GCVE Workshop - 22 September 2026 (14:00-18:00), Luxembourg Before The Vulnopticon Conference - Registration

FKIE_CVE-2026-86304

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-06 23:17 - Updated: 2026-09-08 19:20
Severity
9.8 (Critical) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
MojoX::Authentication versions before 0.006 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass because parse_assertion builds Net::SAML2::Binding::POST without a trust anchor. parse_assertion in MojoX::Authentication::Model::SAML2 calls Net::SAML2::Binding::POST->new with no cacert, cert_text or anchors argument, then passes the returned XML to Net::SAML2::Protocol::Assertion->new_from_xml with the IdP signing certificate as cacert. In Net::SAML2 before 0.86 that certificate guards only encrypted assertions, so the signature on an unencrypted assertion is checked against the certificate the response itself carries. An attacker starts a SAML login, then posts a response signed with a certificate of their own. The audience, InResponseTo and timestamp checks that follow are all satisfiable by the attacker, so the response authenticates any NameID it carries.
References
9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441ehttps://metacpan.org/release/POLETTIX/MojoX-Authentication-0.004/source/lib/MojoX/Authentication/Model/SAML2.pm#L188
9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441ehttps://metacpan.org/release/POLETTIX/MojoX-Authentication-0.006/source/Changes
9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441ehttps://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-18089
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://cpan.org/modules",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "modules": [
            "MojoX::Authentication"
          ],
          "packageName": "MojoX-Authentication",
          "packageURL": "pkg:cpan/MojoX-Authentication",
          "programFiles": [
            "lib/MojoX/Authentication/Model/SAML2.pm"
          ],
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "MojoX::Authentication::Model::SAML2::parse_assertion"
            }
          ],
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "0.006",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "custom"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "MojoX::Authentication versions before 0.006 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass because parse_assertion builds Net::SAML2::Binding::POST without a trust anchor.\n\nparse_assertion in MojoX::Authentication::Model::SAML2 calls Net::SAML2::Binding::POST-\u003enew with no cacert, cert_text or anchors argument, then passes the returned XML to Net::SAML2::Protocol::Assertion-\u003enew_from_xml with the IdP signing certificate as cacert. In Net::SAML2 before 0.86 that certificate guards only encrypted assertions, so the signature on an unencrypted assertion is checked against the certificate the response itself carries.\n\nAn attacker starts a SAML login, then posts a response signed with a certificate of their own. The audience, InResponseTo and timestamp checks that follow are all satisfiable by the attacker, so the response authenticates any NameID it carries."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-86304",
  "lastModified": "2026-09-08T19:20:13.933",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 9.8,
          "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-86304",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "yes"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-09-08T18:41:21.191743Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-09-06T23:17:39.483",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
      "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/POLETTIX/MojoX-Authentication-0.004/source/lib/MojoX/Authentication/Model/SAML2.pm#L188"
    },
    {
      "source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
      "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/POLETTIX/MojoX-Authentication-0.006/source/Changes"
    },
    {
      "source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-18089"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-347"
        }
      ],
      "source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.





Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.