FKIE_CVE-2026-89651
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-11 20:19 - Updated: 2026-09-13 07:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: bound MDSCapAuth path and fs_name decode in handle_session()
handle_session() decodes the MDSCapAuth records carried by a
CEPH_SESSION_OPEN message (msg_version >= 6). For each record the
match.path and match.fs_name byte strings are read by first decoding a
32-bit length and then copying that many bytes with the bare
ceph_decode_copy(). Unlike the surrounding fields, which all use the
_safe decode variants, these two copies are not preceded by a
ceph_decode_need() bounds check, and the enclosing MDSCapAuth and
MDSCapMatch struct_len fields are skipped rather than enforced as an
upper bound. A length larger than the bytes remaining in the message
front makes ceph_decode_copy() read past the end of the front buffer.
The message front is a dedicated allocation (ceph_msg_new2() ->
kvmalloc), so the over-read runs off that object. A malicious or
compromised MDS can trigger this with the first post-connect message on
mount, with no client-side user interaction; under KASAN it is reported
as a slab-out-of-bounds read in handle_session().
Impact: a malicious MDS can force the kernel client to read up to 4 GiB
past the message front allocation during session setup, crashing the
client (out-of-bounds read).
Switch both copies to ceph_decode_copy_safe(), which performs the
ceph_decode_need() bounds check before the copy and branches to the
existing bad label, matching the rest of the decoder and the error path
that frees the partially decoded cap_auths array.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/ceph/mds_client.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "dc5c7dffda92ef372fa587c444a1c537373df824",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1d17de9534cb5a4c4c380d174cc2f9281b34f89e",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "c37db86d2b5e9b57001ccae7e7a727e95a4f9c02",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1d17de9534cb5a4c4c380d174cc2f9281b34f89e",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "5f892c767b30e4fb0c744c59f9235c717383d2cd",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1d17de9534cb5a4c4c380d174cc2f9281b34f89e",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "77933e22adfe813be2bd10be08d6e950103c3967",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1d17de9534cb5a4c4c380d174cc2f9281b34f89e",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/ceph/mds_client.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.10"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.10",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.109",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.50",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.4",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nceph: bound MDSCapAuth path and fs_name decode in handle_session()\n\nhandle_session() decodes the MDSCapAuth records carried by a\nCEPH_SESSION_OPEN message (msg_version \u003e= 6). For each record the\nmatch.path and match.fs_name byte strings are read by first decoding a\n32-bit length and then copying that many bytes with the bare\nceph_decode_copy(). Unlike the surrounding fields, which all use the\n_safe decode variants, these two copies are not preceded by a\nceph_decode_need() bounds check, and the enclosing MDSCapAuth and\nMDSCapMatch struct_len fields are skipped rather than enforced as an\nupper bound. A length larger than the bytes remaining in the message\nfront makes ceph_decode_copy() read past the end of the front buffer.\n\nThe message front is a dedicated allocation (ceph_msg_new2() -\u003e\nkvmalloc), so the over-read runs off that object. A malicious or\ncompromised MDS can trigger this with the first post-connect message on\nmount, with no client-side user interaction; under KASAN it is reported\nas a slab-out-of-bounds read in handle_session().\n\nImpact: a malicious MDS can force the kernel client to read up to 4 GiB\npast the message front allocation during session setup, crashing the\nclient (out-of-bounds read).\n\nSwitch both copies to ceph_decode_copy_safe(), which performs the\nceph_decode_need() bounds check before the copy and branches to the\nexisting bad label, matching the rest of the decoder and the error path\nthat frees the partially decoded cap_auths array."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-89651",
"lastModified": "2026-09-13T07:17:30.417",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 9.8,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-09-11T20:19:51.150",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5f892c767b30e4fb0c744c59f9235c717383d2cd"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/77933e22adfe813be2bd10be08d6e950103c3967"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c37db86d2b5e9b57001ccae7e7a727e95a4f9c02"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dc5c7dffda92ef372fa587c444a1c537373df824"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
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