FKIE_CVE-2026-93275
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-24 16:17 - Updated: 2026-09-24 16:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/x86/intel/pt: Fix stop/start with no update
If pt_event_stop() is called without PERF_EF_UPDATE flag, then
perf_aux_output_end() is not called. A subsequent call to pt_event_start()
will call perf_aux_output_begin() again which violates the rule against
nesting and triggers a WARNING in perf_aux_output_begin().
Originally, pt_event_stop() was never called without PERF_EF_UPDATE,
because the only code paths to do so are from event overflow, and Intel PT
does not do that.
However the introduction of group throttling by commit 9734e25fbf5ae
("perf: Fix the throttle logic for a group") meant that an Intel PT event
could be throttled if it was part of a group. Throttling calls PMU
->stop() / ->start() callbacks without flags.
An example is when AUX area sampling is used. The following commands
hit the issue:
echo 10000 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_sample_rate
perf record -F32000 --aux-sample -e '{intel_pt//u,cycles:u}' \
-- bash -c 'for i in `seq 1 100000` ; do true ; done'
Use PERF_HES_UPTODATE to track whether perf_aux_output_begin() and
perf_aux_output_end() are balanced. A cleared PERF_HES_UPTODATE bit
indicates that an AUX output context is still open.
Amend pt_event_start() / pt_event_stop() accordingly so that begin/end
stay balanced:
- In non-snapshot mode, stop() always closes the buffer (the buffer may
have run out of space, and that accounting is done by the update), so
a following start() opens a fresh one as before.
- In snapshot/overwrite mode, stop() without PERF_EF_UPDATE leaves the
buffer open so that pt_event_snapshot_aux() can still copy from it,
and start() then only re-enables tracing instead of calling
perf_aux_output_begin() again.
Note that pt_event_del() calls pt_event_stop() with PERF_EF_UPDATE flag set
(as is required by the documentation), so a final call to
perf_aux_output_end() is assured.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "9b919fb5512f256e9e0604faf960b2bb98aab454",
"status": "affected",
"version": "52ca9ced3f70779589e6ecc329baffe69d8f5f7a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "cab5015ee3f25f789b4a368f2abfa65536576b78",
"status": "affected",
"version": "52ca9ced3f70779589e6ecc329baffe69d8f5f7a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "304844b5545f444d523286da8228a1cbc46ffffa",
"status": "affected",
"version": "52ca9ced3f70779589e6ecc329baffe69d8f5f7a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "2e17bf3a469a41457a3bc31b1f8fd66b6ce94a6d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "52ca9ced3f70779589e6ecc329baffe69d8f5f7a",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.1"
},
{
"lessThan": "4.1",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.110",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.52",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.6",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nperf/x86/intel/pt: Fix stop/start with no update\n\nIf pt_event_stop() is called without PERF_EF_UPDATE flag, then\nperf_aux_output_end() is not called. A subsequent call to pt_event_start()\nwill call perf_aux_output_begin() again which violates the rule against\nnesting and triggers a WARNING in perf_aux_output_begin().\n\nOriginally, pt_event_stop() was never called without PERF_EF_UPDATE,\nbecause the only code paths to do so are from event overflow, and Intel PT\ndoes not do that.\n\nHowever the introduction of group throttling by commit 9734e25fbf5ae\n(\"perf: Fix the throttle logic for a group\") meant that an Intel PT event\ncould be throttled if it was part of a group. Throttling calls PMU\n -\u003estop() / -\u003estart() callbacks without flags.\n\nAn example is when AUX area sampling is used. The following commands\nhit the issue:\n\n echo 10000 \u003e /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_sample_rate\n\n perf record -F32000 --aux-sample -e \u0027{intel_pt//u,cycles:u}\u0027 \\\n -- bash -c \u0027for i in `seq 1 100000` ; do true ; done\u0027\n\nUse PERF_HES_UPTODATE to track whether perf_aux_output_begin() and\nperf_aux_output_end() are balanced. A cleared PERF_HES_UPTODATE bit\nindicates that an AUX output context is still open.\n\nAmend pt_event_start() / pt_event_stop() accordingly so that begin/end\nstay balanced:\n\n - In non-snapshot mode, stop() always closes the buffer (the buffer may\n have run out of space, and that accounting is done by the update), so\n a following start() opens a fresh one as before.\n\n - In snapshot/overwrite mode, stop() without PERF_EF_UPDATE leaves the\n buffer open so that pt_event_snapshot_aux() can still copy from it,\n and start() then only re-enables tracing instead of calling\n perf_aux_output_begin() again.\n\nNote that pt_event_del() calls pt_event_stop() with PERF_EF_UPDATE flag set\n(as is required by the documentation), so a final call to\nperf_aux_output_end() is assured."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-93275",
"lastModified": "2026-09-24T16:17:24.667",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-09-24T16:17:24.667",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2e17bf3a469a41457a3bc31b1f8fd66b6ce94a6d"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/304844b5545f444d523286da8228a1cbc46ffffa"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9b919fb5512f256e9e0604faf960b2bb98aab454"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cab5015ee3f25f789b4a368f2abfa65536576b78"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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