FKIE_CVE-2026-98061
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-25 11:17 - Updated: 2026-09-25 11:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject tail calls directly from callback frames
A tail call from a non-zero frame is modeled as a return from that frame.
The verifier makes R0 unknown and calls prepare_func_exit() for the taken
branch.
When the current frame is a synchronous callback, prepare_func_exit()
enforces the callback return-value contract and marks R0 precise. Since the
tail-call path synthesized R0 rather than deriving it from an instruction,
precision backtracking reaches the callback-calling instruction with R0
still requested and triggers the "callback unexpected regs" verifier bug.
A CAP_BPF task can therefore cause a WARN and an -EFAULT BPF_PROG_LOAD.
Tail calls reachable from callbacks are already rejected later by
check_max_stack_depth(). Reject a tail call made directly by a callback
before constructing the inconsistent return state, using the existing
diagnostic. Tail calls from ordinary subprograms keep their current
behavior.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"kernel/bpf/verifier.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "617c8266e49f45747f71e74177646a63f72b7025",
"status": "affected",
"version": "a6c22c91b6284e4713c0cf5b20ab3c9c71b77ae8",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "96d31b28263c429a56e4de85bcf744a5c320b3a3",
"status": "affected",
"version": "e3245f8990431950d20631c72236d4e8cb2dcde8",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "266aa4ad0b2e82397cd9045752c9bff03d98eddd",
"status": "affected",
"version": "e3245f8990431950d20631c72236d4e8cb2dcde8",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.18.53",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.18.2",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"kernel/bpf/verifier.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.19"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.19",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.53",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.7",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Reject tail calls directly from callback frames\n\nA tail call from a non-zero frame is modeled as a return from that frame.\nThe verifier makes R0 unknown and calls prepare_func_exit() for the taken\nbranch.\n\nWhen the current frame is a synchronous callback, prepare_func_exit()\nenforces the callback return-value contract and marks R0 precise. Since the\ntail-call path synthesized R0 rather than deriving it from an instruction,\nprecision backtracking reaches the callback-calling instruction with R0\nstill requested and triggers the \"callback unexpected regs\" verifier bug.\nA CAP_BPF task can therefore cause a WARN and an -EFAULT BPF_PROG_LOAD.\n\nTail calls reachable from callbacks are already rejected later by\ncheck_max_stack_depth(). Reject a tail call made directly by a callback\nbefore constructing the inconsistent return state, using the existing\ndiagnostic. Tail calls from ordinary subprograms keep their current\nbehavior."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-98061",
"lastModified": "2026-09-25T11:17:35.110",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-09-25T11:17:35.110",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/266aa4ad0b2e82397cd9045752c9bff03d98eddd"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/617c8266e49f45747f71e74177646a63f72b7025"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/96d31b28263c429a56e4de85bcf744a5c320b3a3"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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