FKIE_CVE-2026-90339
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-17 17:17 - Updated: 2026-09-17 17:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/syscall: Fix syscall skip handling for seccomp and ptrace
After enabling GENERIC_ENTRY on PowerPC, syscall_enter_from_user_mode()
returns -1 as a sentinel to signal that seccomp or ptrace has intercepted
the syscall and already set a return value via syscall_set_return_value().
system_call_exception() was not handling this sentinel, and since -1UL
is >= NR_syscalls, the code fell into the out-of-range path and returned
-ENOSYS, overwriting the errno already placed in regs->gpr[3].
The naive fix of checking r0 == -1L before the NR_syscalls bounds check
is ambiguous: a user legitimately calling syscall(-1) also produces r0 ==
-1L, and a tracer intercepting such a call would have its injected return
value silently discarded.
Fix this by introducing a thread flag that is set whenever
syscall_set_return_value() explicitly updates the return value. In
system_call_exception(), check and clear this flag before dispatching
the syscall, and return the preset value directly when it is present.
This ensures that an explicitly supplied return value always suppresses
syscall execution, regardless of the syscall number.
This handles all seccomp actions correctly:
- SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE (no tracer), SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF:
all call syscall_set_return_value(), flag is set, injected value returned.
- SECCOMP_RET_TRAP, SECCOMP_RET_KILL: call syscall_rollback() and deliver
a signal; flag is not set, but the process is dying so the return value
is irrelevant.
The fix covers both ppc32 and ppc64 with no #ifdefs.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"arch/powerpc/include/asm/syscall.h",
"arch/powerpc/include/asm/thread_info.h",
"arch/powerpc/kernel/syscall.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "19b54740e2e1102c7d48553d9e0347c1f6af22b0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "bee25f97ad24641df55cb3887eb5bfcb2b9d8fbc",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "69cb2be898be6d5826cacd1a628f6945a24480b6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "bee25f97ad24641df55cb3887eb5bfcb2b9d8fbc",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"arch/powerpc/include/asm/syscall.h",
"arch/powerpc/include/asm/thread_info.h",
"arch/powerpc/kernel/syscall.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.2"
},
{
"lessThan": "7.2",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.6",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\npowerpc/syscall: Fix syscall skip handling for seccomp and ptrace\n\nAfter enabling GENERIC_ENTRY on PowerPC, syscall_enter_from_user_mode()\nreturns -1 as a sentinel to signal that seccomp or ptrace has intercepted\nthe syscall and already set a return value via syscall_set_return_value().\nsystem_call_exception() was not handling this sentinel, and since -1UL\nis \u003e= NR_syscalls, the code fell into the out-of-range path and returned\n-ENOSYS, overwriting the errno already placed in regs-\u003egpr[3].\n\nThe naive fix of checking r0 == -1L before the NR_syscalls bounds check\nis ambiguous: a user legitimately calling syscall(-1) also produces r0 ==\n-1L, and a tracer intercepting such a call would have its injected return\nvalue silently discarded.\n\nFix this by introducing a thread flag that is set whenever\nsyscall_set_return_value() explicitly updates the return value. In\nsystem_call_exception(), check and clear this flag before dispatching\nthe syscall, and return the preset value directly when it is present.\nThis ensures that an explicitly supplied return value always suppresses\nsyscall execution, regardless of the syscall number.\n\nThis handles all seccomp actions correctly:\n\n - SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE (no tracer), SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF:\n all call syscall_set_return_value(), flag is set, injected value returned.\n - SECCOMP_RET_TRAP, SECCOMP_RET_KILL: call syscall_rollback() and deliver\n a signal; flag is not set, but the process is dying so the return value\n is irrelevant.\n\nThe fix covers both ppc32 and ppc64 with no #ifdefs."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-90339",
"lastModified": "2026-09-17T17:17:32.520",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-09-17T17:17:32.520",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/19b54740e2e1102c7d48553d9e0347c1f6af22b0"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/69cb2be898be6d5826cacd1a628f6945a24480b6"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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