FKIE_CVE-2026-89664
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-11 20:19 - Updated: 2026-09-13 07:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: release OPEN-decoded posix ACLs via op_release
nfsd4_decode_createhow4() calls nfsd4_decode_fattr4(), which allocates
refcounted struct posix_acl objects via posix_acl_alloc() and stores
them in open->op_pacl and open->op_dpacl. These pointers must be
released once the OPEN compound finishes.
When nfsd4_decode_open_claim4() returns a non-seqid-mutating error,
the dispatcher short-circuits before op_func runs:
nfsd4_proc_compound()
if (op->status && op->opnum == OP_OPEN)
op->status = nfsd4_open_omfg(...)
if (!seqid_mutating_err(ntohl(op->status)))
return op->status; /* nfsd4_open() never runs */
...
opdesc->op_release(&op->u) /* must still release op_pacl/op_dpacl */
Before this change OP_OPEN had no .op_release in nfsd4_ops[], and the
release pair lived inside nfsd4_open() at its out_err: label. On the
short-circuit path nfsd4_open() is never invoked, so both posix_acl
refs leak on every malformed OPEN compound that carries valid POSIX
ACL createhow4 attributes.
Add nfsd4_open_release() and wire it as .op_release for OP_OPEN.
posix_acl_release() is NULL-safe, so the single release site covers
both the normal path and the nfsd4_open_omfg short-circuit. Remove
the matching posix_acl_release() pair from nfsd4_open()'s out_err:
label to avoid double-releasing.
The compound loop has two encoding branches: nfsd4_encode_operation()
for normal ops, and nfsd4_encode_replay() for v4.0 replayed ops.
op_release was only called from nfsd4_encode_operation(), so resources
attached to op->u leak on the replay path.
Move the op_release() call out of nfsd4_encode_operation() and the
replay branch, placing it after the if-else in nfsd4_proc_compound().
This gives a single call site in a fairly obviously-correct place,
covering both the normal encoding and replay paths.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c",
"fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "5b3a7d7c23c071efe12dd1bc1d2e5f97c4892921",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5fc51dfc2eb160bd7ab3251ab1767cacf9c8bf05",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "8215892993ea9f5231da4fa9eb42428a286fce8b",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5fc51dfc2eb160bd7ab3251ab1767cacf9c8bf05",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c",
"fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.0"
},
{
"lessThan": "7.0",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.4",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnfsd: release OPEN-decoded posix ACLs via op_release\n\nnfsd4_decode_createhow4() calls nfsd4_decode_fattr4(), which allocates\nrefcounted struct posix_acl objects via posix_acl_alloc() and stores\nthem in open-\u003eop_pacl and open-\u003eop_dpacl. These pointers must be\nreleased once the OPEN compound finishes.\n\nWhen nfsd4_decode_open_claim4() returns a non-seqid-mutating error,\nthe dispatcher short-circuits before op_func runs:\n\n nfsd4_proc_compound()\n if (op-\u003estatus \u0026\u0026 op-\u003eopnum == OP_OPEN)\n op-\u003estatus = nfsd4_open_omfg(...)\n if (!seqid_mutating_err(ntohl(op-\u003estatus)))\n return op-\u003estatus; /* nfsd4_open() never runs */\n ...\n opdesc-\u003eop_release(\u0026op-\u003eu) /* must still release op_pacl/op_dpacl */\n\nBefore this change OP_OPEN had no .op_release in nfsd4_ops[], and the\nrelease pair lived inside nfsd4_open() at its out_err: label. On the\nshort-circuit path nfsd4_open() is never invoked, so both posix_acl\nrefs leak on every malformed OPEN compound that carries valid POSIX\nACL createhow4 attributes.\n\nAdd nfsd4_open_release() and wire it as .op_release for OP_OPEN.\nposix_acl_release() is NULL-safe, so the single release site covers\nboth the normal path and the nfsd4_open_omfg short-circuit. Remove\nthe matching posix_acl_release() pair from nfsd4_open()\u0027s out_err:\nlabel to avoid double-releasing.\n\nThe compound loop has two encoding branches: nfsd4_encode_operation()\nfor normal ops, and nfsd4_encode_replay() for v4.0 replayed ops.\nop_release was only called from nfsd4_encode_operation(), so resources\nattached to op-\u003eu leak on the replay path.\n\nMove the op_release() call out of nfsd4_encode_operation() and the\nreplay branch, placing it after the if-else in nfsd4_proc_compound().\nThis gives a single call site in a fairly obviously-correct place,\ncovering both the normal encoding and replay paths."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-89664",
"lastModified": "2026-09-13T07:17:32.047",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-09-11T20:19:52.790",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5b3a7d7c23c071efe12dd1bc1d2e5f97c4892921"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8215892993ea9f5231da4fa9eb42428a286fce8b"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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