FKIE_CVE-2026-89542
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-11 20:19 - Updated: 2026-09-14 13:19
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: harden gss_krb5_unwrap_v2 against short tokens
gss_krb5_unwrap_v2() reads the EC and RRC header fields at ptr+4 and
ptr+6 before validating that the token is at least GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN
(16) bytes long, and its rotate_left() helper passes buf->len - base
to xdr_buf_subsegment() without verifying that base <= buf->len. When
a caller hands in a sub-16-byte token, or a token whose declared len
leaves base past the end of the buffer, three distinct failures follow:
gss_krb5_unwrap_v2(offset, len, buf)
ptr = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset
ec = *(ptr + 4) /* OOB read on short head */
rrc = *(ptr + 6) /* OOB read on short head */
rotate_left(offset + 16, buf, rrc)
xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &subbuf,
base, buf->len - base) /* u32 wrap when base > len */
_rotate_left(&subbuf, shift)
shift %= buf->len /* divide-by-zero when base == len */
After decryption, the cleanup arithmetic has the same shape:
movelen = min_t(unsigned int, buf->head[0].iov_len, len);
movelen -= offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip;
BUG_ON(offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip + movelen >
buf->head[0].iov_len);
The BUG_ON re-adds the value just subtracted, so it reduces to
min(A, B) > A and is permanently false; it cannot catch the unsigned
underflow of movelen, which then drives a ~UINT_MAX-byte memmove().
Add four defense-in-depth guards inside the unwrap core so it is safe
regardless of what its callers validate:
- reject tokens with len - offset < GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN before
touching ptr+4/ptr+6;
- bail from rotate_left() when buf->len <= base, covering both the
underflow and zero-length cases;
- return early from _rotate_left() when buf->len is zero, so the
shift %= buf->len modulo cannot fault;
- replace the dead BUG_ON with a live check that returns
GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN before the movelen subtraction.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "299d281c7225ded15b28cb861a98d818d82787fc",
"status": "affected",
"version": "de9c17eb4a912c9028f7b470eb80815144883b26",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "84ddbc8d084c0251d534f14f5d1a7da05be56404",
"status": "affected",
"version": "de9c17eb4a912c9028f7b470eb80815144883b26",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "075d7cfc4df8c54cb202ba8b28420370c03ba9b6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "de9c17eb4a912c9028f7b470eb80815144883b26",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "f2591660e0eb263c9415bf0d0bb1b111e62df7a4",
"status": "affected",
"version": "de9c17eb4a912c9028f7b470eb80815144883b26",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "dddcb0f4b7e27fac16a78ea9a1c8ec2e8a241087",
"status": "affected",
"version": "de9c17eb4a912c9028f7b470eb80815144883b26",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "806584a4b67a7233870c33e5b8f872e76dd02988",
"status": "affected",
"version": "de9c17eb4a912c9028f7b470eb80815144883b26",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "a7894e10572d53eb10109b8d07459cc8d3435811",
"status": "affected",
"version": "de9c17eb4a912c9028f7b470eb80815144883b26",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "6959297aaa9572783d620a226d73c3fb94494888",
"status": "affected",
"version": "de9c17eb4a912c9028f7b470eb80815144883b26",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.6.35"
},
{
"lessThan": "2.6.35",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.10.270",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.221",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.188",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.157",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.109",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.50",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.4",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nSUNRPC: harden gss_krb5_unwrap_v2 against short tokens\n\ngss_krb5_unwrap_v2() reads the EC and RRC header fields at ptr+4 and\nptr+6 before validating that the token is at least GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN\n(16) bytes long, and its rotate_left() helper passes buf-\u003elen - base\nto xdr_buf_subsegment() without verifying that base \u003c= buf-\u003elen. When\na caller hands in a sub-16-byte token, or a token whose declared len\nleaves base past the end of the buffer, three distinct failures follow:\n\n gss_krb5_unwrap_v2(offset, len, buf)\n ptr = buf-\u003ehead[0].iov_base + offset\n ec = *(ptr + 4) /* OOB read on short head */\n rrc = *(ptr + 6) /* OOB read on short head */\n rotate_left(offset + 16, buf, rrc)\n xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, \u0026subbuf,\n base, buf-\u003elen - base) /* u32 wrap when base \u003e len */\n _rotate_left(\u0026subbuf, shift)\n shift %= buf-\u003elen /* divide-by-zero when base == len */\n\nAfter decryption, the cleanup arithmetic has the same shape:\n\n movelen = min_t(unsigned int, buf-\u003ehead[0].iov_len, len);\n movelen -= offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip;\n BUG_ON(offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip + movelen \u003e\n buf-\u003ehead[0].iov_len);\n\nThe BUG_ON re-adds the value just subtracted, so it reduces to\nmin(A, B) \u003e A and is permanently false; it cannot catch the unsigned\nunderflow of movelen, which then drives a ~UINT_MAX-byte memmove().\n\nAdd four defense-in-depth guards inside the unwrap core so it is safe\nregardless of what its callers validate:\n\n - reject tokens with len - offset \u003c GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN before\n touching ptr+4/ptr+6;\n - bail from rotate_left() when buf-\u003elen \u003c= base, covering both the\n underflow and zero-length cases;\n - return early from _rotate_left() when buf-\u003elen is zero, so the\n shift %= buf-\u003elen modulo cannot fault;\n - replace the dead BUG_ON with a live check that returns\n GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN before the movelen subtraction."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-89542",
"lastModified": "2026-09-14T13:19:09.370",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 9.8,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-09-11T20:19:37.380",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/075d7cfc4df8c54cb202ba8b28420370c03ba9b6"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/299d281c7225ded15b28cb861a98d818d82787fc"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6959297aaa9572783d620a226d73c3fb94494888"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/806584a4b67a7233870c33e5b8f872e76dd02988"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/84ddbc8d084c0251d534f14f5d1a7da05be56404"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a7894e10572d53eb10109b8d07459cc8d3435811"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dddcb0f4b7e27fac16a78ea9a1c8ec2e8a241087"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f2591660e0eb263c9415bf0d0bb1b111e62df7a4"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
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