FKIE_CVE-2026-97938
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-25 11:17 - Updated: 2026-09-25 11:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
reboot: fix cad_pid use-after-free race
cad_pid is a single kernel-wide struct pid pointer. proc_do_cad_pid()
reads it and passes it to pid_vnr() without protecting the lifetime of
the referenced struct pid. A concurrent writer can replace cad_pid and
drop the final reference to the old struct pid after the reader has
loaded the pointer but before pid_vnr() has finished dereferencing it,
causing a use-after-free.
kill_cad_pid() has the same lifetime race when it passes cad_pid to
kill_pid().
At the time this issue was reported, an unprivileged user could reach the
sysctl through user and PID namespaces because cad_pid was registered in
pid_table[]. Moving cad_pid back to the global reboot sysctl table
corrected that namespace and permission mismatch, but did not fix the
underlying lifetime race.
Fix this by treating cad_pid as an RCU-protected pointer at both read
sites and by waiting for a grace period before dropping the old reference
on the write side.
call_rcu(&old_pid->rcu, ...) cannot be used here because free_pid()
also queues pid->rcu; queueing the same rcu_head twice can corrupt the
RCU callback list.
Original KASAN crash stack:
kernel/pid.c:545 pid_nr_ns() # reads freed pid->level
kernel/pid.c:556 pid_vnr() # calls pid_nr_ns()
kernel/pid.c:775 proc_do_cad_pid() # calls pid_vnr(cad_pid)
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"include/linux/sched.h",
"include/linux/sched/signal.h",
"init/main.c",
"kernel/reboot.c",
"kernel/signal.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "ad72e2566643fff7f01666d845fb026898155e1f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "9ec52099e4b8678a60e9f93e41ad87885d64f3e6",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "9a17b0e053197a6a42cdc75e75a35b17aa662088",
"status": "affected",
"version": "9ec52099e4b8678a60e9f93e41ad87885d64f3e6",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "5a88f78df753993469dab4d1831f8fb4256a9468",
"status": "affected",
"version": "9ec52099e4b8678a60e9f93e41ad87885d64f3e6",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"include/linux/sched.h",
"include/linux/sched/signal.h",
"init/main.c",
"kernel/reboot.c",
"kernel/signal.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.6.19"
},
{
"lessThan": "2.6.19",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.53",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.7",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nreboot: fix cad_pid use-after-free race\n\ncad_pid is a single kernel-wide struct pid pointer. proc_do_cad_pid()\nreads it and passes it to pid_vnr() without protecting the lifetime of\nthe referenced struct pid. A concurrent writer can replace cad_pid and\ndrop the final reference to the old struct pid after the reader has\nloaded the pointer but before pid_vnr() has finished dereferencing it,\ncausing a use-after-free.\n\nkill_cad_pid() has the same lifetime race when it passes cad_pid to\nkill_pid().\n\nAt the time this issue was reported, an unprivileged user could reach the\nsysctl through user and PID namespaces because cad_pid was registered in\npid_table[]. Moving cad_pid back to the global reboot sysctl table\ncorrected that namespace and permission mismatch, but did not fix the\nunderlying lifetime race.\n\nFix this by treating cad_pid as an RCU-protected pointer at both read\nsites and by waiting for a grace period before dropping the old reference\non the write side.\n\ncall_rcu(\u0026old_pid-\u003ercu, ...) cannot be used here because free_pid()\nalso queues pid-\u003ercu; queueing the same rcu_head twice can corrupt the\nRCU callback list.\n\nOriginal KASAN crash stack:\n kernel/pid.c:545 pid_nr_ns() # reads freed pid-\u003elevel\n kernel/pid.c:556 pid_vnr() # calls pid_nr_ns()\n kernel/pid.c:775 proc_do_cad_pid() # calls pid_vnr(cad_pid)"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-97938",
"lastModified": "2026-09-25T11:17:21.193",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-09-25T11:17:21.193",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5a88f78df753993469dab4d1831f8fb4256a9468"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9a17b0e053197a6a42cdc75e75a35b17aa662088"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ad72e2566643fff7f01666d845fb026898155e1f"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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