FKIE_CVE-2026-98076
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-25 11:17 - Updated: 2026-09-25 11:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing/probes: Fix use-after-free on field name/type of events with multiple probes
The fields of a probe-based dynamic event (kprobe, uprobe, eprobe and
fprobe events) are created in traceprobe_define_arg_fields() by handing
the probe_arg name/type strings to trace_define_field(), which only
stores the pointers without copying. Those strings are owned by the
trace_probe and are freed when that probe is removed.
An event can have several probes attached. The field list is defined
only once, by the first probe that registers the event, but it is kept
alive by any surviving sibling probe. Deleting just that first probe by
symbol -
# primary A: fields are defined from A's args
echo 'p:kprobes/ev vfs_read a1=$arg1' > kprobe_events
# append B: shares A's event call
echo 'p:kprobes/ev vfs_write a1=$arg1' >> kprobe_events
# delete only A (matched by symbol), B survives
echo '-:kprobes/ev vfs_read' >> kprobe_events
frees A's args (trace_probe_cleanup() -> traceprobe_free_probe_arg()),
but trace_probe_unlink() keeps the trace_probe_event because the probe
list is not empty. The event call stays registered via B while its
fields now reference freed memory. Any field lookup then reads it, e.g.
echo 'a1 == 1' > events/kprobes/ev/filter
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in strcmp+0xa7/0xb0
Call Trace:
strcmp
trace_find_event_field
parse_pred
process_preds
create_filter
apply_event_filter
event_filter_write
field->name references parg->name (kstrdup'd, freed with the probe) and,
for array arguments, field->type references parg->fmt (kmalloc'd, freed
with the probe) - the scalar type otherwise points at the static
fmttype rodata, which is safe.
Have traceprobe_define_arg_fields() duplicate the name and type strings
and anchor the copies on the trace_probe_event, which embeds the event
call and outlives every individual probe; trace_probe_event_free()
releases them.
The reproducer above triggers reliably; the field lookup and the delete
both run under event_mutex, so this is a dangling reference after
removal rather than a race.
The issue was found by the autokbug dynamic kernel fuzzer at Tencent
Yunding Lab.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"kernel/trace/trace_probe.c",
"kernel/trace/trace_probe.h"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "68ae584169c7a41fc9bc4677c1d368983cf44b21",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ca89bc071d5e4e981dcc52e0ca90f4500d332e42",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "411c9080a776577664531b4f7d3ee53b7a747ba8",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ca89bc071d5e4e981dcc52e0ca90f4500d332e42",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "178ff2e011e21fbebdf57f5d58a408fe59136d82",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ca89bc071d5e4e981dcc52e0ca90f4500d332e42",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "86b7a239ec6b14a7544200ede85474c6f5526049",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ca89bc071d5e4e981dcc52e0ca90f4500d332e42",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"kernel/trace/trace_probe.c",
"kernel/trace/trace_probe.h"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.4"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.4",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.111",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.53",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.7",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntracing/probes: Fix use-after-free on field name/type of events with multiple probes\n\nThe fields of a probe-based dynamic event (kprobe, uprobe, eprobe and\nfprobe events) are created in traceprobe_define_arg_fields() by handing\nthe probe_arg name/type strings to trace_define_field(), which only\nstores the pointers without copying. Those strings are owned by the\ntrace_probe and are freed when that probe is removed.\n\nAn event can have several probes attached. The field list is defined\nonly once, by the first probe that registers the event, but it is kept\nalive by any surviving sibling probe. Deleting just that first probe by\nsymbol -\n\n # primary A: fields are defined from A\u0027s args\n echo \u0027p:kprobes/ev vfs_read a1=$arg1\u0027 \u003e kprobe_events\n # append B: shares A\u0027s event call\n echo \u0027p:kprobes/ev vfs_write a1=$arg1\u0027 \u003e\u003e kprobe_events\n # delete only A (matched by symbol), B survives\n echo \u0027-:kprobes/ev vfs_read\u0027 \u003e\u003e kprobe_events\n\nfrees A\u0027s args (trace_probe_cleanup() -\u003e traceprobe_free_probe_arg()),\nbut trace_probe_unlink() keeps the trace_probe_event because the probe\nlist is not empty. The event call stays registered via B while its\nfields now reference freed memory. Any field lookup then reads it, e.g.\n\n echo \u0027a1 == 1\u0027 \u003e events/kprobes/ev/filter\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in strcmp+0xa7/0xb0\n Call Trace:\n strcmp\n trace_find_event_field\n parse_pred\n process_preds\n create_filter\n apply_event_filter\n event_filter_write\n\nfield-\u003ename references parg-\u003ename (kstrdup\u0027d, freed with the probe) and,\nfor array arguments, field-\u003etype references parg-\u003efmt (kmalloc\u0027d, freed\nwith the probe) - the scalar type otherwise points at the static\nfmttype rodata, which is safe.\n\nHave traceprobe_define_arg_fields() duplicate the name and type strings\nand anchor the copies on the trace_probe_event, which embeds the event\ncall and outlives every individual probe; trace_probe_event_free()\nreleases them.\n\nThe reproducer above triggers reliably; the field lookup and the delete\nboth run under event_mutex, so this is a dangling reference after\nremoval rather than a race.\n\nThe issue was found by the autokbug dynamic kernel fuzzer at Tencent\nYunding Lab."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-98076",
"lastModified": "2026-09-25T11:17:36.963",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-09-25T11:17:36.963",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/178ff2e011e21fbebdf57f5d58a408fe59136d82"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/411c9080a776577664531b4f7d3ee53b7a747ba8"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/68ae584169c7a41fc9bc4677c1d368983cf44b21"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/86b7a239ec6b14a7544200ede85474c6f5526049"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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