FKIE_CVE-2026-89579
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-11 20:19 - Updated: 2026-09-14 13:19
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Harden bloom filter sizing and indexing on 32-bit kernels
bloom_map_alloc() has two 32-bit-specific problems when the computed
bitmap reaches the U32_MAX fallback case.
First, BITS_TO_BYTES(U32_MAX) is evaluated with 32-bit arithmetic. The
addition performed by DIV_ROUND_UP wraps, so the map allocates only the
fixed-size bloom filter object while keeping bitset_mask == U32_MAX.
Subsequent updates can then write past the allocated object.
Second, fixing only the allocation size is not sufficient. The bloom hash
is a u32, but set_bit() takes a signed long bit number and x86 test_bit()
eventually feeds the index to variable_test_bit(long, ...). On 32-bit
kernels, hashes in [0x80000000, U32_MAX] therefore become negative bit
offsets. x86 bt/bts with a memory operand interpret those offsets relative
to the supplied base, so a map with bitset_mask == U32_MAX can read or
write before bloom->bitset even after allocating the full 512 MiB bitmap.
Keep the U32_MAX fallback, but split each hash into a word pointer and an
in-word bit number before calling test_bit() or set_bit(). The bitops
argument is then always in [0, BITS_PER_LONG - 1], while BIT_WORD(h) still
selects the intended word in the full bitmap.
Compute the bitset size from (u64)bitset_mask + 1 before passing the final
size to bpf_map_area_alloc(). This fixes the original under-allocation and
keeps the allocated storage consistent with the addressable bitset.
Exploitation note: local privilege escalation is possible on a 32-bit x86
kernel using the under-allocation bug from a binary with CAP_BPF.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"kernel/bpf/bloom_filter.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "a6183bc683f97f4317f7e84939ca7fff37c5688b",
"status": "affected",
"version": "9330986c03006ab1d33d243b7cfe598a7a3c1baa",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "80551bf8912c42d1e3d55eec6fa3c40f306c3de8",
"status": "affected",
"version": "9330986c03006ab1d33d243b7cfe598a7a3c1baa",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "3b7a13eccfcf97714ffc1ca6aa663d66d4a30e29",
"status": "affected",
"version": "9330986c03006ab1d33d243b7cfe598a7a3c1baa",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "272fcb4ba6fab678db0eb966dc81c4c804bef64a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "9330986c03006ab1d33d243b7cfe598a7a3c1baa",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "dff481e12b3f127739f6a4ea7cef2c25dc12e056",
"status": "affected",
"version": "9330986c03006ab1d33d243b7cfe598a7a3c1baa",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "11c1e836710dcba03e50454a4eedfdbaf8d3050e",
"status": "affected",
"version": "9330986c03006ab1d33d243b7cfe598a7a3c1baa",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"kernel/bpf/bloom_filter.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.16"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.16",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.188",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.157",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.109",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.50",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.4",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Harden bloom filter sizing and indexing on 32-bit kernels\n\nbloom_map_alloc() has two 32-bit-specific problems when the computed\nbitmap reaches the U32_MAX fallback case.\n\nFirst, BITS_TO_BYTES(U32_MAX) is evaluated with 32-bit arithmetic. The\naddition performed by DIV_ROUND_UP wraps, so the map allocates only the\nfixed-size bloom filter object while keeping bitset_mask == U32_MAX.\nSubsequent updates can then write past the allocated object.\n\nSecond, fixing only the allocation size is not sufficient. The bloom hash\nis a u32, but set_bit() takes a signed long bit number and x86 test_bit()\neventually feeds the index to variable_test_bit(long, ...). On 32-bit\nkernels, hashes in [0x80000000, U32_MAX] therefore become negative bit\noffsets. x86 bt/bts with a memory operand interpret those offsets relative\nto the supplied base, so a map with bitset_mask == U32_MAX can read or\nwrite before bloom-\u003ebitset even after allocating the full 512 MiB bitmap.\n\nKeep the U32_MAX fallback, but split each hash into a word pointer and an\nin-word bit number before calling test_bit() or set_bit(). The bitops\nargument is then always in [0, BITS_PER_LONG - 1], while BIT_WORD(h) still\nselects the intended word in the full bitmap.\n\nCompute the bitset size from (u64)bitset_mask + 1 before passing the final\nsize to bpf_map_area_alloc(). This fixes the original under-allocation and\nkeeps the allocated storage consistent with the addressable bitset.\n\nExploitation note: local privilege escalation is possible on a 32-bit x86\nkernel using the under-allocation bug from a binary with CAP_BPF."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-89579",
"lastModified": "2026-09-14T13:19:12.303",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-09-11T20:19:42.127",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/11c1e836710dcba03e50454a4eedfdbaf8d3050e"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/272fcb4ba6fab678db0eb966dc81c4c804bef64a"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3b7a13eccfcf97714ffc1ca6aa663d66d4a30e29"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/80551bf8912c42d1e3d55eec6fa3c40f306c3de8"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a6183bc683f97f4317f7e84939ca7fff37c5688b"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dff481e12b3f127739f6a4ea7cef2c25dc12e056"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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