FKIE_CVE-2026-98075
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-25 11:17 - Updated: 2026-09-25 11:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: reject BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC reference to the main program
fixups.c:jit_subprogs() rewrites BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads to contain real
function addresses. This function is invoked from bpf_jit_subprogs()
only when env->subprog_cnt > 1. Meaning that for any program like
below:
int main(void *ctx) {
void *ptr = main;
...
bpf_timer_set_callback(..., ptr);
...
}
The 'ptr' won't be ever converted to contain an address.
In combination with e.g. bpf_timer_set_callback() this would lead to a
function call at a bogus address.
Instead of complicating the implementation, just assume that no useful
program needs main to be a sync or async callback and reject
BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads for the main subprogram.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"kernel/bpf/verifier.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "118212417ba0120d99f84154799f8880f07411f4",
"status": "affected",
"version": "69c087ba6225b574afb6e505b72cb75242a3d844",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "d6c39774ae093c9f7009cc4ae918f18fc1af7ae7",
"status": "affected",
"version": "69c087ba6225b574afb6e505b72cb75242a3d844",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "92f0bd0e2b632c6565ac2214a4d7d2ed37e5b9f6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "69c087ba6225b574afb6e505b72cb75242a3d844",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "374b2c5561db80fcdd7cdce44af37a49416f61c7",
"status": "affected",
"version": "69c087ba6225b574afb6e505b72cb75242a3d844",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"kernel/bpf/verifier.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.13"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.13",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.111",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.53",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.7",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: reject BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC reference to the main program\n\nfixups.c:jit_subprogs() rewrites BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads to contain real\nfunction addresses. This function is invoked from bpf_jit_subprogs()\nonly when env-\u003esubprog_cnt \u003e 1. Meaning that for any program like\nbelow:\n\n int main(void *ctx) {\n void *ptr = main;\n ...\n bpf_timer_set_callback(..., ptr);\n ...\n }\n\nThe \u0027ptr\u0027 won\u0027t be ever converted to contain an address.\nIn combination with e.g. bpf_timer_set_callback() this would lead to a\nfunction call at a bogus address.\n\nInstead of complicating the implementation, just assume that no useful\nprogram needs main to be a sync or async callback and reject\nBPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads for the main subprogram."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-98075",
"lastModified": "2026-09-25T11:17:36.847",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-09-25T11:17:36.847",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/118212417ba0120d99f84154799f8880f07411f4"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/374b2c5561db80fcdd7cdce44af37a49416f61c7"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/92f0bd0e2b632c6565ac2214a4d7d2ed37e5b9f6"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d6c39774ae093c9f7009cc4ae918f18fc1af7ae7"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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