FKIE_CVE-2026-98044
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-25 11:17 - Updated: 2026-09-25 11:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject legacy packet loads from callbacks
check_ld_abs() models a failed BPF_LD_ABS or BPF_LD_IND in a
subprogram as an implicit return with R0 set to zero. It calls
prepare_func_exit() to explore this synthesized path.
When the load is reached directly from a synchronous callback,
prepare_func_exit() enforces the callback return contract and marks R0
precise. R0 is not derived from a real instruction on this path, so
precision backtracking reaches the callback call with R0 still requested
and triggers the "callback unexpected regs" verifier bug. A privileged
program loader can therefore cause a verifier warning and an -EFAULT
BPF_PROG_LOAD.
These legacy packet-load instructions are deprecated. Reject them from
callbacks rather than complicating their implicit-return model. Check all
active frames before constructing the implicit return so nested static
subprograms cannot hide the callback context.
Global functions are verified independently with a fresh frame zero, so
an active-frame check cannot identify a global function called from a
callback. Also check the complete subprogram call graph during stack-depth
validation and reject a function containing a legacy load when any caller
is a callback. This covers global and static descendants without making
has_ld_abs transitive, preserving its per-function BTF return-type check.
Ordinary uses outside callbacks remain supported.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"kernel/bpf/verifier.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "3484a99303912db62428494a9061212049027e57",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ce01a4e5cfac7adbe0be565f90cd32ecbb2f8337",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "bc489c0c9b8c86bd7fac42cfd1bb152f042fca56",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ee861486e377edc55361c08dcbceab3f6b6577bd",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "e7d28823c662128caae63f14e16bd394916c139b",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ee861486e377edc55361c08dcbceab3f6b6577bd",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "928d354ae3557e8f755a227e67be88034eb3cd7f",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "8a800497d9f6c2ec9c2c1ba7b71d0ac2ea7f7bbe",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "de1055e7f9e67af32b1f3376066272b04e5223c0",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "37ad2bb11e9de92cb7b94548705eeedd87f7d392",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "8674e2db06cff6b50f2216eed9a761d15425bb34",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "d846d83bdacbd8f14fc45c63b8c1d22608452e1c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.18.53",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.18.42",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.11",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.10.265",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.16",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.15.216",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.1.183",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.7",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.6.148",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.13",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.12.101",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "7.1",
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.0.10",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"kernel/bpf/verifier.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.1"
},
{
"lessThan": "7.1",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.53",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.7",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Reject legacy packet loads from callbacks\n\ncheck_ld_abs() models a failed BPF_LD_ABS or BPF_LD_IND in a\nsubprogram as an implicit return with R0 set to zero. It calls\nprepare_func_exit() to explore this synthesized path.\n\nWhen the load is reached directly from a synchronous callback,\nprepare_func_exit() enforces the callback return contract and marks R0\nprecise. R0 is not derived from a real instruction on this path, so\nprecision backtracking reaches the callback call with R0 still requested\nand triggers the \"callback unexpected regs\" verifier bug. A privileged\nprogram loader can therefore cause a verifier warning and an -EFAULT\nBPF_PROG_LOAD.\n\nThese legacy packet-load instructions are deprecated. Reject them from\ncallbacks rather than complicating their implicit-return model. Check all\nactive frames before constructing the implicit return so nested static\nsubprograms cannot hide the callback context.\n\nGlobal functions are verified independently with a fresh frame zero, so\nan active-frame check cannot identify a global function called from a\ncallback. Also check the complete subprogram call graph during stack-depth\nvalidation and reject a function containing a legacy load when any caller\nis a callback. This covers global and static descendants without making\nhas_ld_abs transitive, preserving its per-function BTF return-type check.\nOrdinary uses outside callbacks remain supported."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-98044",
"lastModified": "2026-09-25T11:17:33.200",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-09-25T11:17:33.200",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3484a99303912db62428494a9061212049027e57"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bc489c0c9b8c86bd7fac42cfd1bb152f042fca56"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e7d28823c662128caae63f14e16bd394916c139b"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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