FKIE_CVE-2026-89540
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-11 20:19 - Updated: 2026-09-14 13:19
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sunrpc: init gssp_lock before publishing proc entry
create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry() publishes /proc/net/rpc/use-gss-proxy
via proc_create_data() before init_gssp_clnt() runs mutex_init() on
sn->gssp_lock. Once the dentry is linked under proc_subdir_lock it is
immediately reachable from userspace, so a write that lands in the
window drives set_gssp_clnt() into mutex_lock() on a zero-initialized
struct mutex.
create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(net)
proc_create_data("use-gss-proxy", ...) /* dentry live */
init_gssp_clnt(sn)
mutex_init(&sn->gssp_lock) /* too late */
write_gssp()
set_gssp_clnt(net)
mutex_lock(&sn->gssp_lock) /* uninitialized */
gssp_rpc_create(...)
sn->gssp_clnt = clnt
mutex_unlock(&sn->gssp_lock)
The window spans only the two statements between proc_create_data()
returning and init_gssp_clnt(), so a writer reaches it only if the
registering thread is preempted there while another task is already
opening the freshly published file. register_pernet_subsys() runs in
preemptible context under pernet_ops_rwsem, so that preemption is
possible, and the window widens on auth_rpcgss module load, when the
proc entry is created for every live net namespace whose tasks are
already running. A writer that wins the race locks a zero-filled
struct mutex. On CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES the missing magic value trips a
"lock used without init" splat; on a production kernel the fast path
acquires the lock via CMPXCHG(owner, 0, current). In the latter case
a second writer that arrives before init_gssp_clnt() re-zeroes owner
can enter set_gssp_clnt() concurrently, shut down the first writer's
clnt while it is still in use, and leak the loser's clnt.
Fix by initializing sn->gssp_lock in sunrpc_init_net() so its lifetime
matches the sunrpc_net it lives in. sn->gssp_clnt is already NULL from
the kzalloc that backs net_generic storage, so the lazy helper is no
longer needed; drop init_gssp_clnt(), its prototype, and the call from
create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(). sunrpc.ko is a build-time
dependency of auth_rpcgss.ko, so sunrpc_init_net() has always run on
every netns before any auth_gss pernet init can publish the proc
entry.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c",
"net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.h",
"net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c",
"net/sunrpc/sunrpc_syms.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "159a4fab7170badd6c4a553aef81cac079d6f4ee",
"status": "affected",
"version": "030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "b3526ae3351968f6726bcbe25d8d09973ad79109",
"status": "affected",
"version": "030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "7f5bcdc8da15077ebe846c2756a5a17741021410",
"status": "affected",
"version": "030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "89c8e0733e8c46b7973503f15b1b31a8587d8030",
"status": "affected",
"version": "030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "f15b87521168c2a92cb1931f532cba422f856f01",
"status": "affected",
"version": "030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "edeefb111d6181a4aa278f415b005efe284b9489",
"status": "affected",
"version": "030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "3f019571928b269feebcff59926ec13294215e0e",
"status": "affected",
"version": "030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "5ce1ed6159731a41fdd0b03eedbed4e147036a5a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c",
"net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.h",
"net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c",
"net/sunrpc/sunrpc_syms.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "3.10"
},
{
"lessThan": "3.10",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.10.270",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.221",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.188",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.157",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.109",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.50",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.4",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsunrpc: init gssp_lock before publishing proc entry\n\ncreate_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry() publishes /proc/net/rpc/use-gss-proxy\nvia proc_create_data() before init_gssp_clnt() runs mutex_init() on\nsn-\u003egssp_lock. Once the dentry is linked under proc_subdir_lock it is\nimmediately reachable from userspace, so a write that lands in the\nwindow drives set_gssp_clnt() into mutex_lock() on a zero-initialized\nstruct mutex.\n\n create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(net)\n proc_create_data(\"use-gss-proxy\", ...) /* dentry live */\n init_gssp_clnt(sn)\n mutex_init(\u0026sn-\u003egssp_lock) /* too late */\n\n write_gssp()\n set_gssp_clnt(net)\n mutex_lock(\u0026sn-\u003egssp_lock) /* uninitialized */\n gssp_rpc_create(...)\n sn-\u003egssp_clnt = clnt\n mutex_unlock(\u0026sn-\u003egssp_lock)\n\nThe window spans only the two statements between proc_create_data()\nreturning and init_gssp_clnt(), so a writer reaches it only if the\nregistering thread is preempted there while another task is already\nopening the freshly published file. register_pernet_subsys() runs in\npreemptible context under pernet_ops_rwsem, so that preemption is\npossible, and the window widens on auth_rpcgss module load, when the\nproc entry is created for every live net namespace whose tasks are\nalready running. A writer that wins the race locks a zero-filled\nstruct mutex. On CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES the missing magic value trips a\n\"lock used without init\" splat; on a production kernel the fast path\nacquires the lock via CMPXCHG(owner, 0, current). In the latter case\na second writer that arrives before init_gssp_clnt() re-zeroes owner\ncan enter set_gssp_clnt() concurrently, shut down the first writer\u0027s\nclnt while it is still in use, and leak the loser\u0027s clnt.\n\nFix by initializing sn-\u003egssp_lock in sunrpc_init_net() so its lifetime\nmatches the sunrpc_net it lives in. sn-\u003egssp_clnt is already NULL from\nthe kzalloc that backs net_generic storage, so the lazy helper is no\nlonger needed; drop init_gssp_clnt(), its prototype, and the call from\ncreate_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(). sunrpc.ko is a build-time\ndependency of auth_rpcgss.ko, so sunrpc_init_net() has always run on\nevery netns before any auth_gss pernet init can publish the proc\nentry."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-89540",
"lastModified": "2026-09-14T13:19:09.030",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-09-11T20:19:37.097",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/159a4fab7170badd6c4a553aef81cac079d6f4ee"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3f019571928b269feebcff59926ec13294215e0e"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5ce1ed6159731a41fdd0b03eedbed4e147036a5a"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7f5bcdc8da15077ebe846c2756a5a17741021410"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89c8e0733e8c46b7973503f15b1b31a8587d8030"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b3526ae3351968f6726bcbe25d8d09973ad79109"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/edeefb111d6181a4aa278f415b005efe284b9489"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f15b87521168c2a92cb1931f532cba422f856f01"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
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