FKIE_CVE-2026-97432
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-24 17:17 - Updated: 2026-09-25 13:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: fix P2P-Device binding handling
Our binding handling for P2P-Device can run into the following
scenario, as observed by our testing:
- a station interface is connected on some channel
- the P2P-Device does a remain-on-channel (ROC) on that channel
- the ROC ends, and the P2P-Device is removed from the binding,
but the phy_ctxt pointer is left around as a PHY cache so we
don't need to recalibrate to the channel again and again in
case it's not shared
- a binding update by the station interface, even a removal,
will re-add the P2P-Device to the binding
- the P2P-Device is removed, which removes the PHY context, but
it's still in the binding so the firmware crashes
Since the P2P device is removed from the binding and only re-
added by unrelated code, but we want to keep the phy_ctxt around
as a cache for future ROC usage, fix it by adding a boolean that
indicates whether or not the P2P-Device should be added to the
binding, and handle that in the binding iterator. That way, the
station interface cannot re-add the P2P-Device to the binding
when that isn't active.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/binding.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/mac80211.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/mvm.h",
"drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/time-event.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "7be2fc679c8f657868988e41c0bb15bf5a454620",
"status": "affected",
"version": "84ef7cbe90e9e54c71c1da4e645ba34e1b33da77",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "b74e377cad9271950c57472867c469e4b5b2ff0c",
"status": "affected",
"version": "84ef7cbe90e9e54c71c1da4e645ba34e1b33da77",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "8ddf2212cfa5d9ef4fd289ce0d9dda728f2160b8",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "64c277f6329818db3124c9759cb9acf0f6070a54",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.5.12",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.7",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.6.2",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/binding.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/mac80211.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/mvm.h",
"drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/time-event.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.7"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.7",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.53",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: iwlwifi: mvm: fix P2P-Device binding handling\n\nOur binding handling for P2P-Device can run into the following\nscenario, as observed by our testing:\n\n - a station interface is connected on some channel\n - the P2P-Device does a remain-on-channel (ROC) on that channel\n - the ROC ends, and the P2P-Device is removed from the binding,\n but the phy_ctxt pointer is left around as a PHY cache so we\n don\u0027t need to recalibrate to the channel again and again in\n case it\u0027s not shared\n - a binding update by the station interface, even a removal,\n will re-add the P2P-Device to the binding\n - the P2P-Device is removed, which removes the PHY context, but\n it\u0027s still in the binding so the firmware crashes\n\nSince the P2P device is removed from the binding and only re-\nadded by unrelated code, but we want to keep the phy_ctxt around\nas a cache for future ROC usage, fix it by adding a boolean that\nindicates whether or not the P2P-Device should be added to the\nbinding, and handle that in the binding iterator. That way, the\nstation interface cannot re-add the P2P-Device to the binding\nwhen that isn\u0027t active."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-97432",
"lastModified": "2026-09-25T13:17:26.827",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-09-24T17:17:21.237",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7be2fc679c8f657868988e41c0bb15bf5a454620"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b74e377cad9271950c57472867c469e4b5b2ff0c"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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