FKIE_CVE-2026-89624
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-11 20:19 - Updated: 2026-09-13 07:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: universal-pidff: stop the device when force-feedback init fails
universal_pidff_probe() starts the device with hid_hw_start() and then, if
force-feedback initialisation fails, returns the error through a label that
only does "return error". The device is left started.
The HID core does not unwind on the driver's behalf. __hid_device_probe()
releases the devres group, closes the report and clears hdev->driver:
if (ret) {
devres_release_group(&hdev->dev, hdev->devres_group_id);
hid_close_report(hdev);
hdev->driver = NULL;
}
The hidraw character device that hid_hw_start() registered through
hid_connect() is allocated with kzalloc() and added with cdev_device_add(),
so it is not devres-managed and survives that. With hdev->driver NULL,
hid_device_remove() skips hid_hw_stop() as well, because it only unwinds
while a driver is still attached. The registration therefore outlives the
device on both paths.
Opening the surviving /dev/hidrawX writes into freed memory. KASAN reports
a use-after-free write from hidraw_open() -> hid_hw_open() -> the
transport's open callback, which takes a spinlock inside the freed object.
A descriptor that carries a PID usage page and no input reports is enough:
hidraw claims the device so hid_hw_start() succeeds, while hid->inputs
stays empty so force-feedback init fails. The other failure returns in
hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() - no output reports, an allocation failure,
pidff_init_fields(), pidff_check_autocenter(), an unusable effect count,
input_ff_create() - all reach the same label.
Stop the device on that path. hid-dr.c and hid-emsff.c, which start the
device with the same HID_CONNECT_DEFAULT & ~HID_CONNECT_FF mask, already do
this. The two earlier gotos must keep returning without hid_hw_stop(),
since neither has a started device, so give the path that fails after the
start its own label.
Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/hid/hid-universal-pidff.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "01d9874e84d3ab78fd212ad822412eb3af84497f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f06bf8d94fffbb544b1cb5402c92e0a075f0d420",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "c457bb516b61edeab940235a011928e26925381e",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f06bf8d94fffbb544b1cb5402c92e0a075f0d420",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "ce08c5555cabcd444d8b77fa69a7cb68bb05f611",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f06bf8d94fffbb544b1cb5402c92e0a075f0d420",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "c1fde337b317f0a226de92803288741c30799eb0",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "f45f26a6b3e7260c129c7c6bb0ace63aeb7b3868",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "af9f2471dfe5a48384f5b7f021a673fbc741465e",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "b797352954eee6dc084cfaed0659dea60adfb484",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.7",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.6.88",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.13",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.12.24",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.14",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.13.12",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.15",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.14.3",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/hid/hid-universal-pidff.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.15"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.15",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.50",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.4",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nHID: universal-pidff: stop the device when force-feedback init fails\n\nuniversal_pidff_probe() starts the device with hid_hw_start() and then, if\nforce-feedback initialisation fails, returns the error through a label that\nonly does \"return error\". The device is left started.\n\nThe HID core does not unwind on the driver\u0027s behalf. __hid_device_probe()\nreleases the devres group, closes the report and clears hdev-\u003edriver:\n\n\tif (ret) {\n\t\tdevres_release_group(\u0026hdev-\u003edev, hdev-\u003edevres_group_id);\n\t\thid_close_report(hdev);\n\t\thdev-\u003edriver = NULL;\n\t}\n\nThe hidraw character device that hid_hw_start() registered through\nhid_connect() is allocated with kzalloc() and added with cdev_device_add(),\nso it is not devres-managed and survives that. With hdev-\u003edriver NULL,\nhid_device_remove() skips hid_hw_stop() as well, because it only unwinds\nwhile a driver is still attached. The registration therefore outlives the\ndevice on both paths.\n\nOpening the surviving /dev/hidrawX writes into freed memory. KASAN reports\na use-after-free write from hidraw_open() -\u003e hid_hw_open() -\u003e the\ntransport\u0027s open callback, which takes a spinlock inside the freed object.\nA descriptor that carries a PID usage page and no input reports is enough:\nhidraw claims the device so hid_hw_start() succeeds, while hid-\u003einputs\nstays empty so force-feedback init fails. The other failure returns in\nhid_pidff_init_with_quirks() - no output reports, an allocation failure,\npidff_init_fields(), pidff_check_autocenter(), an unusable effect count,\ninput_ff_create() - all reach the same label.\n\nStop the device on that path. hid-dr.c and hid-emsff.c, which start the\ndevice with the same HID_CONNECT_DEFAULT \u0026 ~HID_CONNECT_FF mask, already do\nthis. The two earlier gotos must keep returning without hid_hw_stop(),\nsince neither has a started device, so give the path that fails after the\nstart its own label.\n\nDiscovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee \u003cbaul.lee@xbow.com\u003e"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-89624",
"lastModified": "2026-09-13T07:17:27.800",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-09-11T20:19:47.750",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/01d9874e84d3ab78fd212ad822412eb3af84497f"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c457bb516b61edeab940235a011928e26925381e"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ce08c5555cabcd444d8b77fa69a7cb68bb05f611"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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