FKIE_CVE-2026-89532
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-11 20:19 - Updated: 2026-09-14 13:19
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
svcrdma: Fix pcl_for_each_segment for empty chunks
When a parsed chunk list contains a chunk whose ch_segcount is zero,
pcl_for_each_segment computes its inclusive upper bound as
&chunk->ch_segments[ch_segcount - 1]. ch_segcount is u32, so the
subtraction wraps to 0xFFFFFFFF and the bound lands far past the
ch_segments flex array. The loop body then walks unrelated memory at
sizeof(struct svc_rdma_segment) stride until it faults.
A zero-segcount chunk is reachable from the wire:
xdr_check_write_chunk() only rejects segcount values greater than
rc_maxpages, and pcl_alloc_write() links a freshly allocated chunk
onto rc_write_pcl/rc_reply_pcl before its segment-fill loop runs,
so a Write or Reply chunk advertising zero segments leaves
ch_segcount == 0 on the list. When the transport has negotiated
Send-With-Invalidate, svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey() iterates all four
PCLs with pcl_for_each_segment and dereferences segment->rs_handle
on each iteration, turning the underflow into an out-of-bounds read
and a general protection fault.
xdr_check_write_list / xdr_check_reply_chunk
pcl_alloc_write()
chunk = pcl_alloc_chunk(...) /* ch_segcount = 0 */
list_add_tail(&chunk->ch_list, &pcl->cl_chunks)
/* fill loop iterates zero times for wire segcount 0 */
svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
pcl_for_each_chunk(rc_write_pcl)
pcl_for_each_segment(segment, chunk)
pos <= &ch_segments[0u - 1u] /* 0xFFFFFFFF */
segment->rs_handle /* OOB read -> GPF */
Fix by switching the macro to a half-open upper bound that uses
ch_segcount directly. For ch_segcount == 0 the loop start equals the
loop end and the body is skipped; for ch_segcount > 0 the iteration
range is unchanged. All six existing call sites in
net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_recvfrom.c and
net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_rw.c remain correct under the new bound,
so no caller changes are needed.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"include/linux/sunrpc/svc_rdma_pcl.h"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "1e2e3481e39103a386b86be1c33eaef97cbdf16e",
"status": "affected",
"version": "78147ca8b4a9b6cf0e597ddd6bf17959e08376c2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "3a78b841879c2a3243f74edc514236fb2907167f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "78147ca8b4a9b6cf0e597ddd6bf17959e08376c2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "06d0390c37fa6714624af771bd72bbf1a7ed9bb1",
"status": "affected",
"version": "78147ca8b4a9b6cf0e597ddd6bf17959e08376c2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "9c5a03c3dc505c0295339b0a1b9e4fe36447e482",
"status": "affected",
"version": "78147ca8b4a9b6cf0e597ddd6bf17959e08376c2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "a1c954ca4977a4e6ec73ef92fe48073ec54f9fc8",
"status": "affected",
"version": "78147ca8b4a9b6cf0e597ddd6bf17959e08376c2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "6d33a7e6bf6c6b293a266a617201285a1ad32c56",
"status": "affected",
"version": "78147ca8b4a9b6cf0e597ddd6bf17959e08376c2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "b7713a784c59515d0aba558c8f5df6a0164dd3a9",
"status": "affected",
"version": "78147ca8b4a9b6cf0e597ddd6bf17959e08376c2",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"include/linux/sunrpc/svc_rdma_pcl.h"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.11"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.11",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.221",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.188",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.157",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.109",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.50",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.4",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsvcrdma: Fix pcl_for_each_segment for empty chunks\n\nWhen a parsed chunk list contains a chunk whose ch_segcount is zero,\npcl_for_each_segment computes its inclusive upper bound as\n\u0026chunk-\u003ech_segments[ch_segcount - 1]. ch_segcount is u32, so the\nsubtraction wraps to 0xFFFFFFFF and the bound lands far past the\nch_segments flex array. The loop body then walks unrelated memory at\nsizeof(struct svc_rdma_segment) stride until it faults.\n\nA zero-segcount chunk is reachable from the wire:\nxdr_check_write_chunk() only rejects segcount values greater than\nrc_maxpages, and pcl_alloc_write() links a freshly allocated chunk\nonto rc_write_pcl/rc_reply_pcl before its segment-fill loop runs,\nso a Write or Reply chunk advertising zero segments leaves\nch_segcount == 0 on the list. When the transport has negotiated\nSend-With-Invalidate, svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey() iterates all four\nPCLs with pcl_for_each_segment and dereferences segment-\u003ers_handle\non each iteration, turning the underflow into an out-of-bounds read\nand a general protection fault.\n\n xdr_check_write_list / xdr_check_reply_chunk\n pcl_alloc_write()\n chunk = pcl_alloc_chunk(...) /* ch_segcount = 0 */\n list_add_tail(\u0026chunk-\u003ech_list, \u0026pcl-\u003ecl_chunks)\n /* fill loop iterates zero times for wire segcount 0 */\n\n svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()\n pcl_for_each_chunk(rc_write_pcl)\n pcl_for_each_segment(segment, chunk)\n pos \u003c= \u0026ch_segments[0u - 1u] /* 0xFFFFFFFF */\n segment-\u003ers_handle /* OOB read -\u003e GPF */\n\nFix by switching the macro to a half-open upper bound that uses\nch_segcount directly. For ch_segcount == 0 the loop start equals the\nloop end and the body is skipped; for ch_segcount \u003e 0 the iteration\nrange is unchanged. All six existing call sites in\nnet/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_recvfrom.c and\nnet/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_rw.c remain correct under the new bound,\nso no caller changes are needed."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-89532",
"lastModified": "2026-09-14T13:19:08.400",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 9.1,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 5.2,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-09-11T20:19:36.117",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/06d0390c37fa6714624af771bd72bbf1a7ed9bb1"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1e2e3481e39103a386b86be1c33eaef97cbdf16e"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3a78b841879c2a3243f74edc514236fb2907167f"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6d33a7e6bf6c6b293a266a617201285a1ad32c56"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9c5a03c3dc505c0295339b0a1b9e4fe36447e482"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a1c954ca4977a4e6ec73ef92fe48073ec54f9fc8"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b7713a784c59515d0aba558c8f5df6a0164dd3a9"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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