FKIE_CVE-2026-90429
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-17 17:17 - Updated: 2026-09-18 18:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/tegra241-cmdqv: Synchronize the error ISR against VINTF (de)init
A user VINTF is torn down by tegra241_cmdqv_deinit_vintf(), which runs from
the destroy callback and from the init-failure unwind in the alloc handler.
It clears the cmdqv->vintfs[] slot and lets the iommufd core free it, but
nothing serializes that against the error interrupt: tegra241_cmdqv_isr()
reads cmdqv->vintfs[idx] and dereferences the vintf. A concurrent error can
make the ISR read a slot mid-clear (a NULL deref) or use a vintf which is
about to be freed (a use-after-free).
deinit_vintf() also returns idx to the IDA before clearing the slot, so a
concurrent create that reuses idx can publish its new vintf into the slot,
only for this teardown to erase it again with the stale NULL store.
On the other end, tegra241_cmdqv_init_vintf() publishes a new vintf with a
plain store to the cmdqv->vintfs[] slot, and the ISR dereferences fields of
a published vintf such as vintf->base. A plain store gives no ordering on a
weakly-ordered CPU, and a stale VINTF_ERR_MAP bit on a reused idx can make
the ISR pick a vintf the moment it is published, before its fields are set
or tegra241_vintf_hw_init() runs.
The cmdqv->vintfs[0] slot stays NULL until tegra241_cmdqv_init_structures()
first creates VINTF0, so the slot 0 read needs the same NULL check.
Publish every slot with an smp_store_release(), and read each slot in the
ISR with an smp_load_acquire() under a NULL check, so the ISR always sees
a fully built vintf or NULL. Also make deinit_vintf() clear the slot, and
synchronize_irq() prior to returning idx to the IDA, so no vintf is freed
under a running handler and no reused idx is clobbered.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/iommu/arm/arm-smmu-v3/tegra241-cmdqv.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "bcb82407633c3008362ad927699d985ee4981557",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4dc0d12474f9d4833c3dd96b73d61e406d3f5dc7",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "f3ef4abc271a1d3d7b6715879e149c286dc8aae7",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4dc0d12474f9d4833c3dd96b73d61e406d3f5dc7",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "a491be376abd1c80a314cdd658632c85cd660b73",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4dc0d12474f9d4833c3dd96b73d61e406d3f5dc7",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/iommu/arm/arm-smmu-v3/tegra241-cmdqv.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.17"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.17",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.52",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.6",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\niommu/tegra241-cmdqv: Synchronize the error ISR against VINTF (de)init\n\nA user VINTF is torn down by tegra241_cmdqv_deinit_vintf(), which runs from\nthe destroy callback and from the init-failure unwind in the alloc handler.\nIt clears the cmdqv-\u003evintfs[] slot and lets the iommufd core free it, but\nnothing serializes that against the error interrupt: tegra241_cmdqv_isr()\nreads cmdqv-\u003evintfs[idx] and dereferences the vintf. A concurrent error can\nmake the ISR read a slot mid-clear (a NULL deref) or use a vintf which is\nabout to be freed (a use-after-free).\n\ndeinit_vintf() also returns idx to the IDA before clearing the slot, so a\nconcurrent create that reuses idx can publish its new vintf into the slot,\nonly for this teardown to erase it again with the stale NULL store.\n\nOn the other end, tegra241_cmdqv_init_vintf() publishes a new vintf with a\nplain store to the cmdqv-\u003evintfs[] slot, and the ISR dereferences fields of\na published vintf such as vintf-\u003ebase. A plain store gives no ordering on a\nweakly-ordered CPU, and a stale VINTF_ERR_MAP bit on a reused idx can make\nthe ISR pick a vintf the moment it is published, before its fields are set\nor tegra241_vintf_hw_init() runs.\n\nThe cmdqv-\u003evintfs[0] slot stays NULL until tegra241_cmdqv_init_structures()\nfirst creates VINTF0, so the slot 0 read needs the same NULL check.\n\nPublish every slot with an smp_store_release(), and read each slot in the\nISR with an smp_load_acquire() under a NULL check, so the ISR always sees\na fully built vintf or NULL. Also make deinit_vintf() clear the slot, and\nsynchronize_irq() prior to returning idx to the IDA, so no vintf is freed\nunder a running handler and no reused idx is clobbered."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-90429",
"lastModified": "2026-09-18T18:17:59.077",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-09-17T17:17:47.850",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a491be376abd1c80a314cdd658632c85cd660b73"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bcb82407633c3008362ad927699d985ee4981557"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f3ef4abc271a1d3d7b6715879e149c286dc8aae7"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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