FKIE_CVE-2026-98071
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-25 11:17 - Updated: 2026-09-25 11:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/rds: clear cp_flags bits individually in rds_conn_path_reset()
rds_conn_path_reset() wipes the whole flag word with a plain
cp->cp_flags = 0 store. Every other accessor of that word uses
atomic bitops, and some of them can run concurrently with the reset:
RDS_LL_SEND_FULL is set from rds_send_xmit() and cleared from the
transport completion paths, neither of which holds anything that
excludes the shutdown worker. A plain store racing an atomic
read-modify-write on the same word is a data race, and whichever
side loses has its update silently discarded.
Clear the two bits the reset is actually responsible for instead.
RDS_IN_XMIT and RDS_RECV_REFILL need no store at all here: they
belong to the caller, rds_conn_shutdown(), which waits for both to be
clear before calling the transport shutdown and this reset.
This also gives every bit in cp_flags a single well-defined writer
discipline, which the following patches rely on when they turn
RDS_IN_XMIT and RDS_RECV_REFILL into bit locks held across the
teardown: a blanket store mid-teardown would destroy lock ownership
that an atomic clear preserves.
Oracle UEK carries the same conversion ("net/rds: Preserve essential
connection state flags"), motivated by its asynchronous shutdown
state machine, whose progress and destroy flags must survive the
reset. UEK's variant also clears RDS_IN_XMIT and RDS_RECV_REFILL
because there the reset runs as the final step of a teardown that
owns both bits, making those clears its unlock. Upstream that
release belongs in rds_conn_shutdown(): once a later patch in this
series turns the two bits into locks held across the teardown, ending
ownership needs release semantics and a wake-up that a plain clear
inside the reset would not provide.
Based on Oracle UEK commit "net/rds: Preserve essential connection
state flags" by Gerd Rausch.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/rds/connection.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "ed3ee0ac4aafda50c2f4381eb973beefeb7879ac",
"status": "affected",
"version": "00e0f34c616603ba6500f41943cbf89eb4a8a5be",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "6b8d7563c28b8112e6e54abe413b028ef3f8c549",
"status": "affected",
"version": "00e0f34c616603ba6500f41943cbf89eb4a8a5be",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "cb62aa8f04655a4df487913949719c0a1266ed73",
"status": "affected",
"version": "00e0f34c616603ba6500f41943cbf89eb4a8a5be",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "103c4b13c4f50322910078d1c02f29334a574122",
"status": "affected",
"version": "00e0f34c616603ba6500f41943cbf89eb4a8a5be",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/rds/connection.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.6.30"
},
{
"lessThan": "2.6.30",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.111",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.53",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.7",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/rds: clear cp_flags bits individually in rds_conn_path_reset()\n\nrds_conn_path_reset() wipes the whole flag word with a plain\ncp-\u003ecp_flags = 0 store. Every other accessor of that word uses\natomic bitops, and some of them can run concurrently with the reset:\nRDS_LL_SEND_FULL is set from rds_send_xmit() and cleared from the\ntransport completion paths, neither of which holds anything that\nexcludes the shutdown worker. A plain store racing an atomic\nread-modify-write on the same word is a data race, and whichever\nside loses has its update silently discarded.\n\nClear the two bits the reset is actually responsible for instead.\nRDS_IN_XMIT and RDS_RECV_REFILL need no store at all here: they\nbelong to the caller, rds_conn_shutdown(), which waits for both to be\nclear before calling the transport shutdown and this reset.\n\nThis also gives every bit in cp_flags a single well-defined writer\ndiscipline, which the following patches rely on when they turn\nRDS_IN_XMIT and RDS_RECV_REFILL into bit locks held across the\nteardown: a blanket store mid-teardown would destroy lock ownership\nthat an atomic clear preserves.\n\nOracle UEK carries the same conversion (\"net/rds: Preserve essential\nconnection state flags\"), motivated by its asynchronous shutdown\nstate machine, whose progress and destroy flags must survive the\nreset. UEK\u0027s variant also clears RDS_IN_XMIT and RDS_RECV_REFILL\nbecause there the reset runs as the final step of a teardown that\nowns both bits, making those clears its unlock. Upstream that\nrelease belongs in rds_conn_shutdown(): once a later patch in this\nseries turns the two bits into locks held across the teardown, ending\nownership needs release semantics and a wake-up that a plain clear\ninside the reset would not provide.\n\nBased on Oracle UEK commit \"net/rds: Preserve essential connection\nstate flags\" by Gerd Rausch."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-98071",
"lastModified": "2026-09-25T11:17:36.327",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-09-25T11:17:36.327",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/103c4b13c4f50322910078d1c02f29334a574122"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6b8d7563c28b8112e6e54abe413b028ef3f8c549"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cb62aa8f04655a4df487913949719c0a1266ed73"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ed3ee0ac4aafda50c2f4381eb973beefeb7879ac"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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