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FKIE_CVE-2026-90040

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-16 11:17 - Updated: 2026-09-16 11:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SEV: Forcefully invalidate SNP VMSA if its backing gmem page is zapped Wire up a gmem_invalidate_range() call for SNP VMs, and use it to force vCPUs to reload/recheck their guest-provided VMSA if the backing gmem page is being invalidated, e.g. is being PUNCH_HOLE'd. Use the same core logic to handle invalidations as VMX does for the APIC-access page, as the two concepts are nearly identical: shove the physical address of a page into the vCPU's control structure: 1. Snapshot the invalidation sequence counter 2. Grab the pfn (from guest_memfd in this case) 3. Acquire mmu_lock for read 4. Re-request reload if retry is needed, otherwise commit the change. Note, the re-request action in #4 is necessary as KVM's retry logic is fuzzy, i.e. can get false positives. If the guest_memfd page has been dropped, at some point a subsequent reload will fail to get a PFN from guest_memfd, and KVM will fail KVM_RUN. If the retry was due to a false positive, KVM will retry until there are no relevant MMU notifier events (and will retry in the "outer" loop, i.e. will drop locks and resched as needed). Note #2! Take care to invalidate the VMSA when a relevant memslot is DELETED or MOVED, as invalidations in response to PUNCH_HOLE are predicated on memslot bindings (KVM doesn't know what GFN range(s) to invalidate without a binding). And more importantly, the VMSA mapping requires a memslot, i.e. must be invalidated if its memslots disappears, regardless of the state of the underlying guest_memfd inode. Failure to invalidate the vCPU's control.vmsa_pa (which is checked by pre_sev_run()) can prevent KVM from properly freeing the page as firmware will reject the RMPUPDATE to reclaim the page with FAIL_INUSE if the vCPU is actively running, i.e. if VMSA page is in-use. That in turn leads to an RMP #PF on the next use, as the page will still be assigned to the SNP VM. SEV-SNP: RMPUPDATE failed for PFN 78d198, pg_level: 1, ret: 3 SEV-SNP: PFN 0x78d198, RMP entry: [0xfff0000000144001 - 0x000000000000000f] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 31345 Comm: sev_snp_vmsa_pu Tainted: G U O Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 34.86.0-102 01/25/2026 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x54/0x70 rmpupdate+0x12c/0x140 rmp_make_shared+0x3b/0x60 sev_gmem_invalidate+0xe0/0x170 [kvm_amd] delete_from_page_cache_batch+0x1d8/0x220 truncate_inode_pages_range+0x120/0x3d0 kvm_gmem_fallocate+0x19a/0x270 [kvm] vfs_fallocate+0x1bc/0x1f0 __x64_sys_fallocate+0x48/0x70 do_syscall_64+0x10a/0x480 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x496c7e </TASK> ------------[ cut here ]------------ SEV: Failed to update RMP entry for PFN 0x78d198 error -14 WARNING: arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c:5160 at sev_gmem_invalidate+0x126/0x170 [kvm_amd], CPU#3: sev_snp_vmsa_pu/31345 CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 31345 Comm: sev_snp_vmsa_pu Tainted: G U O Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 34.86.0-102 01/25/2026 RIP: 0010:sev_gmem_invalidate+0x12b/0x170 [kvm_amd] Call Trace: <TASK> delete_from_page_cache_batch+0x1d8/0x220 truncate_inode_pages_range+0x120/0x3d0 kvm_gmem_fallocate+0x19a/0x270 [kvm] vfs_fallocate+0x1bc/0x1f0 __x64_sys_fallocate+0x48/0x70 do_syscall_64+0x10a/0x480 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x496c7e </TASK> irq event stamp: 20689 hardirqs last enabled at (20699): [<ffffffff8e76092c>] __console_unlock+0x5c/0x60 hardirqs last disabled at (20708): [<ffffffff8e760911>] __console_unlock+0x41/0x60 softirqs last enabled at (20722): [<ffffffff8e6cd74e>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x7e/0x140 softirqs last disabled at (20717): [<ffffffff8e6cd74e>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x7e/0x140 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff99 ---truncated---
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h",
            "arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h",
            "arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c",
            "arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c",
            "arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c",
            "arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h",
            "arch/x86/kvm/x86.c",
            "include/linux/kvm_host.h",
            "virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "2640cc26ed0dd1bf6ec2f6852a60e494093db3e5",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "e366f92ea99e1961fbad5e2110900e9f4fcb249b",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "d1a3c216233413f57f5341a9b878b7e2dde7e785",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "e366f92ea99e1961fbad5e2110900e9f4fcb249b",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h",
            "arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h",
            "arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c",
            "arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c",
