FKIE_CVE-2026-67278
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-05 20:17 - Updated: 2026-09-25 14:56
Severity
Summary
MikroTik RouterOS accepts malformed RSA/PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures across RSA-based services, including TLS/X.509 certificate validation and SSH host-key authentication. Because its trust store includes an e=3 root CA, an attacker controlling or redirecting an outbound RouterOS TLS connection can use the root’s public certificate - without its private key - to forge a trusted intermediate and issue certificates for arbitrary hostnames, enabling TLS server impersonation. The same permissive verification also undermines RSA-based SSH authentication.
This issue affects only 7.x branch was fixed in versions: 7.23.6 (Long-term) and 7.24.3 (Stable).
Releases 7.23.4 and 7.24.2 included an incomplete fix.
References
| URL | Tags | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| cvd@cert.pl | https://cert.pl/en/posts/2026/09/mikrotik-routeros-cve | Third Party Advisory | |
| cvd@cert.pl | https://cert.pl/en/posts/2026/09/vulnerabilities-in-mikrotik-routeros-actively-exploited/ | Mitigation, Third Party Advisory | |
| cvd@cert.pl | https://forum.mikrotik.com/t/7-23-6-long-term-is-released/273139 | Release Notes | |
| cvd@cert.pl | https://forum.mikrotik.com/t/7-24-3-stable-is-released/273138 | Release Notes | |
| cvd@cert.pl | https://mikrotik.com/supportsec/september-2026-vulnerability/ | Vendor Advisory | |
| cvd@cert.pl | https://npratley.net/reversing-mikrotiks-silent-patch-the-routeros-7-23-4-fix-they-wouldnt-explain/ | Exploit, Third Party Advisory |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "RouterOS",
"vendor": "Mikrotik",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "7.24.3",
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.24",
"versionType": "custom"
},
{
"lessThan": "7.23.6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.0.0",
"versionType": "custom"
}
]
}
],
"source": "cvd@cert.pl"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:mikrotik:routeros:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "A770020E-95C7-40B0-A981-E2350A27920D",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.23.6",
"versionStartIncluding": "7.0",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:mikrotik:routeros:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "6E8D92F3-12C1-4382-A90F-203F017ED484",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.24.3",
"versionStartIncluding": "7.24",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "MikroTik RouterOS accepts malformed RSA/PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures across RSA-based services, including TLS/X.509 certificate validation and SSH host-key authentication. Because its trust store includes an e=3 root CA, an attacker controlling or redirecting an outbound RouterOS TLS connection can use the root\u2019s public certificate - without its private key - to forge a trusted intermediate and issue certificates for arbitrary hostnames, enabling TLS server impersonation. The same permissive verification also undermines RSA-based SSH authentication.\n\n\n\nThis issue affects only 7.x branch was fixed in versions: 7.23.6 (Long-term) and 7.24.3 (Stable).\nReleases 7.23.4 and 7.24.2 included an incomplete fix."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-67278",
"lastModified": "2026-09-25T14:56:04.743",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 9.1,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 5.2,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 6.3,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "cvd@cert.pl",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-67278",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-09-08T15:30:45.430794Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-09-05T20:17:18.257",
"references": [
{
"source": "cvd@cert.pl",
"tags": [
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "https://cert.pl/en/posts/2026/09/mikrotik-routeros-cve"
},
{
"source": "cvd@cert.pl",
"tags": [
"Mitigation",
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "https://cert.pl/en/posts/2026/09/vulnerabilities-in-mikrotik-routeros-actively-exploited/"
},
{
"source": "cvd@cert.pl",
"tags": [
"Release Notes"
],
"url": "https://forum.mikrotik.com/t/7-23-6-long-term-is-released/273139"
},
{
"source": "cvd@cert.pl",
"tags": [
"Release Notes"
],
"url": "https://forum.mikrotik.com/t/7-24-3-stable-is-released/273138"
},
{
"source": "cvd@cert.pl",
"tags": [
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://mikrotik.com/supportsec/september-2026-vulnerability/"
},
{
"source": "cvd@cert.pl",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "https://npratley.net/reversing-mikrotiks-silent-patch-the-routeros-7-23-4-fix-they-wouldnt-explain/"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "cvd@cert.pl",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-347"
}
],
"source": "cvd@cert.pl",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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