
sender distinguished name directly as the format string to `ERR_raise_data()`.
Impact summary: A malicious or intercepted CMP endpoint can crash a CMP client
that enforces an expected sender or uses a pinned server certificate whose
subject becomes the default expected sender.
CWE: CWE-134 (Use of Externally-Controlled Format String)
Description: When validating a received CMP message, ossl_cmp_msg_check_update()
converts the peer-supplied sender distinguished name with X509_NAME_oneline()
and passes it directly as the format argument to ERR_raise_data(). Percent
characters survive the conversion, so a sender DN such as "CN=%s%n" reaches
BIO_vsnprintf() as an attacker-controlled format string with no matching variadic
arguments. This path is only reached when the caller configures an expected
sender or pins a server certificate, which is the normal configuration for a
CMP client validating server responses.
Since the attacker controls the format string but none of the variadic
arguments, such specifiers as %s and %n dereference or write through unrelated
stack contents and crash the client. The reliable consequence is a denial of
service, when the response comes from a malicious or intercepted CMP endpoint.
There is no controlled memory write, arbitrary-address read, or reliable path
to remote code execution.
FIPS impact: no
No FIPS modules are affected by this issue, as the CMP protocol
implementation is outside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "OpenSSL",
"vendor": "OpenSSL",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "4.0.2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.0.0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "3.6.4",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3.6.0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "3.5.8",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3.5.0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "3.4.7",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3.4.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "openssl-security@openssl.org"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Issue summary: OpenSSL CMP response validation passed an unexpected response\nsender distinguished name directly as the format string to `ERR_raise_data()`.\n\nImpact summary: A malicious or intercepted CMP endpoint can crash a CMP client\nthat enforces an expected sender or uses a pinned server certificate whose\nsubject becomes the default expected sender.\n\nCWE: CWE-134 (Use of Externally-Controlled Format String)\n\nDescription: When validating a received CMP message, ossl_cmp_msg_check_update()\nconverts the peer-supplied sender distinguished name with X509_NAME_oneline()\nand passes it directly as the format argument to ERR_raise_data(). Percent\ncharacters survive the conversion, so a sender DN such as \"CN=%s%n\" reaches\nBIO_vsnprintf() as an attacker-controlled format string with no matching variadic\narguments. This path is only reached when the caller configures an expected\nsender or pins a server certificate, which is the normal configuration for a\nCMP client validating server responses.\n\nSince the attacker controls the format string but none of the variadic\narguments, such specifiers as %s and %n dereference or write through unrelated\nstack contents and crash the client. The reliable consequence is a denial of\nservice, when the response comes from a malicious or intercepted CMP endpoint.\nThere is no controlled memory write, arbitrary-address read, or reliable path\nto remote code execution.\n\nFIPS impact: no\n\nNo FIPS modules are affected by this issue, as the CMP protocol\nimplementation is outside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-63073",
"lastModified": "2026-08-25T13:19:26.147",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-08-25T13:19:26.147",
"references": [
{
"source": "openssl-security@openssl.org",
"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/0cc20b322639919aa423e90799d9a57c3b4b76ca"
},
{
"source": "openssl-security@openssl.org",
"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/6a0acc072b4d37a7cac1252a29c1ce1f00c5ec29"
},
{
"source": "openssl-security@openssl.org",
"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/7eb2e3ec9d1d4f35c8022fccd4b03398b3f33e21"
},
{
"source": "openssl-security@openssl.org",
"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/a7e5a6eea8fd3ccca6b6fbba031a5fbf8a3d93b4"
},
{
"source": "openssl-security@openssl.org",
"url": "https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260825.txt"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "openssl-security@openssl.org",
"vulnStatus": "Received",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-134"
}
],
"source": "openssl-security@openssl.org",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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