FKIE_CVE-2026-89761
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-11 20:20 - Updated: 2026-09-13 07:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix out-of-bounds write when null terminating a label vec
aa_vec_unique() null terminates at vec[n - dups] when VEC_FLAG_TERMINATE
is passed. If the components are all distinct no duplicates are dropped,
dups is 0 and the terminator goes to vec[n], so the caller has to provide
room for n + 1 entries.
aa_label_strn_parse() sets up its vector with vec_setup(profile, vec, len,
gfp) and then calls aa_vec_unique(vec, len, VEC_FLAG_TERMINATE), but
vec_setup() does not reserve the terminator entry. Up to LOCAL_VEC_ENTRIES
it uses the local array of LOCAL_VEC_ENTRIES pointers, above that it
allocates exactly len pointers. The terminator therefore lands one entry
past the end of the local array when len is LOCAL_VEC_ENTRIES, and one
entry past the end of the allocation when len is larger.
len comes from the number of "//&" separated components in the label name
and label_count_strn_entries() does not bound it. An unprivileged task
reaches the parse by writing to /proc/self/attr/apparmor/current or through
lsm_set_self_attr(2), both of which go through do_setattr(), and the name
is parsed before the change_profile permission is checked.
The query_label() path behind the securityfs .access file, which is
mode 0666, performs no permission check at all. Every component has to
resolve to a loaded profile, so a system with policy loaded is required.
The other two VEC_FLAG_TERMINATE users work on a label vec that
aa_label_alloc() has already sized with "+ 1 for null terminator entry on
vec". Reserve the same entry in vec_setup() and DEFINE_VEC(). Passing
len + 1 from the caller instead would move len == LOCAL_VEC_ENTRIES out of
the local array and into kzalloc().
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"security/apparmor/include/label.h"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "9124e078ea2250d8d01d2162a550acb01ef5bf48",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f1bd904175e8190ce14aedee37e207ab51fe3b30",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "28069434aef66b9d084f0609b7a29c171846815e",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f1bd904175e8190ce14aedee37e207ab51fe3b30",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "36bdd0b45ec3f4822832a56e9db8674c8450dfce",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f1bd904175e8190ce14aedee37e207ab51fe3b30",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "9f1e40193eef7f047e6b77cfb4b4cafdecd7a123",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f1bd904175e8190ce14aedee37e207ab51fe3b30",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"security/apparmor/include/label.h"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.13"
},
{
"lessThan": "4.13",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.109",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.50",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.4",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\napparmor: fix out-of-bounds write when null terminating a label vec\n\naa_vec_unique() null terminates at vec[n - dups] when VEC_FLAG_TERMINATE\nis passed. If the components are all distinct no duplicates are dropped,\ndups is 0 and the terminator goes to vec[n], so the caller has to provide\nroom for n + 1 entries.\n\naa_label_strn_parse() sets up its vector with vec_setup(profile, vec, len,\ngfp) and then calls aa_vec_unique(vec, len, VEC_FLAG_TERMINATE), but\nvec_setup() does not reserve the terminator entry. Up to LOCAL_VEC_ENTRIES\nit uses the local array of LOCAL_VEC_ENTRIES pointers, above that it\nallocates exactly len pointers. The terminator therefore lands one entry\npast the end of the local array when len is LOCAL_VEC_ENTRIES, and one\nentry past the end of the allocation when len is larger.\n\nlen comes from the number of \"//\u0026\" separated components in the label name\nand label_count_strn_entries() does not bound it. An unprivileged task\nreaches the parse by writing to /proc/self/attr/apparmor/current or through\nlsm_set_self_attr(2), both of which go through do_setattr(), and the name\nis parsed before the change_profile permission is checked.\nThe query_label() path behind the securityfs .access file, which is\nmode 0666, performs no permission check at all. Every component has to\nresolve to a loaded profile, so a system with policy loaded is required.\n\nThe other two VEC_FLAG_TERMINATE users work on a label vec that\naa_label_alloc() has already sized with \"+ 1 for null terminator entry on\nvec\". Reserve the same entry in vec_setup() and DEFINE_VEC(). Passing\nlen + 1 from the caller instead would move len == LOCAL_VEC_ENTRIES out of\nthe local array and into kzalloc()."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-89761",
"lastModified": "2026-09-13T07:17:40.427",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-09-11T20:20:07.243",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/28069434aef66b9d084f0609b7a29c171846815e"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/36bdd0b45ec3f4822832a56e9db8674c8450dfce"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9124e078ea2250d8d01d2162a550acb01ef5bf48"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9f1e40193eef7f047e6b77cfb4b4cafdecd7a123"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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