FKIE_CVE-2026-98023
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-25 11:17 - Updated: 2026-09-25 15:18
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vxlan: reject dynamic fdb entries that reference a nexthop id
The commit cited in the Fixes tag allowed VXLAN FDB entries to point to
FDB nexthops so that overlay traffic could be load balanced across
multiple VTEPs. Such entries can only be configured from user space,
cannot be learned and cannot roam. They only make sense with a user space
control plane such as E-VPN where data plane learning is disabled.
Despite that, the VXLAN driver does not currently prevent such entries
from being configured with the "dynamic" flag. The per-nexthop FDB list
is only protected by the per-device hash lock, which is not sufficient
when two VXLAN devices point to the same FDB nexthop and therefore share
the list. Aging runs in softirq context without RTNL, so an entry deleted
by one device can race with an addition or deletion from the other,
leading to list corruption:
list_del corruption. next->prev should be ffff8881069d9548, but was
dead000000000122. (next=ffff8881069d9448)
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 90 at lib/list_debug.c:65
__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x1aa/0x210
...
vxlan_fdb_destroy+0x5b8/0xad0
vxlan_cleanup+0x328/0x450
call_timer_fn+0x2a/0x1c0
run_timer_softirq+0x18c/0x210
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in vxlan_fdb_destroy
Fix this by rejecting the bogus configuration of dynamic FDB entries that
point to FDB nexthops, both when created and when an existing entry is
updated. As such, the per-nexthop FDB list is only ever mutated under the
RTNL lock. Add test cases to make sure that this does not regress in the
future.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/vxlan/vxlan_core.c",
"tools/testing/selftests/net/fib_nexthops.sh"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "28f86eec851b7406a4bc6143f82aeba2882d9842",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1274e1cc42264d4e629841e4f182795cb0becfd2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "53359916ceb649b7e6947c8c2f669368a41c1354",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1274e1cc42264d4e629841e4f182795cb0becfd2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "3fa64d86fc64eda104e3e97721a12a42a2fd2073",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1274e1cc42264d4e629841e4f182795cb0becfd2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "98fc57d167446b95b4e719815fe79edef93f8e7a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1274e1cc42264d4e629841e4f182795cb0becfd2",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/vxlan/vxlan_core.c",
"tools/testing/selftests/net/fib_nexthops.sh"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.8"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.8",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.111",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.53",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.7",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvxlan: reject dynamic fdb entries that reference a nexthop id\n\nThe commit cited in the Fixes tag allowed VXLAN FDB entries to point to\nFDB nexthops so that overlay traffic could be load balanced across\nmultiple VTEPs. Such entries can only be configured from user space,\ncannot be learned and cannot roam. They only make sense with a user space\ncontrol plane such as E-VPN where data plane learning is disabled.\n\nDespite that, the VXLAN driver does not currently prevent such entries\nfrom being configured with the \"dynamic\" flag. The per-nexthop FDB list\nis only protected by the per-device hash lock, which is not sufficient\nwhen two VXLAN devices point to the same FDB nexthop and therefore share\nthe list. Aging runs in softirq context without RTNL, so an entry deleted\nby one device can race with an addition or deletion from the other,\nleading to list corruption:\n\n list_del corruption. next-\u003eprev should be ffff8881069d9548, but was\n dead000000000122. (next=ffff8881069d9448)\n WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 90 at lib/list_debug.c:65\n __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x1aa/0x210\n ...\n vxlan_fdb_destroy+0x5b8/0xad0\n vxlan_cleanup+0x328/0x450\n call_timer_fn+0x2a/0x1c0\n run_timer_softirq+0x18c/0x210\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in vxlan_fdb_destroy\n\nFix this by rejecting the bogus configuration of dynamic FDB entries that\npoint to FDB nexthops, both when created and when an existing entry is\nupdated. As such, the per-nexthop FDB list is only ever mutated under the\nRTNL lock. Add test cases to make sure that this does not regress in the\nfuture."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-98023",
"lastModified": "2026-09-25T15:18:03.823",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-09-25T11:17:30.873",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/28f86eec851b7406a4bc6143f82aeba2882d9842"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3fa64d86fc64eda104e3e97721a12a42a2fd2073"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/53359916ceb649b7e6947c8c2f669368a41c1354"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/98fc57d167446b95b4e719815fe79edef93f8e7a"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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