FKIE_CVE-2026-89671
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-11 20:19 - Updated: 2026-09-14 13:19
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: gate nfs3 setacl by argp->mask
nfsd3_proc_setacl() calls set_posix_acl() unconditionally for both
ACL_TYPE_ACCESS and ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT, passing argp->acl_access and
argp->acl_default verbatim. The NFSv3 ACL decoder only populates
those pointers when the corresponding mask bit is set:
nfs3svc_decode_setaclargs()
if (args->mask & NFS_ACL) decode into acl_access
if (args->mask & NFS_DFACL) decode into acl_default
/* otherwise the pointer stays NULL (pc_argzero) */
nfsd3_proc_setacl()
set_posix_acl(.., ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, argp->acl_access)
set_posix_acl(.., ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT, argp->acl_default)
set_posix_acl(idmap, dentry, type, NULL) is the VFS "remove this
ACL type" operation. A NULL pointer that means "the client did not
send this arm" is therefore indistinguishable from "the client
asked to remove this ACL". A SETACL with mask=NFS_ACL silently
drops the directory's default ACL; mask=0 drops both.
The sibling nfsd3_proc_getacl() already consults argp->mask before
touching each arm; mirror that in setacl.
Fix by wrapping each set_posix_acl() call in the matching mask bit
check and initializing error to 0 before inode_lock so that a
request with neither bit set leaves the on-disk ACLs untouched and
returns nfs_ok. The out_drop_lock path and the unconditional
posix_acl_release() at out: are preserved; both NULL-tolerate the
skipped arms.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/nfsd/nfs3acl.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "3be1d8611dae4829e4608007db29f4a8748c37b2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "a257cdd0e2179630d3201c32ba14d7fcb3c3a055",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "68a80b26efdff1d09f8ae1773c6a915abb9e191d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "a257cdd0e2179630d3201c32ba14d7fcb3c3a055",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "b3bff820d068ea59767d4e91a3258231a879da5f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "a257cdd0e2179630d3201c32ba14d7fcb3c3a055",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "ff99ed007f065198fd723152405c22aa558f700b",
"status": "affected",
"version": "a257cdd0e2179630d3201c32ba14d7fcb3c3a055",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "453d7198a0ab07a12d46e0575861ac7b932da17e",
"status": "affected",
"version": "a257cdd0e2179630d3201c32ba14d7fcb3c3a055",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/nfsd/nfs3acl.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.6.13"
},
{
"lessThan": "2.6.13",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.157",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.109",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.50",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.4",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnfsd: gate nfs3 setacl by argp-\u003emask\n\nnfsd3_proc_setacl() calls set_posix_acl() unconditionally for both\nACL_TYPE_ACCESS and ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT, passing argp-\u003eacl_access and\nargp-\u003eacl_default verbatim. The NFSv3 ACL decoder only populates\nthose pointers when the corresponding mask bit is set:\n\n nfs3svc_decode_setaclargs()\n if (args-\u003emask \u0026 NFS_ACL) decode into acl_access\n if (args-\u003emask \u0026 NFS_DFACL) decode into acl_default\n /* otherwise the pointer stays NULL (pc_argzero) */\n\n nfsd3_proc_setacl()\n set_posix_acl(.., ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, argp-\u003eacl_access)\n set_posix_acl(.., ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT, argp-\u003eacl_default)\n\nset_posix_acl(idmap, dentry, type, NULL) is the VFS \"remove this\nACL type\" operation. A NULL pointer that means \"the client did not\nsend this arm\" is therefore indistinguishable from \"the client\nasked to remove this ACL\". A SETACL with mask=NFS_ACL silently\ndrops the directory\u0027s default ACL; mask=0 drops both.\n\nThe sibling nfsd3_proc_getacl() already consults argp-\u003emask before\ntouching each arm; mirror that in setacl.\n\nFix by wrapping each set_posix_acl() call in the matching mask bit\ncheck and initializing error to 0 before inode_lock so that a\nrequest with neither bit set leaves the on-disk ACLs untouched and\nreturns nfs_ok. The out_drop_lock path and the unconditional\nposix_acl_release() at out: are preserved; both NULL-tolerate the\nskipped arms."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-89671",
"lastModified": "2026-09-14T13:19:19.040",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 9.1,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 5.2,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-09-11T20:19:53.647",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3be1d8611dae4829e4608007db29f4a8748c37b2"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/453d7198a0ab07a12d46e0575861ac7b932da17e"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/68a80b26efdff1d09f8ae1773c6a915abb9e191d"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b3bff820d068ea59767d4e91a3258231a879da5f"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ff99ed007f065198fd723152405c22aa558f700b"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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