FKIE_CVE-2026-98274
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-06 09:18 - Updated: 2026-10-06 09:18
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: psp: avoid conflicts with skb->decrypted and sk_validate_xmit_skb()
PSP conflicts with TLS ULP in its usage of both skb->decrypted and
sk->sk_validate_xmit_skb().
Make PSP mutually exclusive with TLS ULP, the only other user of either
of these. As other users of skb->decrypted come along, they can be added
to sk_has_decrypt_user(). It would make sense to also assert that
sk->sk_validate_xmit_skb() is also NULL in both of these setup paths for
similar future proofing, but the PSP listener/sk_clone() path is still
broken and it could be seen as a regression to not allow rx assoc to run
on a child of a listener socket with PSP tx assoc state.
Include all TCP ULPs in the sk_has_decrypt_user() check, even though TLS
is the only one that conflicts with PSP via the decrypted bit. This is
intentional because PSP was not designed to be used with ULPs. It is
best to close off surface area that may make bugs reachable, until
someone wishes to design and test an actual user of PSP with ULPs.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"include/net/sock.h",
"net/core/sock.c",
"net/ipv4/tcp_ulp.c",
"net/psp/psp_sock.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "a13cca5ba5375f13cbdab545abfb5e288bef3f78",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6b46ca260e2290e3453d1355ab5b6d283d73d780",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "c8c8c18862337c469e325c207601de3279847809",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6b46ca260e2290e3453d1355ab5b6d283d73d780",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "a41f24c612c3f5139a3143307eb85bbcf1bd4d07",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6b46ca260e2290e3453d1355ab5b6d283d73d780",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"include/net/sock.h",
"net/core/sock.c",
"net/ipv4/tcp_ulp.c",
"net/psp/psp_sock.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.18"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.18",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.54",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.8",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc4",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: psp: avoid conflicts with skb-\u003edecrypted and sk_validate_xmit_skb()\n\nPSP conflicts with TLS ULP in its usage of both skb-\u003edecrypted and\nsk-\u003esk_validate_xmit_skb().\n\nMake PSP mutually exclusive with TLS ULP, the only other user of either\nof these. As other users of skb-\u003edecrypted come along, they can be added\nto sk_has_decrypt_user(). It would make sense to also assert that\nsk-\u003esk_validate_xmit_skb() is also NULL in both of these setup paths for\nsimilar future proofing, but the PSP listener/sk_clone() path is still\nbroken and it could be seen as a regression to not allow rx assoc to run\non a child of a listener socket with PSP tx assoc state.\n\nInclude all TCP ULPs in the sk_has_decrypt_user() check, even though TLS\nis the only one that conflicts with PSP via the decrypted bit. This is\nintentional because PSP was not designed to be used with ULPs. It is\nbest to close off surface area that may make bugs reachable, until\nsomeone wishes to design and test an actual user of PSP with ULPs."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-98274",
"lastModified": "2026-10-06T09:18:17.077",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-10-06T09:18:17.077",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a13cca5ba5375f13cbdab545abfb5e288bef3f78"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a41f24c612c3f5139a3143307eb85bbcf1bd4d07"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c8c8c18862337c469e325c207601de3279847809"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
Loading…
Loading…
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Loading…
Loading…
The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Loading…
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
Loading…