FKIE_CVE-2026-81914

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-29 10:17 - Updated: 2026-09-29 21:19
Severity
4.3 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Summary
Apache Airflow's Google provider built Google Drive search expressions by interpolating file and folder names directly into single-quoted string literals, without escaping the quote character that delimits them. A name containing an apostrophe therefore terminated the literal early and appended clauses of the attacker's choosing to the query. The names are frequently not written by the Dag author. In a wildcard `gcs_to_gdrive` transfer they come from the source bucket listing, so anyone able to create objects in that bucket controls them — typically an external data producer or an ingest-only service account, a different trust principal from the Dag author. An injected clause can broaden the match and so steer which file or folder the hook resolves: an upload can be directed into a folder the attacker named, and, because downloads select the most recently modified match, a download can return a file they placed rather than the one the Dag asked for. Affects deployments passing externally-sourced names to the Google Drive hook, including wildcard `gcs_to_gdrive` transfers from buckets writable by less-trusted principals. Users are advised to upgrade to `apache-airflow-providers-google` `22.6.0` or later, which escapes quote and backslash characters in every value interpolated into a Drive query.
References
security@apache.orghttps://github.com/apache/airflow/pull/72166
security@apache.orghttps://lists.apache.org/thread/90osv795jrqds051y7v3lcdzhsospooo
af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/29/13
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://pypi.python.org",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "apache-airflow-providers-google",
          "packageURL": "pkg:pypi/apache-airflow-providers-google",
          "product": "Apache Airflow Google provider",
          "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "22.6.0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@apache.org"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Apache Airflow\u0027s Google provider built Google Drive search expressions by interpolating file and folder names directly into single-quoted string literals, without escaping the quote character that delimits them. A name containing an apostrophe therefore terminated the literal early and appended clauses of the attacker\u0027s choosing to the query.\n\nThe names are frequently not written by the Dag author. In a wildcard `gcs_to_gdrive` transfer they come from the source bucket listing, so anyone able to create objects in that bucket controls them \u2014 typically an external data producer or an ingest-only service account, a different trust principal from the Dag author. An injected clause can broaden the match and so steer which file or folder the hook resolves: an upload can be directed into a folder the attacker named, and, because downloads select the most recently modified match, a download can return a file they placed rather than the one the Dag asked for.\n\nAffects deployments passing externally-sourced names to the Google Drive hook, including wildcard `gcs_to_gdrive` transfers from buckets writable by less-trusted principals. Users are advised to upgrade to `apache-airflow-providers-google` `22.6.0` or later, which escapes quote and backslash characters in every value interpolated into a Drive query."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-81914",
  "lastModified": "2026-09-29T21:19:31.897",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 4.3,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 1.4,
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-81914",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "yes"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-09-29T20:02:49.245279Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-09-29T10:17:12.530",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/airflow/pull/72166"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/90osv795jrqds051y7v3lcdzhsospooo"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/29/13"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security@apache.org",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-943"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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