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FKIE_CVE-2026-89533

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-11 20:19 - Updated: 2026-09-14 13:19
Severity
9.8 (Critical) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: svcrdma: Fix offset arithmetic in read_chunk_range svc_rdma_read_chunk_range() walks a Read chunk's segment list to build a sub-range starting at byte offset and spanning length bytes for a Position-Zero or Call chunk. Two arithmetic defects in the per-segment loop produce wrong DMA lengths and a u32 underflow: pcl_for_each_segment(segment, chunk) { if (offset > segment->rs_length) { offset -= segment->rs_length; continue; } dummy.rs_handle = segment->rs_handle; dummy.rs_length = min_t(u32, length, segment->rs_length) - offset; dummy.rs_offset = segment->rs_offset + offset; First, the skip predicate uses '>' instead of '>='. When offset equals the segment's full rs_length, the segment is fully consumed and should be skipped, but the loop falls through into the body. The resulting dummy.rs_length is min_t(u32, length, rs_length) - rs_length, which underflows to a near-UINT_MAX u32 when length is smaller than rs_length, or is zero otherwise. Second, the length formula subtracts offset from the min_t() result rather than from segment->rs_length before the cap. For offset > 0 the segment's residual is rs_length - offset, not rs_length, so the cap must be applied to the residual. With the current bracketing, whenever length is smaller than rs_length - offset the per-segment length becomes length - offset instead of length, silently dropping offset bytes from the rebuilt chunk. Combined with the boundary case above it also enables the u32 underflow path, which propagates a huge nr_bvec into svc_rdma_build_read_segment() and a multi-MiB kmalloc_array_node() in svc_rdma_get_rw_ctxt(). Additionally, svc_rdma_read_call_chunk() can invoke this function with length == 0 when the last Read chunk ends exactly at the end of the Call chunk. With the corrected >= predicate, every segment is skipped and the function returns the initial -EINVAL, rejecting a valid request. Return success immediately when length is zero. Also break out of the loop once length is fully consumed to avoid passing zero-length segments to svc_rdma_build_read_segment(). Fix by using '>=' so a fully-consumed segment is skipped, by moving '- offset' inside min_t() so the cap is applied to the segment's residual length, by returning success for zero-length requests, and by stopping iteration when the requested range has been consumed.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/10873311f91db9454e2fadbf9866bc819e0646d9
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4493c96bbd0068fadf69cbae8d13426202e34cdc
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4a44c140cc2f3643a39e258bb0c0ab9d0f494f5e
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6ee4dc7476b3abc92ec1d444533a559f33f59561
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a46b35f213c2426f5d6a0458a8f7e873fc59cdfd
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/addbf02dfe3b25e7e38e03bbd4e2a6ed86a14be7
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cba8543c18cf42fd80fd63effb6df6ff4f7e73ce
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_rw.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "10873311f91db9454e2fadbf9866bc819e0646d9",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "d7cc73972661be4a02a1b09f1d9b3283c6c05154",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "addbf02dfe3b25e7e38e03bbd4e2a6ed86a14be7",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "d7cc73972661be4a02a1b09f1d9b3283c6c05154",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "cba8543c18cf42fd80fd63effb6df6ff4f7e73ce",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "d7cc73972661be4a02a1b09f1d9b3283c6c05154",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6ee4dc7476b3abc92ec1d444533a559f33f59561",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "d7cc73972661be4a02a1b09f1d9b3283c6c05154",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "a46b35f213c2426f5d6a0458a8f7e873fc59cdfd",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "d7cc73972661be4a02a1b09f1d9b3283c6c05154",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "4493c96bbd0068fadf69cbae8d13426202e34cdc",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "d7cc73972661be4a02a1b09f1d9b3283c6c05154",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "4a44c140cc2f3643a39e258bb0c0ab9d0f494f5e",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "d7cc73972661be4a02a1b09f1d9b3283c6c05154",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_rw.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5.11"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "5.11",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "5.15.221",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.1.188",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.6.157",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.109",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.50",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.4",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3-rc1",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsvcrdma: Fix offset arithmetic in read_chunk_range\n\nsvc_rdma_read_chunk_range() walks a Read chunk\u0027s segment list to\nbuild a sub-range starting at byte offset and spanning length bytes\nfor a Position-Zero or Call chunk. Two arithmetic defects in the\nper-segment loop produce wrong DMA lengths and a u32 underflow:\n\n    pcl_for_each_segment(segment, chunk) {\n            if (offset \u003e segment-\u003ers_length) {\n                    offset -= segment-\u003ers_length;\n                    continue;\n            }\n\n            dummy.rs_handle = segment-\u003ers_handle;\n            dummy.rs_length = min_t(u32, length,\n                                    segment-\u003ers_length) - offset;\n            dummy.rs_offset = segment-\u003ers_offset + offset;\n\nFirst, the skip predicate uses \u0027\u003e\u0027 instead of \u0027\u003e=\u0027. When offset\nequals the segment\u0027s full rs_length, the segment is fully consumed\nand should be skipped, but the loop falls through into the body.\nThe resulting dummy.rs_length is min_t(u32, length, rs_length) -\nrs_length, which underflows to a near-UINT_MAX u32 when length is\nsmaller than rs_length, or is zero otherwise.\n\nSecond, the length formula subtracts offset from the min_t() result\nrather than from segment-\u003ers_length before the cap. For offset \u003e 0\nthe segment\u0027s residual is rs_length - offset, not rs_length, so the\ncap must be applied to the residual. With the current bracketing,\nwhenever length is smaller than rs_length - offset the per-segment\nlength becomes length - offset instead of length, silently dropping\noffset bytes from the rebuilt chunk. Combined with the boundary\ncase above it also enables the u32 underflow path, which propagates\na huge nr_bvec into svc_rdma_build_read_segment() and a multi-MiB\nkmalloc_array_node() in svc_rdma_get_rw_ctxt().\n\nAdditionally, svc_rdma_read_call_chunk() can invoke this function\nwith length == 0 when the last Read chunk ends exactly at the end\nof the Call chunk. With the corrected \u003e= predicate, every segment\nis skipped and the function returns the initial -EINVAL, rejecting\na valid request. Return success immediately when length is zero.\nAlso break out of the loop once length is fully consumed to avoid\npassing zero-length segments to svc_rdma_build_read_segment().\n\nFix by using \u0027\u003e=\u0027 so a fully-consumed segment is skipped, by\nmoving \u0027- offset\u0027 inside min_t() so the cap is applied to the\nsegment\u0027s residual length, by returning success for zero-length\nrequests, and by stopping iteration when the requested range has\nbeen consumed."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-89533",
  "lastModified": "2026-09-14T13:19:08.560",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 9.8,
          "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-09-11T20:19:36.250",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/10873311f91db9454e2fadbf9866bc819e0646d9"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4493c96bbd0068fadf69cbae8d13426202e34cdc"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4a44c140cc2f3643a39e258bb0c0ab9d0f494f5e"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6ee4dc7476b3abc92ec1d444533a559f33f59561"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a46b35f213c2426f5d6a0458a8f7e873fc59cdfd"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/addbf02dfe3b25e7e38e03bbd4e2a6ed86a14be7"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cba8543c18cf42fd80fd63effb6df6ff4f7e73ce"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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