FKIE_CVE-2026-98200
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-06 09:18 - Updated: 2026-10-06 09:18
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (hp-wmi-sensors) Fix use-after-free in fungible_show()
nsensor->current_state is dynamically replaced as the sensor's state
changes. update_numeric_sensor_from_wobj() does this by freeing the
old string and installing a new one:
if (strcmp(trimmed, nsensor->current_state)) {
new_string = hp_wmi_strdup(dev, trimmed);
if (new_string) {
devm_kfree(dev, nsensor->current_state);
nsensor->current_state = new_string;
}
}
This function is only ever called from hp_wmi_update_info() while
state->lock is held, so the free-and-replace itself is properly
serialized against concurrent updates.
fungible_show(), however, reads the same pointer after the lock has
already been dropped:
err = hp_wmi_update_info(state, info);
if (err)
return err;
switch (prop) {
...
case HP_WMI_PROPERTY_CURRENT_STATE:
seq_printf(seqf, "%s\n", nsensor->current_state);
break;
hp_wmi_update_info() takes state->lock internally and releases it
before returning, so by the time fungible_show() dereferences
nsensor->current_state in seq_printf(), no lock is held. Two
processes reading a sensor's current_state debugfs entry at
overlapping times (or one reading it while another read of the same
sensor triggers a refresh) can race: one thread's seq_printf() can
be part-way through printing the string at the moment another
thread's call into update_numeric_sensor_from_wobj() frees it with
devm_kfree() and installs a new pointer, causing a use-after-free
read.
Take state->lock around the read in fungible_show() as well, so it
can never run concurrently with the free-and-replace in
update_numeric_sensor_from_wobj().
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/hwmon/hp-wmi-sensors.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "b6b2a638aa36c441b2c8d0b6bd8ed2bb9701e795",
"status": "affected",
"version": "23902f98f8d4811ab84dde6419569a5b374f8122",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "f59ecfd2c58bace39538f3fff7f43788b3fdb539",
"status": "affected",
"version": "23902f98f8d4811ab84dde6419569a5b374f8122",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "72c85149794a1ccf8d718ffed1521106b5d31968",
"status": "affected",
"version": "23902f98f8d4811ab84dde6419569a5b374f8122",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "9c1e65bc79ff104914b11e6ad972139296ec86fe",
"status": "affected",
"version": "23902f98f8d4811ab84dde6419569a5b374f8122",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "e6cb0b4d4ecb8e71fd2200d907ab2e9663356f69",
"status": "affected",
"version": "23902f98f8d4811ab84dde6419569a5b374f8122",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/hwmon/hp-wmi-sensors.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.5"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.5",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.158",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.112",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.54",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.8",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc4",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nhwmon: (hp-wmi-sensors) Fix use-after-free in fungible_show()\n\nnsensor-\u003ecurrent_state is dynamically replaced as the sensor\u0027s state\nchanges. update_numeric_sensor_from_wobj() does this by freeing the\nold string and installing a new one:\n\n\tif (strcmp(trimmed, nsensor-\u003ecurrent_state)) {\n\t\tnew_string = hp_wmi_strdup(dev, trimmed);\n\t\tif (new_string) {\n\t\t\tdevm_kfree(dev, nsensor-\u003ecurrent_state);\n\t\t\tnsensor-\u003ecurrent_state = new_string;\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\nThis function is only ever called from hp_wmi_update_info() while\nstate-\u003elock is held, so the free-and-replace itself is properly\nserialized against concurrent updates.\n\nfungible_show(), however, reads the same pointer after the lock has\nalready been dropped:\n\n\terr = hp_wmi_update_info(state, info);\n\tif (err)\n\t\treturn err;\n\n\tswitch (prop) {\n\t...\n\tcase HP_WMI_PROPERTY_CURRENT_STATE:\n\t\tseq_printf(seqf, \"%s\\n\", nsensor-\u003ecurrent_state);\n\t\tbreak;\n\nhp_wmi_update_info() takes state-\u003elock internally and releases it\nbefore returning, so by the time fungible_show() dereferences\nnsensor-\u003ecurrent_state in seq_printf(), no lock is held. Two\nprocesses reading a sensor\u0027s current_state debugfs entry at\noverlapping times (or one reading it while another read of the same\nsensor triggers a refresh) can race: one thread\u0027s seq_printf() can\nbe part-way through printing the string at the moment another\nthread\u0027s call into update_numeric_sensor_from_wobj() frees it with\ndevm_kfree() and installs a new pointer, causing a use-after-free\nread.\n\nTake state-\u003elock around the read in fungible_show() as well, so it\ncan never run concurrently with the free-and-replace in\nupdate_numeric_sensor_from_wobj()."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-98200",
"lastModified": "2026-10-06T09:18:05.747",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-10-06T09:18:05.747",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/72c85149794a1ccf8d718ffed1521106b5d31968"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9c1e65bc79ff104914b11e6ad972139296ec86fe"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b6b2a638aa36c441b2c8d0b6bd8ed2bb9701e795"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e6cb0b4d4ecb8e71fd2200d907ab2e9663356f69"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f59ecfd2c58bace39538f3fff7f43788b3fdb539"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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