            "arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c",
            "arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h",
            "arch/x86/kvm/x86.c",
            "include/linux/kvm_host.h",
            "virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.11"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.11",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.5",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3-rc1",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nKVM: SEV: Forcefully invalidate SNP VMSA if its backing gmem page is zapped\n\nWire up a gmem_invalidate_range() call for SNP VMs, and use it to force\nvCPUs to reload/recheck their guest-provided VMSA if the backing gmem\npage is being invalidated, e.g. is being PUNCH_HOLE\u0027d.  Use the same core\nlogic to handle invalidations as VMX does for the APIC-access page, as the\ntwo concepts are nearly identical: shove the physical address of a page\ninto the vCPU\u0027s control structure:\n\n 1. Snapshot the invalidation sequence counter\n 2. Grab the pfn (from guest_memfd in this case)\n 3. Acquire mmu_lock for read\n 4. Re-request reload if retry is needed, otherwise commit the change.\n\nNote, the re-request action in #4 is necessary as KVM\u0027s retry logic is\nfuzzy, i.e. can get false positives.  If the guest_memfd page has been\ndropped, at some point a subsequent reload will fail to get a PFN from\nguest_memfd, and KVM will fail KVM_RUN.  If the retry was due to a false\npositive, KVM will retry until there are no relevant MMU notifier events\n(and will retry in the \"outer\" loop, i.e. will drop locks and resched as\nneeded).\n\nNote #2!  Take care to invalidate the VMSA when a relevant memslot is\nDELETED or MOVED, as invalidations in response to PUNCH_HOLE are predicated\non memslot bindings (KVM doesn\u0027t know what GFN range(s) to invalidate\nwithout a binding).  And more importantly, the VMSA mapping requires a\nmemslot, i.e. must be invalidated if its memslots disappears, regardless of\nthe state of the underlying guest_memfd inode.\n\nFailure to invalidate the vCPU\u0027s control.vmsa_pa (which is checked by\npre_sev_run()) can prevent KVM from properly freeing the page as firmware\nwill reject the RMPUPDATE to reclaim the page with FAIL_INUSE if the vCPU\nis actively running, i.e. if VMSA page is in-use.  That in turn leads to an\nRMP #PF on the next use, as the page will still be assigned to the SNP VM.\n\n  SEV-SNP: RMPUPDATE failed for PFN 78d198, pg_level: 1, ret: 3\n  SEV-SNP: PFN 0x78d198, RMP entry: [0xfff0000000144001 - 0x000000000000000f]\n  CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 31345 Comm: sev_snp_vmsa_pu Tainted: G     U     O\n  Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE\n  Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 34.86.0-102 01/25/2026\n  Call Trace:\n   \u003cTASK\u003e\n   dump_stack_lvl+0x54/0x70\n   rmpupdate+0x12c/0x140\n   rmp_make_shared+0x3b/0x60\n   sev_gmem_invalidate+0xe0/0x170 [kvm_amd]\n   delete_from_page_cache_batch+0x1d8/0x220\n   truncate_inode_pages_range+0x120/0x3d0\n   kvm_gmem_fallocate+0x19a/0x270 [kvm]\n   vfs_fallocate+0x1bc/0x1f0\n   __x64_sys_fallocate+0x48/0x70\n   do_syscall_64+0x10a/0x480\n   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53\n  RIP: 0033:0x496c7e\n   \u003c/TASK\u003e\n  ------------[ cut here ]------------\n  SEV: Failed to update RMP entry for PFN 0x78d198 error -14\n  WARNING: arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c:5160 at sev_gmem_invalidate+0x126/0x170 [kvm_amd], CPU#3: sev_snp_vmsa_pu/31345\n  CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 31345 Comm: sev_snp_vmsa_pu Tainted: G     U     O\n  Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE\n  Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 34.86.0-102 01/25/2026\n  RIP: 0010:sev_gmem_invalidate+0x12b/0x170 [kvm_amd]\n  Call Trace:\n   \u003cTASK\u003e\n   delete_from_page_cache_batch+0x1d8/0x220\n   truncate_inode_pages_range+0x120/0x3d0\n   kvm_gmem_fallocate+0x19a/0x270 [kvm]\n   vfs_fallocate+0x1bc/0x1f0\n   __x64_sys_fallocate+0x48/0x70\n   do_syscall_64+0x10a/0x480\n   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53\n  RIP: 0033:0x496c7e\n   \u003c/TASK\u003e\n  irq event stamp: 20689\n  hardirqs last  enabled at (20699): [\u003cffffffff8e76092c\u003e] __console_unlock+0x5c/0x60\n  hardirqs last disabled at (20708): [\u003cffffffff8e760911\u003e] __console_unlock+0x41/0x60\n  softirqs last  enabled at (20722): [\u003cffffffff8e6cd74e\u003e] __irq_exit_rcu+0x7e/0x140\n  softirqs last disabled at (20717): [\u003cffffffff8e6cd74e\u003e] __irq_exit_rcu+0x7e/0x140\n  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---\n  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff99\n---truncated---"
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-90040",
  "lastModified": "2026-09-16T11:17:17.213",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-09-16T11:17:17.213",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2640cc26ed0dd1bf6ec2f6852a60e494093db3e5"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d1a3c216233413f57f5341a9b878b7e2dde7e785"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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