FKIE_CVE-2026-68191
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-10 13:20 - Updated: 2026-08-17 05:18
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath12k: fix NULL pointer dereference in rhash table destroy
When unbinding the ath12k driver, kernel NULL pointer dereferences
occur in irq_work_sync() called from rhashtable_destroy().
Two hash tables are affected:
1. ath12k_link_sta hash table in ath12k_base
2. ath12k_dp_link_peer hash table in ath12k_dp
The issue happens because the destroy functions are called unconditionally
in cleanup paths, but the hash tables are only initialized late in their
respective init functions. If the device was never fully started or if the
init functions failed before initializing the hash tables, the pointers
will be NULL. The issues are always reproducible from a VM because the MSI
addressing initialization is failing.
Call trace for ath12k_link_sta_rhash_tbl_destroy:
RIP: irq_work_sync+0x1e/0x70
rhashtable_destroy+0x12/0x60
ath12k_link_sta_rhash_tbl_destroy+0x19/0x40 [ath12k]
ath12k_core_stop+0xe/0x80 [ath12k]
ath12k_core_hw_group_cleanup+0x6b/0xb0 [ath12k]
ath12k_pci_remove+0x60/0x110 [ath12k]
Call trace for ath12k_dp_link_peer_rhash_tbl_destroy:
RIP: irq_work_sync+0x1e/0x70
rhashtable_destroy+0x12/0x60
ath12k_dp_link_peer_rhash_tbl_destroy+0x29/0x50 [ath12k]
ath12k_dp_cmn_device_deinit+0x21/0x140 [ath12k]
ath12k_core_hw_group_cleanup+0x6b/0xb0 [ath12k]
ath12k_pci_remove+0x60/0x110 [ath12k]
Fix this by adding NULL checks before calling rhashtable_destroy() in
both destroy functions.
The NULL check approach was chosen because the rhashtable pointer
serves as the initialization state indicator. The init can fail at
various points, leaving some components uninitialized. Checking the
pointer directly is simpler than adding separate state flags that
would need synchronization.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/dp_peer.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/peer.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "17a4298f7794843af0094035723dc5e7311c7453",
"status": "affected",
"version": "57ccca410237285f8f25a988655e6910cadc63f2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "70231dcd782201579990ded73e0435d18bb524ca",
"status": "affected",
"version": "57ccca410237285f8f25a988655e6910cadc63f2",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/dp_peer.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/peer.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.0"
},
{
"lessThan": "7.0",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.6",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: ath12k: fix NULL pointer dereference in rhash table destroy\n\nWhen unbinding the ath12k driver, kernel NULL pointer dereferences\noccur in irq_work_sync() called from rhashtable_destroy().\n\nTwo hash tables are affected:\n1. ath12k_link_sta hash table in ath12k_base\n2. ath12k_dp_link_peer hash table in ath12k_dp\n\nThe issue happens because the destroy functions are called unconditionally\nin cleanup paths, but the hash tables are only initialized late in their\nrespective init functions. If the device was never fully started or if the\ninit functions failed before initializing the hash tables, the pointers\nwill be NULL. The issues are always reproducible from a VM because the MSI\naddressing initialization is failing.\n\nCall trace for ath12k_link_sta_rhash_tbl_destroy:\n RIP: irq_work_sync+0x1e/0x70\n rhashtable_destroy+0x12/0x60\n ath12k_link_sta_rhash_tbl_destroy+0x19/0x40 [ath12k]\n ath12k_core_stop+0xe/0x80 [ath12k]\n ath12k_core_hw_group_cleanup+0x6b/0xb0 [ath12k]\n ath12k_pci_remove+0x60/0x110 [ath12k]\n\nCall trace for ath12k_dp_link_peer_rhash_tbl_destroy:\n RIP: irq_work_sync+0x1e/0x70\n rhashtable_destroy+0x12/0x60\n ath12k_dp_link_peer_rhash_tbl_destroy+0x29/0x50 [ath12k]\n ath12k_dp_cmn_device_deinit+0x21/0x140 [ath12k]\n ath12k_core_hw_group_cleanup+0x6b/0xb0 [ath12k]\n ath12k_pci_remove+0x60/0x110 [ath12k]\n\nFix this by adding NULL checks before calling rhashtable_destroy() in\nboth destroy functions.\n\nThe NULL check approach was chosen because the rhashtable pointer\nserves as the initialization state indicator. The init can fail at\nvarious points, leaving some components uninitialized. Checking the\npointer directly is simpler than adding separate state flags that\nwould need synchronization."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-68191",
"lastModified": "2026-08-17T05:18:20.913",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-08-10T13:20:06.433",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/17a4298f7794843af0094035723dc5e7311c7453"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/70231dcd782201579990ded73e0435d18bb524ca"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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