FKIE_CVE-2026-89732
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-11 20:20 - Updated: 2026-09-14 13:19
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_fs: Prevent deadlock during ep0 read loop
Currently, ffs_ep0_read() holds ffs->mutex when it prepares to go to
sleep waiting for an event. When no setup events are pending, it calls
wait_event_interruptible_exclusive_locked_irq() with the mutex still
held. The wait macro deliberately drops the waitqueue spinlock before
sleeping but does not drop the mutex.
If a userspace daemon is polling ep0 via read() and the gadget is
asynchronously torn down via configfs (e.g., echo "" > UDC), a
deadlock can occur:
1. The configfs teardown calls functionfs_unbind(), which queues a
FUNCTIONFS_UNBIND event.
2. The daemon wakes up, consumes the event, and drops the mutex.
3. However, if the daemon loops and immediately issues another read()
before exiting, it reacquires ffs->mutex and again goes into an
interruptible sleep.
4. Meanwhile, functionfs_unbind() continues execution and attempts to
acquire ffs->mutex to tear down ep0req.
5. The kernel deadlocks because the configfs thread is stuck in an
uninterruptible sleep waiting for the mutex, while the userspace
daemon is in an interruptible sleep holding the mutex forever
because no more events will arrive.
To fix this, we drop both the waitqueue spinlock and ffs->mutex before
going to sleep, and use wait_event_interruptible_exclusive() instead.
Upon waking up, we jump back to the `retry` label to safely reacquire
the mutex and re-evaluate the state machine. By not sleeping with
ffs->mutex held, we natively decouple gadget teardowns (which require
the mutex) from userspace polling.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "fbe3db4b650c284df8eb4cb68eebcf270cf861b5",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ddf8abd2599491cbad959c700b90ba72a5dce8d0",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "30430509c156e1df2bdafd5f1cadb160e53db5d6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ddf8abd2599491cbad959c700b90ba72a5dce8d0",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "bafddd0f20b5228760be303aa69c58502e92309c",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ddf8abd2599491cbad959c700b90ba72a5dce8d0",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "b0a6bfac0c3c3edf5b2ecaee87a09234601fe78d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ddf8abd2599491cbad959c700b90ba72a5dce8d0",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "fd20cc68bbdb5620696ac108e8f2efd180fe2c1a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ddf8abd2599491cbad959c700b90ba72a5dce8d0",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "34e88f53614640b59039a46717fb6142e9871022",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ddf8abd2599491cbad959c700b90ba72a5dce8d0",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "eac233e63f9db82ba874e3cccafaafab162999e0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ddf8abd2599491cbad959c700b90ba72a5dce8d0",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "569dd7e5dcffe1e1c6b26ca2cd3be57eb433e082",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ddf8abd2599491cbad959c700b90ba72a5dce8d0",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.6.35"
},
{
"lessThan": "2.6.35",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.10.270",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.221",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.188",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.157",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.109",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.50",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.4",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nusb: gadget: f_fs: Prevent deadlock during ep0 read loop\n\nCurrently, ffs_ep0_read() holds ffs-\u003emutex when it prepares to go to\nsleep waiting for an event. When no setup events are pending, it calls\nwait_event_interruptible_exclusive_locked_irq() with the mutex still\nheld. The wait macro deliberately drops the waitqueue spinlock before\nsleeping but does not drop the mutex.\n\nIf a userspace daemon is polling ep0 via read() and the gadget is\nasynchronously torn down via configfs (e.g., echo \"\" \u003e UDC), a\ndeadlock can occur:\n\n1. The configfs teardown calls functionfs_unbind(), which queues a\n FUNCTIONFS_UNBIND event.\n2. The daemon wakes up, consumes the event, and drops the mutex.\n3. However, if the daemon loops and immediately issues another read()\n before exiting, it reacquires ffs-\u003emutex and again goes into an\n interruptible sleep.\n4. Meanwhile, functionfs_unbind() continues execution and attempts to\n acquire ffs-\u003emutex to tear down ep0req.\n5. The kernel deadlocks because the configfs thread is stuck in an\n uninterruptible sleep waiting for the mutex, while the userspace\n daemon is in an interruptible sleep holding the mutex forever\n because no more events will arrive.\n\nTo fix this, we drop both the waitqueue spinlock and ffs-\u003emutex before\ngoing to sleep, and use wait_event_interruptible_exclusive() instead.\nUpon waking up, we jump back to the `retry` label to safely reacquire\nthe mutex and re-evaluate the state machine. By not sleeping with\nffs-\u003emutex held, we natively decouple gadget teardowns (which require\nthe mutex) from userspace polling."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-89732",
"lastModified": "2026-09-14T13:19:22.293",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-09-11T20:20:03.600",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/30430509c156e1df2bdafd5f1cadb160e53db5d6"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/34e88f53614640b59039a46717fb6142e9871022"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/569dd7e5dcffe1e1c6b26ca2cd3be57eb433e082"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b0a6bfac0c3c3edf5b2ecaee87a09234601fe78d"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bafddd0f20b5228760be303aa69c58502e92309c"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eac233e63f9db82ba874e3cccafaafab162999e0"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fbe3db4b650c284df8eb4cb68eebcf270cf861b5"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fd20cc68bbdb5620696ac108e8f2efd180fe2c1a"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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