FKIE_CVE-2026-98156
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-25 11:17 - Updated: 2026-09-25 15:18
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/virtio: use the DMA API for resource backing on Xen
On a Xen PV domain page addresses bear no relation to the real machine
addresses the host would have to use to reach it.
virtio_ring.c handles this correctly, vring_use_map_api() returns true
for any xen_domain() regardless of VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM.
virtio-gpu makes the same decision independently, but its copy
looks only at the feature bit:
bool use_dma_api = !virtio_has_dma_quirk(vgdev->vdev);
QEMU does not set iommu_platform on virtio-vga by default, so
VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM is not negotiated, use_dma_api is false, and
virtio_gpu_object_shmem_init() describes the framebuffer's backing pages
to the host with sg_phys(). Those are guest-physical addresses. In a PV
domain they resolve, on the host side, to pages belonging to some other
domain, so the host scans out unrelated memory.
Move the decision into virtio_gpu_use_dma_api() and give it the
xen_domain() check, like vring_use_map_api() has. This
additionally enables the dma_sync_sgtable_for_device() calls in
virtgpu_vq.c, which are required for correctness whenever swiotlb
is in play.
Reproduced with a Xen 4.21 PV dom0 nested inside QEMU 8.2 with
virtio-vga, on both a distro 6.8 kernel and 6.18 LTS. A PVH dom0
works fine and doesn't need this fix because it is identity-mapped,
only PV dom0s are affected.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_drv.h",
"drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_object.c",
"drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_vq.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "93c557e947ef0040004b1ac6a1c1265d79a957e1",
"status": "affected",
"version": "a3b815f09bb846255c458c181b8a5b1cc66891b4",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "455184dbe9652d01470d3c5cf5edd09a7a673a99",
"status": "affected",
"version": "a3b815f09bb846255c458c181b8a5b1cc66891b4",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "6a736d2f9d0c6e6217fe7532bc4c50ceca71db78",
"status": "affected",
"version": "a3b815f09bb846255c458c181b8a5b1cc66891b4",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_drv.h",
"drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_object.c",
"drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_vq.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.20"
},
{
"lessThan": "4.20",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.53",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.7",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/virtio: use the DMA API for resource backing on Xen\n\nOn a Xen PV domain page addresses bear no relation to the real machine\naddresses the host would have to use to reach it.\nvirtio_ring.c handles this correctly, vring_use_map_api() returns true\nfor any xen_domain() regardless of VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM.\n\nvirtio-gpu makes the same decision independently, but its copy\nlooks only at the feature bit:\n\n\tbool use_dma_api = !virtio_has_dma_quirk(vgdev-\u003evdev);\n\nQEMU does not set iommu_platform on virtio-vga by default, so\nVIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM is not negotiated, use_dma_api is false, and\nvirtio_gpu_object_shmem_init() describes the framebuffer\u0027s backing pages\nto the host with sg_phys(). Those are guest-physical addresses. In a PV\ndomain they resolve, on the host side, to pages belonging to some other\ndomain, so the host scans out unrelated memory.\n\nMove the decision into virtio_gpu_use_dma_api() and give it the\nxen_domain() check, like vring_use_map_api() has. This\nadditionally enables the dma_sync_sgtable_for_device() calls in\nvirtgpu_vq.c, which are required for correctness whenever swiotlb\nis in play.\n\nReproduced with a Xen 4.21 PV dom0 nested inside QEMU 8.2 with\nvirtio-vga, on both a distro 6.8 kernel and 6.18 LTS. A PVH dom0\nworks fine and doesn\u0027t need this fix because it is identity-mapped,\nonly PV dom0s are affected."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-98156",
"lastModified": "2026-09-25T15:18:07.240",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.1,
"impactScore": 6.0,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-09-25T11:17:47.280",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/455184dbe9652d01470d3c5cf5edd09a7a673a99"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6a736d2f9d0c6e6217fe7532bc4c50ceca71db78"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/93c557e947ef0040004b1ac6a1c1265d79a957e1"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
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They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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