FKIE_CVE-2026-68372

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-10 13:20 - Updated: 2026-08-17 06:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: core: port: Deattach Type-C connector on component unbind connector_unbind() is the mirror of connector_bind(), but it is missing the symmetric call to typec_deattach() that connector_bind() makes via: if (port_dev->child) typec_attach(port_dev->connector, &port_dev->child->dev); When a Thunderbolt dock is unplugged, two teardown paths race: 1. The component framework calls connector_unbind() first, which sets port_dev->connector = NULL without calling typec_deattach(). This leaves port->usb2_dev/port->usb3_dev in struct typec_port pointing at the USB device that is about to be freed. 2. usb_disconnect() then calls typec_deattach(port_dev->connector, ...), but port_dev->connector is already NULL, so the call is a no-op and port->usb2_dev is never cleared. 3. Concurrently, UCSI detects a PD partner-disconnect event and calls typec_unregister_partner(), which reads port->usb2_dev (now a dangling pointer to freed memory) and passes it to typec_partner_unlink_device() -> sysfs_remove_link() -> dev_name() on the freed device, corrupting the typec/UCSI partner state. This corruption leaves the Thunderbolt tunnel in an inconsistent state on the next dock hot-plug. On affected hardware the dock's I225/igc NIC fails to enumerate: AER fires a slot reset while the igc driver is still initialising ("PCIe link lost"), and the subsequent igc_reset attempt hits igc_rd32 on an already-detached device: igc 0000:2e:00.0 eth0: PCIe link lost, device now detached igc: Failed to read reg 0x0! WARNING: CPU: 9 PID: 129 at drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_main.c:7005 igc_rd32+0xa4/0xc0 [igc] Call Trace: igc_disable_pcie_master+0x16/0xa0 [igc] igc_reset_hw_base+0x14/0x170 [igc] igc_reset+0x63/0x110 [igc] igc_io_slot_reset+0x9e/0xd0 [igc] report_slot_reset+0x5d/0xc0 pcie_do_recovery+0x209/0x400 aer_isr_one_error_type+0x235/0x430 aer_isr+0x4e/0x80 irq_thread+0xf4/0x1f0 4. UCSI later handles the PD partner-disconnect and calls typec_unregister_partner(), which still sees the stale port->usb2_dev and tries to remove its sysfs link a second time: kernfs: can not remove 'typec', no directory WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 55 at fs/kernfs/dir.c:1706 kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0xe9/0xf0 Workqueue: events ucsi_handle_connector_change [typec_ucsi] Call Trace: sysfs_remove_link+0x19/0x50 typec_unregister_partner+0x6e/0x120 [typec] ucsi_unregister_partner+0x107/0x150 [typec_ucsi] ucsi_handle_connector_change+0x3ec/0x490 [typec_ucsi] process_one_work+0x18e/0x3e0 worker_thread+0x2e3/0x420 kthread+0x10a/0x230 ret_from_fork+0x121/0x140 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 With worse timing the same stale pointer is dereferenced after the backing memory is freed, turning the warning into a use-after-free. Fix the asymmetry: call typec_deattach() before clearing port_dev->connector, matching what connector_bind() does on the bind side. typec_partner_deattach() is already protected by port->partner_link_lock, so it serialises safely with the concurrent typec_unregister_partner() path.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/usb/core/port.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "78d361e60caf1999d51bda0e1b1004f5d39fcfbc",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "11110783f5ea866318831a56353c6f1c3fc0d8ed",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "7714fb896ed308cf13d32d317040adc4f200b8e4",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "11110783f5ea866318831a56353c6f1c3fc0d8ed",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "e00109b5adf71635919248e9ab6300a662e6a3e8",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "11110783f5ea866318831a56353c6f1c3fc0d8ed",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "e0b291fe117964037e0ba382eff4bb365d531c3a",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "11110783f5ea866318831a56353c6f1c3fc0d8ed",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/usb/core/port.