FKIE_CVE-2026-72889
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-19 08:17 - Updated: 2026-08-19 21:17
Severity
Summary
Net::OAuth versions before 0.33 for Perl allow the sender to choose the signature algorithm in verify.
verify resolves the signature method class from the signature_method parameter of the incoming message. signature_method is required on every request, so the algorithm used to check a signature is chosen by whoever sent it, and nothing lets the verifying party pin the method instead. When a message names HMAC-SHA1 or HMAC-SHA256, the key is derived from consumer_secret and token_secret rather than from the key the provider deployed.
A provider deployed on RSA-SHA1 holds only the consumer public key, and RFC 5849 does not use consumer_secret for that method, so the required parameter is filled with a placeholder. A client that names HMAC-SHA1 instead has its signature checked against that placeholder, so a guessable one is enough to forge requests for any consumer key and token.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://cpan.org/modules",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"Net::OAuth"
],
"packageName": "Net-OAuth",
"packageURL": "pkg:cpan/Net-OAuth",
"programFiles": [
"lib/Net/OAuth/Message.pm",
"lib/Net/OAuth/Request.pm"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "Net::OAuth::Message::verify"
},
{
"name": "Net::OAuth::Message::_signature_method_class"
},
{
"name": "Net::OAuth::Request::signature_key"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/vurtdev/Net-OAuth",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "0.33",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "custom"
}
]
}
],
"source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Net::OAuth versions before 0.33 for Perl allow the sender to choose the signature algorithm in verify.\n\nverify resolves the signature method class from the signature_method parameter of the incoming message. signature_method is required on every request, so the algorithm used to check a signature is chosen by whoever sent it, and nothing lets the verifying party pin the method instead. When a message names HMAC-SHA1 or HMAC-SHA256, the key is derived from consumer_secret and token_secret rather than from the key the provider deployed.\n\nA provider deployed on RSA-SHA1 holds only the consumer public key, and RFC 5849 does not use consumer_secret for that method, so the required parameter is filled with a placeholder. A client that names HMAC-SHA1 instead has its signature checked against that placeholder, so a guessable one is enough to forge requests for any consumer key and token."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-72889",
"lastModified": "2026-08-19T21:17:36.520",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-08-19T08:17:13.833",
"references": [
{
"source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
"url": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5849#section-3.4.2"
},
{
"source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
"url": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5849#section-3.4.3"
},
{
"source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
"url": "https://github.com/vurtdev/Net-OAuth/commit/c467adf45c8d77ac4b92ad78b3eebf949252ba7f.patch"
},
{
"source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
"url": "https://github.com/vurtdev/Net-OAuth/security/advisories/GHSA-c8rm-g5cm-4pf5"
},
{
"source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/RRWO/Net-OAuth-0.33/changes"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/19/2"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
"vulnStatus": "Received",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-347"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-757"
}
],
"source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
Loading…
Loading…
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Loading…
The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Loading…
Loading…