FKIE_CVE-2026-80946
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-11 20:19 - Updated: 2026-09-11 20:19
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse: copy request headers via a stack buffer for io-uring
The fuse-io-uring transport copies req->in.h out to the ring in
fuse_uring_copy_to_ring() and req->out.h back in fuse_uring_commit().
Both headers live inside the fuse_request slab object, whose cache
(fuse_req_cachep) is created without a usercopy whitelist, so copying
them directly to/from userspace trips CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY and
panics:
usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLUB object
'fuse_request' (offset 56, size 40)!
kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:usercopy_abort (mm/usercopy.c:90)
Call Trace:
__check_heap_object (mm/slub.c:8268)
__check_object_size (mm/usercopy.c:197 mm/usercopy.c:258 mm/usercopy.c:223)
copy_header_to_ring (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:618)
fuse_uring_prepare_send (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:776 fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:785)
fuse_uring_send_in_task (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:1306)
tctx_task_work_run (io_uring/tw.c:96)
task_work_run (kernel/task_work.c:233)
io_run_task_work (io_uring/tw.h:84)
io_cqring_wait (io_uring/wait.c:278)
__do_sys_io_uring_enter (io_uring/io_uring.c:2685)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
Bounce both headers through an on-stack copy so the usercopy touches
stack memory, not the slab object.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/fuse/dev_uring.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "194d0fb0ea4720535ff3168c9d04c7632cec7071",
"status": "affected",
"version": "c090c8abae4b6b77a1bee116aa6c385456ebef96",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "a47a416ff68d706dc3327ab583f86b9ee757358b",
"status": "affected",
"version": "c090c8abae4b6b77a1bee116aa6c385456ebef96",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "fd10f40af314f07b6d6e028b1ca25c8b49903aab",
"status": "affected",
"version": "c090c8abae4b6b77a1bee116aa6c385456ebef96",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/fuse/dev_uring.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.14"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.14",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.51",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.4",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfuse: copy request headers via a stack buffer for io-uring\n\nThe fuse-io-uring transport copies req-\u003ein.h out to the ring in\nfuse_uring_copy_to_ring() and req-\u003eout.h back in fuse_uring_commit().\nBoth headers live inside the fuse_request slab object, whose cache\n(fuse_req_cachep) is created without a usercopy whitelist, so copying\nthem directly to/from userspace trips CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY and\npanics:\n\n usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLUB object\n \u0027fuse_request\u0027 (offset 56, size 40)!\n kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!\n Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI\n RIP: 0010:usercopy_abort (mm/usercopy.c:90)\n Call Trace:\n __check_heap_object (mm/slub.c:8268)\n __check_object_size (mm/usercopy.c:197 mm/usercopy.c:258 mm/usercopy.c:223)\n copy_header_to_ring (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:618)\n fuse_uring_prepare_send (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:776 fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:785)\n fuse_uring_send_in_task (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:1306)\n tctx_task_work_run (io_uring/tw.c:96)\n task_work_run (kernel/task_work.c:233)\n io_run_task_work (io_uring/tw.h:84)\n io_cqring_wait (io_uring/wait.c:278)\n __do_sys_io_uring_enter (io_uring/io_uring.c:2685)\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)\n\nBounce both headers through an on-stack copy so the usercopy touches\nstack memory, not the slab object."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-80946",
"lastModified": "2026-09-11T20:19:00.180",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-09-11T20:19:00.180",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/194d0fb0ea4720535ff3168c9d04c7632cec7071"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a47a416ff68d706dc3327ab583f86b9ee757358b"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fd10f40af314f07b6d6e028b1ca25c8b49903aab"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
Loading…
Loading…
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Loading…
The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Loading…
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
Loading…