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.7"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.7",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.101",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.42",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.1.6",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nusb: core: port: Deattach Type-C connector on component unbind\n\nconnector_unbind() is the mirror of connector_bind(), but it is missing\nthe symmetric call to typec_deattach() that connector_bind() makes via:\n\n    if (port_dev-\u003echild)\n        typec_attach(port_dev-\u003econnector, \u0026port_dev-\u003echild-\u003edev);\n\nWhen a Thunderbolt dock is unplugged, two teardown paths race:\n\n1. The component framework calls connector_unbind() first, which sets\n   port_dev-\u003econnector = NULL without calling typec_deattach().  This\n   leaves port-\u003eusb2_dev/port-\u003eusb3_dev in struct typec_port pointing at\n   the USB device that is about to be freed.\n\n2. usb_disconnect() then calls typec_deattach(port_dev-\u003econnector, ...),\n   but port_dev-\u003econnector is already NULL, so the call is a no-op and\n   port-\u003eusb2_dev is never cleared.\n\n3. Concurrently, UCSI detects a PD partner-disconnect event and calls\n   typec_unregister_partner(), which reads port-\u003eusb2_dev (now a dangling\n   pointer to freed memory) and passes it to typec_partner_unlink_device()\n   -\u003e sysfs_remove_link() -\u003e dev_name() on the freed device, corrupting\n   the typec/UCSI partner state.\n\nThis corruption leaves the Thunderbolt tunnel in an inconsistent state on\nthe next dock hot-plug.  On affected hardware the dock\u0027s I225/igc NIC fails\nto enumerate: AER fires a slot reset while the igc driver is still\ninitialising (\"PCIe link lost\"), and the subsequent igc_reset attempt hits\nigc_rd32 on an already-detached device:\n\n    igc 0000:2e:00.0 eth0: PCIe link lost, device now detached\n    igc: Failed to read reg 0x0!\n    WARNING: CPU: 9 PID: 129 at drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_main.c:7005\n             igc_rd32+0xa4/0xc0 [igc]\n    Call Trace:\n     igc_disable_pcie_master+0x16/0xa0 [igc]\n     igc_reset_hw_base+0x14/0x170 [igc]\n     igc_reset+0x63/0x110 [igc]\n     igc_io_slot_reset+0x9e/0xd0 [igc]\n     report_slot_reset+0x5d/0xc0\n     pcie_do_recovery+0x209/0x400\n     aer_isr_one_error_type+0x235/0x430\n     aer_isr+0x4e/0x80\n     irq_thread+0xf4/0x1f0\n\n4. UCSI later handles the PD partner-disconnect and calls\n   typec_unregister_partner(), which still sees the stale port-\u003eusb2_dev\n   and tries to remove its sysfs link a second time:\n\n   kernfs: can not remove \u0027typec\u0027, no directory\n   WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 55 at fs/kernfs/dir.c:1706 kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0xe9/0xf0\n   Workqueue: events ucsi_handle_connector_change [typec_ucsi]\n   Call Trace:\n    sysfs_remove_link+0x19/0x50\n    typec_unregister_partner+0x6e/0x120 [typec]\n    ucsi_unregister_partner+0x107/0x150 [typec_ucsi]\n    ucsi_handle_connector_change+0x3ec/0x490 [typec_ucsi]\n    process_one_work+0x18e/0x3e0\n    worker_thread+0x2e3/0x420\n    kthread+0x10a/0x230\n    ret_from_fork+0x121/0x140\n    ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\n\n   With worse timing the same stale pointer is dereferenced after the\n   backing memory is freed, turning the warning into a use-after-free.\n\nFix the asymmetry: call typec_deattach() before clearing\nport_dev-\u003econnector, matching what connector_bind() does on the bind side.\ntypec_partner_deattach() is already protected by port-\u003epartner_link_lock,\nso it serialises safely with the concurrent typec_unregister_partner() path."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-68372",
  "lastModified": "2026-08-17T06:17:45.560",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-08-10T13:20:30.040",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7714fb896ed308cf13d32d317040adc4f200b8e4"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/78d361e60caf1999d51bda0e1b1004f5d39fcfbc"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e00109b5adf71635919248e9ab6300a662e6a3e8"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e0b291fe117964037e0ba382eff4bb365d531c3a"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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