FKIE_CVE-2026-93251
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-24 16:17 - Updated: 2026-09-25 13:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPI: bus: Introduce acpi_bus_get_primary_device()
The function used for obtaining the first "physical" device for which
the given ACPI one is the ACPI companion, acpi_get_first_physical_node(),
may return a stale device pointer (mostly in theory) because
acpi_unbind_one() may run as a whole after dropping the ACPI device's
physical_node_lock in acpi_get_first_physical_node() and before it
returns. The last reference to the "physical" device may be dropped
then before the pointer to it is returned to the caller.
If that happens and the acpi_get_first_physical_node() caller invokes
get_device() on the pointer obtained from it, which is done by the
majority of its callers, a use-after-free will occur.
To prepare for addressing this problem, introduce a new function for
getting the first "physical" device associated with the given ACPI one
(the "primary physical device") that will also reference count the
device in question before returning a pointer to it.
Make that new function and acpi_get_first_physical_node() share the
physical node list lookup code.
No intentional functional impact.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/acpi/bus.c",
"include/acpi/acpi_bus.h"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "5657859851abb65105220a6cdb5804926249f714",
"status": "affected",
"version": "91e5687805885f9fceb60b95e950a3d3bdcf4764",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "72530e1f72b0515a73fd88292254d04fecf03649",
"status": "affected",
"version": "91e5687805885f9fceb60b95e950a3d3bdcf4764",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/acpi/bus.c",
"include/acpi/acpi_bus.h"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "3.8"
},
{
"lessThan": "3.8",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.6",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nACPI: bus: Introduce acpi_bus_get_primary_device()\n\nThe function used for obtaining the first \"physical\" device for which\nthe given ACPI one is the ACPI companion, acpi_get_first_physical_node(),\nmay return a stale device pointer (mostly in theory) because\nacpi_unbind_one() may run as a whole after dropping the ACPI device\u0027s\nphysical_node_lock in acpi_get_first_physical_node() and before it\nreturns. The last reference to the \"physical\" device may be dropped\nthen before the pointer to it is returned to the caller.\n\nIf that happens and the acpi_get_first_physical_node() caller invokes\nget_device() on the pointer obtained from it, which is done by the\nmajority of its callers, a use-after-free will occur.\n\nTo prepare for addressing this problem, introduce a new function for\ngetting the first \"physical\" device associated with the given ACPI one\n(the \"primary physical device\") that will also reference count the\ndevice in question before returning a pointer to it.\n\nMake that new function and acpi_get_first_physical_node() share the\nphysical node list lookup code.\n\nNo intentional functional impact."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-93251",
"lastModified": "2026-09-25T13:17:18.220",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-09-24T16:17:21.340",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5657859851abb65105220a6cdb5804926249f714"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/72530e1f72b0515a73fd88292254d04fecf03649"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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